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‘Indirect expropriation’ is not an uncommon concept in international law. It 
generally concerns situations in which State regulations impact upon the use of 
private property in a manner tantamount to direct expropriation. However, the 
conduct and the extent in which State regulation can constitute an indirect 
expropriation subject to compensation obligations under international investment 
treaties are still unclear in international law, and the problems of legal indeterminacy 
in the area of indirect expropriation have resulted in inconsistent and incoherent legal 
interpretations in a series of investment arbitrations. 
In order to develop a more coherent approach with the potential to reduce the 
indeterminacy of indirect expropriation provisions, this thesis argues that, 
considering the public law nature of international investment treaties, vague indirect 
expropriation terms contained within those treaties should be interpreted in light of 
legal doctrines drawn from public law principles under both domestic and 
international law. In international law, relevant rules applicable between the parties 
comprise the context for treaty interpretation, as set out in article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These are ‘general principles of law’ 
recognized as sources of international law under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. To identify the relevant public law principles, the 
thesis focuses on resource materials, doctrinal analysis and case studies drawn from 
domestic public laws and national jurisprudence developed by the US Supreme 
Court, the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional and Administrative 
Court of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Supreme Court of Mexico. The diversity 
of selected jurisdictions is to ensure the comprehensiveness and generalizability of 
the compared principles. 
Analysis of the findings shows that the courts in selected jurisdictions affirm the 
powers of governments to regulate private properties for public interests. However, 
as societies evolve economically, the State’s rights to interfere with private property 
become more limited, and governments can exercise their powers only within a 
ii 
limited bound of permissible legislative and bureaucratic discretion. Courts in the 
selected jurisdictions generally affirm the emergence of the ‘proportionality 
doctrine’ as a tool to assess the regulatory interference measure imposed. Indirect 
expropriation is then typically subject to compensation obligation, first, when a 
regulation deprives the property owner of all property rights or all economically-
viable uses; and second, when the regulatory interference falls short of full 
deprivation of property rights, but fails to meet the ‘proportionality test’ and imposes 
an ‘excessive burden’ borne by the property owner. In the latter case, the amount of 
compensation is not subject to full market price, but rather varied according to the 
nature of measure and circumstances in each case.  
Current national jurisprudence demonstrates that the ‘principle of proportionality’ 
can provide a coherent framework for legal analysis of expropriation, and enable an 
adjudicator to scrutinize all kinds of regulatory interferences that expropriate private 
property, without impeding democratic processes on public policy processes within a 
country. It can provide important guidance for treaty drafters searching for a less 
indeterminate model clause on indirect expropriation. The ‘proportionality doctrine’ 
enables a State to interfere with private property for public policy purposes, 
providing that the measure is necessary, suitable to the goals pursued and non-
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A. Background Information 
The lack of clarity within the definitions of “Indirect expropriation” provisions under 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other investment treaties (e.g. NAFTA 
Chapter 11) has long been discussed. The type of government conduct that is 
considered to be an indirect expropriation is surrounded by controversy. While direct 
expropriation normally concerns a forced transfer of property from an individual to 
the State, indirect expropriation is not easily determined and can be varied in nature. 
Whilst it generally refers to government intervention having an equivalent effect to 
the outright taking of private property, exactly which governmental interferences 
designed to serve public interests qualify as indirect expropriation is often uncertain.  
As a result of unclearly defined legal doctrine as well as the vagueness of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ texts (BITs) regarding the phrase ’indirect expropriation’, a 
series of international tribunals have applied different conceptual frameworks to 
distinguish between normal public policies, on the one hand, and indirect 
expropriation qualifying for compensation under investment treaties, on the other.
1
 
Inconsistencies in applying this term have consequently hindered the development of 
jurisprudence in this area of law.
2
 
In addition to the problem of making the meaning of this abstract language unclear, 
the current standards for investment protection have also been blamed for not clearly 
integrating other international obligations; such as international human rights and 
environmental protection obligations by which a country is bound.
3
 This problem 
                                                 
1
 There were cases which ended up with opposing outcomes even though a different group of 
arbitrators faced the same set of facts CME v Czech Republic (Partial Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral 
Tribunal, 13 September 2001) and Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb, Final Award, 160–
165, 204, 235 (Sept. 3, 2001). 
2
 Peter D Isakoff, 'Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments' (2013) 
3(2) Global Business Law Review 189, 196-200. 
3
 Luke Eric Peterson, 'Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the Role of Human 
Rights Law withi Investor-State Arbitration' (Rights & Democracy, 2009). 
2 
further adds to the inconsistency within investment treaty jurisprudence pertaining to 
the rights of host State governments to take necessary measures. While some 
arbitrators pay no attention to State intent or motivation to regulate for public 
interests, and focus merely on effects-based issues,
4
 other arbitrators interpret 
expropriation clauses as endorsing the public welfare purposes of State actions.
5
 This 
exacerbates conflicting interpretations of legal texts between the investment treaties 
and other branches of international law that the disputing parties have to respect.  
Furthermore, the legal standards used by arbitral tribunals are arguably more 
expansive than the legal requirements stipulated under the domestic laws of some 
countries.
6
 As Been and Beauvais stated, some arbitral tribunals interpret 
compensation requirements under expropriation clauses in a manner that far exceed 
the substantive scope of the US takings standard.
7
 This arguably imposes extra 
obligations on a State to compensate whenever it implements regulations that 
interfere with investor’s benefits, or the investment’s value, even though the 
contentious regulations were implemented for public interests and were not 
discriminatory under domestic law. The ambiguity and uncertainty of the term 
‘indirect expropriation’ under international law is, therefore, problematic. As 
Peterson claims, the broadly defined term of ‘indirect expropriation’ allows an 
arbitral tribunal at its own discretion to ‘draw the line between legitimate 




In contrast to international law, the concept of indirect expropriation is not a totally 
new thing within the context of domestic public law. It largely concerns a situation 
in which a State’s regulations restrict the use of private property to the extent that 
                                                 
4
 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB 
(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v 
Argentine Republic (Award) (2007) ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3); Sempra Energy v The Argentine 
Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/02/16, 28 September 2007). 
5
 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States (Award) (ICSID Arbitral 
Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003); EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador 
(Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, Case No UN 3481, 3 February 2006); Methanex 
Corporation v United States (Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005). 
6
 Vicki Been and Joel C Beauvais, 'The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine' (2003) 78(1) NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 30, 59-78. 
7
 Ibid, 37. 
8
 Peterson, above n 3, 14. 
3 
they produce an impact tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation, without 
officially depriving the title of ownership over property.  The power of government 
to limit rights over property has long been recognized in the history of many 
countries. In essence, the State right to control property was understood as an 
exercise of the ‘police power’ to promote legitimate purposes in the society. 
However, as societies evolve, property rights protections become increasingly 
predominant in many countries in order to safeguard property owners from abusive 
use of state power. As a result, protection against illegitimate regulatory interference 
has been included in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and various other forms of 
legal instruments. Nevertheless, since property rights are not absolute those protected 
rights are also subject to reasonable limitations. State authorities can, therefore, 
exercise their powers in accordance with permissible legislative or bureaucratic 
discretion, beyond which legal remedies are provided to redress the harm suffered by 
property owners as a result of regulatory interference.  
However, State interference has increased in response to contemporary social 
problems in a wide range of areas. This leads to heated demands by property owners 
and diverse interest groups for compensation for regulatory interventions that 
undermine the use and value of their properties.
9
 Domestic courts in both developed 
and developing countries have tried to overcome these tensions by articulating legal 
principles that distinguish compensable indirect expropriation from non-
compensable regulation. By drawing from experiences under domestic laws (in the 
United States, Thailand and Mexico) and regional law under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), this research aim to illuminate insights into 
the concept of indirect expropriation and to suggest more appropriate and effective 
interpretative guidance for arbitral decision makers to enable them to reach more 
consistent and coherent legal interpretations and doctrinal frameworks. This research 
outcome could be useful in the future development of international rules, assisting in 
formulation of the scope and content of indirect expropriation clauses in order to 
clarify vague standards of investment protection and to ensure consistency in the 
interpretation and application of such clauses for all investment treaties. 
                                                 
9
 Steven J Eagle, 'The Birth of the Property Rights Movement' (Policy Analysis No 558, CATO 
Institute, 15 December 2005) <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/birth-property-
rights-movement-0>, 3. 
4 
In contrast to some commentators who favor dynamism and diversity and claim that 
inconsistency is normal (given that different sets of laws are suitable to different 
jurisdictions),
10
 I argue for harmonization. Arbitral decision-makers should utilize 
the same common basic principles in a range of legally analogous situations across 
judicial bodies across nations and various international legal bodies.
11
 Making use of 
recognizable ‘general principles of law’ would potentially strengthen harmonized 
interpretation, which ultimately leads to greater certainty and clearer expectations 
among governments, individuals and arbitrators themselves concerning the baselines 
for appropriate government interventions and the maximum limits of protection that 
foreign investors should be able to enjoy. 
 
B. Research Objectives 
Based on the aforementioned concerns, there are six broad research objectives that 
will be addressed in my thesis:  
(1) To articulate the phenomenon and legal theory in the area of indirect 
expropriation law. 
(2) To investigate the evolving concepts, and the current state of, the doctrines of 
‘indirect expropriation’ and the ‘standard of compensation’ under international law. 
(3) To analyze the influence of social, economic and political factors on the 
formulation of the legal interpretations on the protection against indirect 
expropriation. 
(4) To articulate the legal doctrines that determine when an indirect expropriation 
occurs and to identify the ‘general principles of law’ on indirect expropriation and 
the standard of compensation generally accepted not only by developed, but also 
developing countries. 
                                                 
10
 Steven R. Ratner, 'Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
International Law' (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 475. 
11
 Markus Perkams, The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law—Searching 
for Light in the Dark, International Investment Agreement and Comparative Public Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 111-12; A. Roberts, 'Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the 
Investment Treaty System' (2013) 107(1) American Journal of International Law 45, 92. 
5 
(5) To develop and devise a more coherent methodology to be used by international 
commercial arbitrators to distinguish the use of normal regulatory powers from 
compensable indirect expropriation. 
(6) To provide recommendations for redrafting new model laws that can clarify the 
term indirect expropriation and which conform to judicial practices under domestic 
laws. 
 
C. Research Questions 
Based on the above set of research objectives, the key research questions that will be 
explored within this thesis are as follows:  
(1) What theoretical approaches best address and solve the problems of legal 
indeterminacy? 
(2) How do broadly defined treaty texts and the current practices of investment 
arbitrations contribute to the problems of legal ambiguity and unpredictability in 
investment treaties? 
(3) Should international arbitral tribunals defer to national public policies/public 
laws in indirect expropriation enquiries? Can the concepts of ‘comparative public 
law approach’ and the ‘general principle of law’ be used as interpretative guidance to 
strike a balance between private and public interests? 
(4) What are the legal concepts/thresholds adopted by national courts, in certain 
selected developed and developing country jurisdictions to identify the existence of 
indirect expropriation, and to calculate compensation? And what are the common 
general tendencies within their respective national jurisprudence regarding indirect 
expropriation?  
(5) What are the ‘general principles of law’ on indirect expropriation most 
commonly accepted by nations from both developed and developing countries, in 
light of their different legal institutions and socioeconomic backgrounds? 
6 
(6) What would be an appropriate model law on indirect expropriation to improve 
textual clarity and comply with the judicial standards adopted by the courts in 
developed and developing countries? 
 
D. Research Methodology 
The research undertaken in this thesis is an historical and comparative study, with a 
primary goal to clarify the vague concept of compensable indirect expropriation 
under international investment laws. To answer the research questions mentioned 
above, this thesis will use a legal research methodology which focuses on resource 
materials, doctrinal analysis, and case studies. To achieve the proposed research 
goals, the thesis will be approached in five logical steps.  
1. Establishing a Theoretical Framework 
In this first stage, the thesis will develop a theoretical framework to understand and 
to resolve the problems of legal indeterminacy. Based on the existing legal concepts 
developed by legal thinkers from three distinct schools of thought, namely, Legal 
Positivism, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) and Legal Pragmatism, an attempt is made 
to discover core principles surrounding notions of legal indeterminacy, as discussed 
in each philosophical construct. Some general key ideas will be distilled in regard to 
how the problem of legal indeterminacy can be resolved. Fundamentally, to respond 
to this problem, it will be argued that an adjudicator should not only rely on the 
written law as a decisive source of interpretation, but should contextualize normative 
interests, facts and societal values embodied in a legal community. This interpretive 
approach would allow an adjudicator to extract the real legal meaning of the vague 
text from a number of possible semantic possibilities, and decide which one 
constitutes the most proper meaning of the text. 
2. Identifying the Problems of Legal Indeterminacy in the Context of Indirect 
Expropriation in International Investment Laws 
In the second stage, the study will focus on the problem of legal indeterminacy in the 
area of indirect expropriation as evidenced in international investment laws. 
7 
Although State rights to regulate private property have long been recognized in 
customary international law, it is less clear when the State can constrain or limit the 
right to use private property without incurring international responsibility. Due to the 
lack of definitional clarity, the problem of legal indeterminacy is manifested in the 
context of international investment treaties where the clauses are typically drafted in 
short and vague language. The textual imprecision creates significant concerns 
regarding inconsistent arbitral interpretations and unfair interference in private 
property. The problem of legal indeterminacy is thus not uncommon in international 
laws.  
To analyze this issue, the study will focus primarily on treaty texts as well as 
relevant decisions by arbitral tribunals, collected from both primary and secondary 
sources. The analysis will place emphasis on foreign investment protection laws that 
are contained in four different types of international legal instruments, namely, the 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Iran-United States Criminal Tribunal Declaration (IRUSCT) and the 
recently concluded Tran-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). In order to conduct a 
fruitful doctrinal analysis, a variety of case law databases will be used, including the 
electronic resources operated by the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID),
12





 and the Iran-United State Claims Tribunal.
15
 
3. Exploring the General Principles of Law of Indirect Expropriation through the 
Comparative Public Law Method 
Since an ‘indirect expropriation’ can occur through various forms of state 
interference for the benefits of the public in general, this type of expropriation occurs 
in the context of ‘public law’, which develops out of the commitment to political and 
social norms in the community. Using the conceptual frameworks articulated by 
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 ICSID, Cases <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx>. 
13
 UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html>. 
14
 University of Victoria, <www.italaw.com>. This is a comprehensive and free database on 
investment treaties and investor-state arbitration, operated by Professor Andrew Newcombe of the 
Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, Canada.  
15
 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Awards & Decisions <http://www.iusct.net>. 
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some legal scholars regarding the role of public law in investment arbitration,
16
 this 
thesis argues that, instead of relying on general commercial law frameworks, legal 
interpreters should employ public law thinking as a guiding tool to overcome the 
problems of legal indeterminacy in international investment treaties. To engage 
comparative public law with the interpretation of investment treaties, this thesis will 
suggest that adjudicators should interpret vague provisions in light of ‘general 
principles of law’ as prescribed by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
To identify general principles of law, the exploration of commonly accepted 
principles of indirect expropriation will be carried out through a ‘comparative public 
law study’, which involves the comparison of indirect expropriation jurisprudence 
developed by courts across selected jurisdictions. Based on the courts’ jurisprudence 
and the context of national economic developmental circumstances, the commonly 
accepted principles that reflect ‘general principles of law’ can be identified to 
provide a good source of interpretive guidance for investment arbitral tribunals. The 
shared concepts will not only promote a more coherent and consistent interpretative 
framework, but also improve the harmonization of legal doctrines at international 
levels.  
To build a common platform for comparison, the scope of the study will be limited 
to the courts’ jurisprudence on damage attributed to two main types of state 
regulatory powers: (i) the enactment of legislation to protect public interests (such as 
the enactment of environmental and zoning laws); and (ii) State’s administrative acts 
(such as a State revocation of granting permit of any harmful activities). The 
research will, however, exclude court decisions on ‘tortious damage’ caused by the 
State. In other words, the study will be limited to the loss incurred in the course of 
                                                 
16
 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Stephan W. Schill, 'Enhancing international investment law's legitimacy: conceptual and 
methodological foundations of a new public law approach' (2011) 52(1) Virginia Journal of 
International Law 57; Stephan W Schill, 'Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-
Conceptualize the Standard of Review Through Comparative Public Law' (Paper presented at the 
Third Biennial Global Conference, National University of Singapore, NUS Faculty of Law, Center for 
International Law, 30 June 2012) <http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2012-Singapore-
Conference.html>; William Burke-White and Andreas Von Staden, 'The Need for Public Law 
Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations' in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 690. 
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exercising authoritative powers that are empowered by specific laws, rather than the 
general infringement on private property under tort laws. 
To ensure the comprehensiveness and generalizability of the compared principles, 
the surveyed jurisdictions cover the United States, Thailand, Mexico and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These jurisdictions were selected on the 
basis of their diverse backgrounds in terms of the levels of economic development, 
legal traditions, different litigation experiences and language diversity. 
(a) The Level of Economic Development 
In order to ensure diversity in the levels of economic development, the study consists 
of sample jurisdictions from both developed and developing countries. While the 
United States is considered by the World Bank as a developed country,
17
 Thailand 
and Mexico are selected as an indicative sample of developing countries falling 
within a group of middle upper income nations.
18
 Unlike the United States, Thailand 
and Mexico, the ECtHR, which is an international organization body with its main 
function being to oversee the protection of human rights in the European Union 
(EU), is composed of 47 Member States with different levels of economic 
development.
19
 The ECtHR thus represents a key supra-national body that promotes 
common values and standards of human rights protections across Member States 
with multicultural diversity and diverse levels of economic development. To some 
extent, the progress of economic development in certain jurisdiction might reflect a 
direct relationship between welfare improvement, on the one hand, and a higher level 
of individual freedom and property right protection, on the other. 
(b) Legal Systems 
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the type of legal system is another 
important element that affects the way in which the law is interpreted and applied. 
To ensure comprehensiveness of the analysis, the thesis compares countries from 
two key legal traditions – common law and civil law. While the judgments of the 
                                                 
17
 The World Bank, United States The World Bank <http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states>. 
18
 The World Bank, Thailand The World Bank <http://data.worldbank.org/country/thailand>.  
19
 Council of Europe, Migration and Human rights: European Court of Human Rights (2014) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp>. 
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U.S. courts are influenced by the common-law tradition, whereby the law is 
generally developed from court judgments, the Thai legal system is greatly 
influenced by the civil-law system, which was adopted from French and German 
civil law cultures, where core principles are codified by law-making bodies. The 
Thai legal system is similar to Mexico which is largely based on a civil law system,
20
 
and Mexican codes, like most Latin American countries, borrowed from European 




 However, the ECtHR, which is a supra-national court 
with a jurisdiction to hear complaints from its Member States with diverse domestic 
legal systems, applies a single standard of human rights protections to all disputes 
regardless of the diversity of legal systems operating within each of its Member 
States.
22
   
(c) Litigation Experiences 
This comparative research is also concerned with contrasting differing litigation 
experiences. With solid litigation traditions and experiences, the ECtHR
23
 and the 
US courts
24
 are appropriate examples of jurisdictions that have heard a large number 
of cases relating to the issue of indirect expropriation. As a result, the courts in both 
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 Franciso A Avalos, Mexican Legal System (16 December 2014) Daniel F Cracchiolo Law Library, 
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 See Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary), Application 
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Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary), Application Nos 10522/83; 11011/84; 11070/84, 19 
December 1989) ('Mellacher'); Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (European 
Court of Human Rights, Court (Chamber), Application No 13427/87, 9 December 1994) ('Stran 
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33202/96, 5 January 2000) ('Beyeler'). 
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 See Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922); Armstrong v  United States, 364 US 40 
(1960); Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978); Andrus v Allard, 444 
US 51 (1979); Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980); Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan, 458 
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US 469 (2005); Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S Ct 2586 (2013).  
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jurisdictions have long developed legal criteria with which to solve this type of 
conflict. This is contrary to the position in Thailand, where the relevant specialized 
courts were established as recently as 1999. Thus the administrative courts
25
 and the 
Constitutional Court of Thailand
26
 have decided a significantly smaller number of 
cases as compared to developed countries. As such, the courts in Thailand are at the 
early stage of developing a coherent legal analytical framework to handle this 
complex issue of indirect expropriation.
27
 This is similar to Mexico, where the 
application of the Mexican Constitution against State regulatory interference with 
private properties is quite limited due to a strict interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution, which holds that compensation is given only when the property is 
seized by formal decrees.
28
 
(d) Language Diversity 
Besides legal factors, the selection of sample jurisdictions is limited by knowledge of 
language. Basically, this research focuses on the jurisdictions that use English as the 
official language. This includes the United States and the ECtHR. The information to 
be compared can be obtained from both primary and secondary sources.
29
 However, 
to make the research findings more scientifically sound and generalizable, this thesis 
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 See e.g. ศาลปกครองสูงสุด [Thai Supreme Administrative Court], For 17/2545 (2002); ศาลปกครอง
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also includes samples from other non-English countries, namely Thailand and 
Mexico. In relation to Thailand, all information largely appears in Thai, the author’s 
native language, so this allows the researcher to gain access to local information 
available in both primary and secondary sources.
30
 However, due to limited English 
language publications in the area of indirect expropriation law in Mexico, the 
researcher heavily relies on translated works in English which are available in some 
English language literature and reliable online materials. 
4. Analysis of the Utility of the Proportionality Doctrine 
After the comparative analysis of similarities and differences between the legal 
doctrines adopted by the surveyed jurisdictions, the thesis offers an in-depth analysis 
of key elements and the context in which the ‘proportionality doctrine’ has been 
applied in the area of indirect expropriation law. Due to the widespread application 
of this doctrine, at both national and international levels, this thesis suggests the 
identification of the ‘proportionality doctrine’ as a general principle of law that can 
be adopted to resolve tensions between public and private interests in the context of 
indirect expropriation law under international investment treaties. Some advantages 
and drawbacks of this doctrine will also be analyzed. 
5. Proposing a New Model Treaty Clause for Indirect Expropriation 
In the final part of this thesis, the study will provide some suggestions concerning 
how to enhance the predictability, consistent interpretation and coherence of a legal 
framework for the issue of indirect expropriation. To make the suggested legal 
framework more immediate and practical, a new model clause on indirect 
expropriation to be articulated in investment treaties will be proposed. By 
incorporating the proportionality doctrine in the proposed clause, the model law is 
intended not only to improve textual clarity and precision, but also to reflect the 
current practices recognized by national jurisprudence (namely within the United 
States, Thailand, and Mexico) and international jurisprudence (namely by the 
                                                 
30
 Besides the scholarly publications in both Thai and English, the decisions and judgements by local 
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Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, Court's Judgements <http://library.constitutionalcourt.or.th/> and 
The Administrative Court of the Kingdom of Thailand, Interesting Cases Classified by the Nature of 
Dispute <http://www.admincourt.go.th/admincourt/site/05SearchCategory.html>. 
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ECtHR) utilized to distinguish normal regulations from compensable regulatory 
interference. 
 
E. Chapter Structure and Brief Contents 
Chapter Objectives 
1 Introduction 
2 This Chapter examines the concepts of legal indeterminacy proposed by 
various legal theories. The applicability of the doctrine and its relevance 
to international investment agreements will be analyzed. Some proposed 
legal remedies to the problem of legal indeterminacy will be addressed, 
and will be used as an analytical framework for the remainder of the 
thesis. 
3 This Chapter reviews the concepts and the applications of expropriation 
regimes under customary international law and of the international 
minimum standard of treatment. The discussion will reflect upon the 
ideological conflicts between exporting and importing countries in the 
early period of expropriation of foreign investment. 
4 This study focuses on the legal concept of expropriation under 
contemporary international investment treaties. It also examines current 
developments in arbitral jurisprudence on indirect expropriation under 
international law on foreign investment protection. It gives an overview 
of past jurisprudence regarding the manner in which private arbitrators 
distinguish compensatory expropriations from legitimate State 
regulations. The study also reviews the concepts of dispute settlement 
and the interpretative approaches undertaken by private arbitrations 
14 
Chapter Objectives 
under various legal regimes, such as NAFTA, BITs and the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP). Based on this past jurisprudence, working under the framework 
of ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitral rules, the analysis reveals how an 
unclearly defined term of indirect expropriation and the current systems 
of investment dispute settlement contribute to the problem of legal 
ambiguity and legal unpredictability. 
5 This Chapter outlines the role of domestic public law as a means of 
providing interpretative guidance for investment arbitrations. Rather 
than conferring upon the private arbitrator full discretionary power to 
interpret vague substantive rights contained in investment treaties, this 
Chapter argues that treaty interpretation should be based on standards 
and concepts embodied in each domestic legal order.  
The study will analyze the limitation of conventional approaches to 
treaty interpretation in effectively resolving the problems of legal 
indeterminacy in investment treaties. Based on new legal concepts 
developed by a number of legal scholars, the study suggests that 
deference should be paid specifically to the ‘public law approach’ in 
order to resolve problems of legal indeterminacy in international 
investment treaties. 
To clarify the ambiguous standards of indirect expropriation law, the 
study adopts the ‘general principles of law’ framework pursuant to 
Article 31(3)(c) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
as a means to clarify vague legal principles of indirect expropriation and 
standards of compensation. An examination of the role of domestic 
public law will be carried out through both a theoretical discussion and a 
survey of practical outcomes of past jurisprudence. Despite not being 
applied in a uniform manner across sample jurisdictions, the thesis will 
15 
Chapter Objectives 
argue in Chapter Nine that the ‘proportionality doctrine’ is widely 
regarded as a commonly acceptable principle that is used in all 
comparing jurisdictions.  
6-8 The surveys of judicial standards concerning indirect expropriation at 
both domestic and international levels are carried out in four different 
jurisdictions. In Chapter Six, the study focuses on the historical 
development, internal judicial review system, objectives and decisions 
made by the US Supreme Court. In Chapter Seven, the research focuses 
on the position within the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
and in Chapter Eight, the position within Thailand and Mexico is 
examined respectively.  
9 A comparative analysis of these four legal systems, their standards of 
review and the concepts of indirect expropriation as well as the 
associated compensation regimes employed by the ECtHR, the United 
States, Thailand and Mexico is undertaken in Chapter 9.  
From the experiences in these four different jurisdictions, this Chapter 
distills a comparative overview of institutional backgrounds, core legal 
doctrines and State practices on the jurisprudence of review in relation 
to indirect expropriation. It will argue that common ‘general principles 
of law’ can be recognized as inherent in those selected jurisdictions. The 
identified proportionality doctrine could provide a coherent 
interpretative framework that investment arbitrators can follow when 
they encounter hard cases in the future.  
10 This Chapter provides an overview of the major thesis findings. In 
addition, it provides policy recommendations in support of developing a 
new model clause on indirect expropriation in investment treaties. To 
16 
Chapter Objectives 
resolve the tensions arising out of an unclearly defined conceptual 
framework regarding indirect expropriation provisions, an attempt is 
made to present a potential model clause by making use of the 
proportionality doctrine that has been developed by ECtHR and 
domestic courts in the United States, Thailand and Mexico when dealing 
with the regulatory interference. It is argued that the proposed model 
clause would not only improve textual clarity, but also reaffirm an 
appropriate balance between the right to regulate by state governments 
and the rights to be protected from regulatory interference, which 
conforms to both national and international practices. 
 
F. Significance of Study 
This thesis is significant for three reasons. Firstly, this thesis fills a gap in academic 
literature on the doctrine of indirect expropriation in international investment 
treaties. It is one the first studies to examine the ‘general principles of law’ approach 
to indirect expropriation from the point of view of both developed and developing 
countries. Secondly, the findings of this thesis could provide interpretative guidance 
for arbitral tribunals when analyzing indirect expropriation claims. The aim of such 
guidance is not only to improve consistency in interpretations of vague treaty texts, 
but also to ensure better interpretations, which comply with the standards adopted by 
judicial practices in both developed and developing countries. Thirdly, the research 
findings could provide useful insights for host and investor state governments to 
revise provisions on indirect expropriation contained in international investment 




LEGAL INDETERMINACY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, SOURCES, 
SOLUTIONS AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS 
 
The concept of ‘indirect expropriation’ presents a great challenge in international 
legal proceedings on investment protection law. There is still no consensus as to 
when any governmental interference should be regarded as an indirect expropriation 
under international law. 
To promote justice and consistency in this growing and important field, this Chapter 
provides an overview of existing theoretical frameworks used to analyze the issue of 
legal ambiguity within international investment agreements. The study reviews the 
theoretical foundations, sources and remedies for ‘legal indeterminacy’. By doing so, 
this Chapter provides a thorough understanding of the key problems and provides 
some insight into possible solutions. The theory of legal indeterminacy provides a 
context for coherent discussion of indirect expropriation in the remaining parts of 
this thesis.  
The Chapter starts by examining the meaning and types of legal indeterminacy. The 
second section then reviews theoretical aspects of legal indeterminacy, raised by 
three different schools of thought; ranging from legal positivism to critical legal 
studies, as well as law and economic pragmatism. In addition to the legal concepts 
themselves, some discussion of the suggested devices proposed by each legal 
approach is carried out on order to identify various ideas regarding how adjudicators 
should react to problems of legal indeterminacy. In the last section, the study focuses 
on the problems of legal indeterminacy in international investment agreements. 
Since the treaty language is inherently ambiguous, its indeterminacy allows 
arbitrators to exercise considerable discretionary power in deciding cases. Despite an 
arbitrator’s impartiality, the vague standards of protection in an investment treaty 
may result in inconsistency in treaty interpretation, undermining the legitimacy of 
the international arbitration process. Finally, to resolve the problems of legal 
18 
indeterminacy in international investment arbitration, some suggested solutions are 
provided. 
 
A. The Types of Legal Indeterminacy and Associated Problems 
Legal indeterminacy’, or ‘Indeterminacy Theory’, is a significant theme in current 
legal debate and is advanced in a number of legal theories. In general, these theories 
posit that in any given set of legal principles, there are always ‘substantial gaps, 
conflicts and ambiguities’.
1
 If the law does not precisely prescribe the outcome of a 
situation, other factors such as the personal attitude of the judge might influence the 
outcome. According to Kress, if legal ambiguities are not addressed, the objectivity 
and neutrality of legal decisions will always be questioned, and this would lead to 
the problematic questioning of the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.
2
 
In order to analyze the nature of indeterminacy, commentators have identified 
different types of indeterminacy that may arise in legal systems. Lorenz Kaehler, for 
example, provides a broad overview of the nature of legal indeterminacy. He claims 
that there are at least five different types of indeterminacy in any legal system: 
formal indeterminacy, normative indeterminacy, substantial indeterminacy, factual 
indeterminacy and linguistic indeterminacy.
3
 For Kaehler, formal indeterminacy 
concerns a situation in which the law is unable to a give an accurate answer to the 
legal question before an adjudicator. In the case of normative indeterminacy, the law 
itself cannot determine accurately which norm should govern the case. In this case, 
he argues that the personal opinion of the adjudicator can be of importance in 
making a decision. Another type of indeterminacy can be described as a substantial 
indeterminacy, which is concerned with the vagueness of a legal provision and a 
judge’s inability to apply an accurate legal standard to the case.  Factual 
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indeterminacy can also play a role in the uncertainty of law. It concerns uncertainty 
in how an adjudicator connects facts and evidence with the conduct and 
consequences in question.   
Similarly, Professor Sol Picciotto points out the sources of indeterminacy in the rule 
of law.
4
  At its root, the problem originates from the indeterminacy of ‘language’.
5
 
Since language is associated with a society, the meaning of words is not static and is 
interpreted in accordance with the prevalent social context, which is changing over 
time.
6
 In addition to vague language, the indeterminacy of law flows from the 
presence of ‘liberal legality’.
7
 Since the legislator cannot draft the law to capture all 
existing and future applications in real life, the drafter has to leave a certain degree in 
flexibility of legal interpretation to the adjudicator. Legal practitioners are free to 
interpret the text within the framework formulated by the legislature so as to bridge 
these legal gaps. Nevertheless, this flexibility of legal interpretation might create 
tensions and contradictions, resulting in the indeterminacy of law.
8
 In addition to 
these legal factors, Professor Picciotto also notes that the interpretation of law is not 
only concerned with facts and written law, but also the ‘norms’ embodied in a set of 
laws.
9
 As a result, the different norms and values contained in a set of laws 
inevitably leads to different interpretations of the meaning of the texts, which reflects 
a hidden ideological power of the decision-maker.
10
   
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the types of indeterminacy in law are 
diverse and vary in scope and degree.
11
 Although there is no conclusive answer to 
define the complete nature of indeterminacy in law, it can be said that different types 
of indeterminacy in law can be linked and clustered together. Since indeterminacy in 
law is a common phenomenon, it can trigger many legal problems concerning the 
application of law, interpretative consistency of law and methodological approaches 
to be used by adjudicators. In essence, the imprecision of the ‘open texture’ of 
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language can not only lead to ‘disagreement between reasonable people on the 
application of that expression’,
12
 but also to disagreement regarding the ‘semantic’ 
uncertainty of how law should be applied within a specific circumstance to 




B. Theoretical Responses to the Problem of Legal Indeterminacy 
In order to overcome the problems caused by legal indeterminacy, legal 
commentators have considered various fundamental principles to resolve them. In 
the following part, three main schools of thought including Legal Positivism, Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) and Pragmatism, will be investigated and analyzed. In each 
theory, some fundamental legal concepts are highlighted. In addition, some aspects 
of the problem of legal indeterminacy and potential solutions embodied in each 
theory will be discussed. The aim of this examination is to see how legal thinkers 
respond to the existence of legal indeterminacy in order to discern the a best 
interpretation. 
1. Legal Positivism 
(a) Basic Ideas: The Objectivity of Law 
The concept of legal positivism played a critical role for nearly 200 years from the 
end of 18
th




 Due to the Industrial Revolution in 
Europe and America, the understanding of law and legal interpretation was 
influenced by ‘modernism’, according to which law and judgment must be 
scientifically, rationally and analytically proven.
15
 Generally, legal positivism does 
not reject the existence of moral values, but it claims that ‘the existence of law is 
                                                 
12
 Timothy A O Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 11-12. 
13
 LELIJA ŠOČANAĆ, 'Indeterminacy vs Precision in International Arbitration: The Arbitration 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and teh Government of teh Republicc 
of Slovenia' (2011) 1(1) Lapland Law Review 190, 195. 
14
 Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories: Contexts and Practices (Lawbook Co, 2009) 
240. 
15
 Ibid 182-9. 
21 
conceptually distinct from its moral value.’
16
 Legal positivism, based on the absolute 
ground of science and knowledge, denies moral questions. 
The discussion of the concept of legal positivism dates back to ancient Greece in the 





century when legal theory was largely grounded on the basis of ‘command’ and 
‘sovereignty’.
17
 Jeremy Bentham (1747-1832), a renowned legal positivist, 
maintained that people are rational and respond to the system of reward and 
punishment.
18
 Since the ultimate goal of law is to increase the total sum of social 
pleasure,
19
 Bentham perceives law as a ‘communication of how the sovereign wants 
(or commands) their subjects to behave, together with something that makes them 
inclined to obey the commands’.
20
 John Austin (1790-1859) also perceived law as a 
command of the sovereign.
21
 However, Austin went further by explaining that the 
formation of command also incorporates other key elements, including a wish, 
communication of wish, and inherent sanctions.
22
 Austin thus conceived law as the 
generalized commands of the sovereign that are backed up by sanctions.
23
  
To remove subjective matters from legal science, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) 
established a ‘pure theory of law’ that aims to describe the general nature of law in 
any legal system.
24
 According to Kelsen, law is not merely a set of written laws, but 
also a set of ‘norms’ that create a sense of obligation on people’s behaviors.
25
 A 
norm is thus the expression of the idea that something ‘ought to occur’ in a given 
situation.
26
 If a person acts in a manner contrary to the norms of the society, 
sanctions might be imposed.
27
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Based on Kelsen’s theory, rules of law can be seen as norms that everyone will obey 
only if they are conceived as valid.
28
 Kelsen viewed that positive law is a system of 
norms in which the higher norms validate the inferior ones in the same hierarchical 
chain.
29
 Kelsen asserted that any given system of law starts from the ‘Basic Norm’ 
(Grundnorm), with which all inferior norms in the system must conform.
30
 Being the 
original point of the hierarchy, the Grundnorm thus plays an important role in 
validating all other norms in the legal system. According to Kelsen’s theory, it is the 
role of the adjudicator to understand the nature of the original legal norm and its 
hierarchical relationship with all other norms that formulate a valid system of law 
which fosters trust among people. 
In a similar manner, HLA Hart (1907-1992) also precluded questions of morality 
from impacting legal issues. Hart conceived a law as not simply a command from the 
sovereign, but a means to regulate on human behaviors connected to people’s 
collective attitude.
31
 He considers that law consists of both an ‘external’ and an 
‘internal’ aspect.
32
 So laws not only represent a set of rules that dictate the 
‘observable action’ of people, they represent standards of behavior that are internally 
accepted by people and form expectations about other people’s and their own 
behaviors.
33




To make law valid and recognizable by people, the enacted law must comply with 
Hart’s so-called ’secondary rule’ proposition.
35
 According to Hart’s theory of law, 
the secondary rule consists of three distinct components, which are the rule of 
change, the rule of adjudication and the rule of recognition. These components are 
essential elements that determine the validity of any law, which ultimately is dictated 
by people’s attitude towards the creditability of said law.
36
 Instead of viewing laws 
as commands issued by the sovereign, Hart considered that people would only accept 
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commands that are handed down by accepted legal institutes and officials who have 
the power to make and adjudicate the rules. In addition, the said rules must also be 
accepted by officials. 
Viewing laws as based on recognition by people, Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) 
similarly asserts that law is not simply a collection of written rules, but it involves a 
‘network of standards’.
37
 Since Dworkin’s conception of law is largely based on the 
principle of liberalism, the factors of legal environment, politics and social beliefs 
embodied in the community are all relevant in forming the system of law.
38
 For him, 
moral value is not fixed and eternal; it is not something abstract but rather a subject 
inherent in the community itself.
39
  
(b) The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy and Proposed Solutions 
According to the conceptual frameworks developed by legal positivist thinkers, the 
law does not only consist of rules to govern individual behaviors, but it is also 
something more than a set of written rules that obligates people to obey. When there 
is no clear-cut rule, pursuant to which an adjudicator can determine a legal answer, 
the interpretation of law becomes more complicated and necessarily involves an 
examination of underlying values and norms that are significant within that place and 
time.  
HLA Hart, for instance, asserted that on many occasions the drafters of laws cannot 
describe precisely the meaning of legal provisions.
40
 However, Hart considered that 
language has a ‘core of certainty’, surrounded by a ‘penumbra’ of uncertainty.
41
 
When facing the problem of ‘open texture’, judges must exercise their discretion to 
find the meaning and the scope of law.
42
 To resolve the problem of legal 
indeterminacy, Hart’s theory admitted that a judge can exercise discretion to decide 
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what law applies to the case,
43
 or fill gaps in legal rules by weighing all competing 
interests and deciding upon which side of the line the meaning lies.
44
 
Contrary to Hart’s theory, Dworkin suggested that in every single case, there is 
always a single right answer and there is no room for judicial discretion in the legal 
system.
45
 When resolving a hard case, the interpretation of any rules of law 
comprises three main steps: (i) the pre-interpretative stage; (ii) the interpretative 
stage and (iii) the post-interpretative stage.
46
 In the pre-interpretative stage, all works 
and rules are gathered to formulate an analytical framework. Then, in the 
interpretative stage, the meanings of legal rules are discovered and in the post-
interpretative stage, the meaning of a rule is determined so as to provide guidance for 
future interpretation. Among these three stages, the ‘interpretative stage’ is arguably 
the most important element as it provides an interpretative meaning that generally 
fits the existing legal materials relevant to the case.
47
  
According to Dworkin’s approach, judges have a duty to develop a ‘theory which 
best explains what the law actually is in a particular situation’.
48
 Based on Dworkin’s 
view, the discovered principle reflects the ‘political morality’ that can fill the gaps in 
the law and best justify the answer to the legal question in a given case.
49
 Even 
though Dworkin asserted that there is always ‘one right answer’, which can be 
discovered through constructive interpretation, given the quantity and complexity of 
all available laws and principles, such a discovery could only be carried out by a role 
model, or ‘Hercules’, judge who is capable of conceptualizing a wide range of ideas 
and influences, and discerning the right balance of all relevant social factors in order 
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to determine the correct answer applicable to the case at hand.
50
 This theoretical 
extreme might prove difficult in practice, since Dworkin’s ‘Hercules’ judge could be 
conceived as a purely abstract construct. Ultimately, this might imply that Dworkin’s 
concept does not altogether deny or underestimate the problem of legal 
indeterminacy and a degree of difficulty in dictating the right answer to a legal 
question. 
2. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
(a) Basic Ideas: Law is Nothing, but a Matter of Power Relationships in the 
Society 
CLS is a school of thought that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and challenged the 
standard norms and practices of the existing legal system. CLS scholars uncovered 
the problems of injustice embodied in laws. CLS theorists assert that ‘law is 
politics’.
51
 According to CLS, law is neither value free, neutral, nor unaffected by 
politics, society and personal points of view.
52
 To the contrary, influenced by these 
external factors, law is indeterminate and it is hard to preclude these elements from 
the process of legal reasoning and decision-making.
53
 As a consequence, the 
decision-maker fills the gap attributed to the indeterminacy of law by freely 
‘pick[ing] and choos[ing]’ doctrine to fit the personally desired legal outcome.
54
  
(b) The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy and Proposed Solutions 
One of the fundamental ideas of the CLS movement is that law is ‘radically 
indeterminate’.
55
 Mark Tushnet, one of the key advocates of CLS, asserts that no 
matter how hard one tries, or how skillful one is as a lawyer, it is very difficult to 
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determine the correct answer for any legal question and, perhaps, it might end up 
with a diverse set of legal answers.
56
  
To explain the root of the problem, a prominent CLS thinker Duncan Kennedy 
asserts that a set of rules is embodied by the ‘fundamental contradiction’ of norms or 
values, and this holds true in every aspect of life.
57
 Kennedy holds that since the 
fundamental contradiction is always present, individual needs might be incompatible 
with community objectives.
58
 Due to the existence of inherent conflicting values in 
any legal rule, Kennedy concludes that the interpretation of law by adjudicators 
could be dominated by the personal experiences of judges; thus, legal reasoning and 
the final outcomes of a case are shaped by a judge’s encounter with external and 
changeable factors.
59
 Due to conflicting purposes and objectives embodied in a rule, 
the adjudicator might find it difficult even to apply a valid and clear rule to some 
hard cases, as a ‘narrow exception’ or ‘standard’ might be needed so as to achieve 
the real purpose of the rule.
60
  
In support of the CLS movement, Csaba Varga, who studies the status of law in the 
judicial system, also asserts that ‘law is something more than a set of rules and it is 
even more than a set of enactments’.
61
 These lines of analysis provide some insights 
into how legal systems work in reality and how a judge’s personal preference and 
other social factors, such as constructed social and political views, can influence the 
judicial outcome when the law is ambiguous; making it is difficult to arrive at a 
straightforward judgment. Furthermore, a well-trained lawyer can consider opposing 
results to produce legal argument that subordinates other competing legal concepts, 
when the legal text is unclear.
62
 Due to this malleability, in many cases, laws tend to 
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be construed in favour of the powerful or in a manner that protects the interest of the 
hegemony, rather than the subordinated.
63
  
The conceptual framework proposed by CLS, which is deeply skeptical about the 
neutrality and objectivity of law to reach a correct answer in a given case, implies 
that courts should not place emphasis only on the written law to determine legal 
outcomes, but also on other factors in constructing court decisions. Since law is 
inherently indeterminate due to embodied conflicts of ideological controversy, this 
results in the varying ‘discretionary interpretive choices affecting the determinacy of 
legal outcome’.
64
 To deal with the problem, adjudicators should leave legal discourse 
out and see how laws work in reality. This enables courts to uncover class relations 
without losing the connection with social reality and historical development. This 
would allow the adjudicators to improve the coherence of judicial reasoning and to 
construe the law so as to reduce social divide and create a more equitable society.
65
 
3. Legal Pragmatism 
(a) Basic Ideas: Law as an Instrument for Justice and Equilibrium 
Legal pragmatism is a theoretical framework that claims that law is a practice which 
should incorporate ‘a more diverse set of data’ that is subject to the ‘specific context 
at hand’.
66
 Legal pragmatist argues that conventional legal analysis, which is 
grounded on the ‘use of precedent’ and ‘rigorous arguments from analogy’, is 
‘naively rationalistic’ and ‘overly legalistic’.
67
 To mitigate the limitations present 
within the conventional approach of judicial decision-making, legal pragmatists 
contextualize the facts by incorporating diverse controversies and arguments in their 
legal analysis, rather than relying solely on written rules to provide interpretative 
                                                 
63
 Ibid 83. 
64
 David Michael Fried, 'Reviewing the Review: The Political Implications of Critical Legal Studies' 
(1989) 10(4) Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 531, 533.  
65
 Ibid 534 citing Christopher Tomlins, 'Of the Old Time Entombed: The Resurrection of the 
American Working Class and the Emerging Critique of American Industrial Relations' (1988) 10(3) 
Industrial Relations Law Journal 426, 428 which postulated the empirical research on labor relations. 
It appeared that there was a tendency to view labor relations in isolation from historical, political and 
jurisprudential influences. As a result, courts were inclined to decide the cases in favor of a capitalism 
ideology. 
66







 As Steven Platt emphasizes, ‘[t]he function of law is to ensure justice 
and equilibrium.  The origin of the law is not the main thing – the goal is. There can 
be no wisdom in the choice of legal path unless we know where it will lead.’
69 The 
advantage of this approach has been confirmed. One of the prominent legal 
pragmatists, Judge Richard Posner, asserts that ‘pragmatism is the best description of 
the American judicial ethos and also the best guide to the improvement of judicial 




(b) The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy and Proposed Solutions 
Pragmatists see law as something which is historically and culturally contingent. 
Although not being associated directly with the legal indeterminacy doctrine, 
pragmatists generally reject the idea of ‘one overarching value or policy 
consideration’.
71
 In this respect, pragmatists do not believe in the concept of a ‘grand 
theory’ in law that can produce a definitive answer in any legal case.
72
 Pragmatists 
understand that when judges try to apply the same legal doctrine to all cases, it can 
produce legal absurdity
73
 since a mere ‘linear arrangement’ or a ‘single foundational 
brick’ could hardly resolve all complex cases.
74
 Judge Richard Posner also asserts 
that when deciding a hard case, judges struggle with the diverse range of contestable 
policy choices and ethical preferences in a given society.
75
 
Responding to this problem, some legal pragmatists suggest interpreters should rely 
on ‘practical reason’ to resolve any legal issue so that the set goal could be 
ultimately achieved. Richard Bernstein, for example, held that in reaching decisions 
there are no determinate rules with which to distinguish between right and wrong 
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 He asserts that since the justification of legal reasoning is historically and 
culturally contingent, such reason must be subject to adjustment in accordance with 
changing knowledge and prevailing experiences.
77
 Judge Richard Posner also 
suggests adjudicators use a practical method to resolve any disputes. Posner believes 
that ‘law’s practical consequences are more important than any broad or narrow 
definition of law itself’ because it is a process  which involves ‘a complex 
interweaving of positive and natural law or…, of law and morality’.
78
 As such, 
Posner affirms that no correct interpretation of law can be sought, only ‘the correct 
ethical political solution.’
79
 In other words, adjudicators need to understand the 
context of the issue to be able to achieve the correct answer. Based on Posner’s 
philosophy, the ability to determine the right answer is subject to many factors, 
including ‘anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, empathy, imputation 
of motives, speaker’s authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, 
experience, intuition and induction’.
80
 He also claims that ‘means-end rationality’, 
‘tacit knowledge’, and the ‘test of time’, are also key elements that adjudicators need 
to take into account when deciding cases.
81
 Based on Posner’s judicial philosophy, 
adjudicators have a duty to sustain ‘a legal fabric that includes considerations of 
precedent, of legislative authority, of the framing of issues by counsel, of the facts of 
record, and so forth.’
82
  
4. Overall Conclusions and Suggested Solutions  
Legal indeterminacy is not a new phenomenon, but has been raised by legal scholars 
for many years. The above theoretical discussion demonstrates that each of the 
examined theories analyzes the problem and potential solutions of legal 
indeterminacy from a different perspective. Based on the idea of the proclaimed 
objectivity of laws, legal positivists claim that it is impossible to include every 
imaginable circumstance falling within the ambit of legal texts. To resolve the 
problem of legal indeterminacy in the context of legal positivism, the relevant 
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interpreters should have the discretion to find the meaning and the standard of law 
that is generally accepted by the community. This generally accepted principle is not 
the same as a morality; rather, it represents the norms, values and attitudes that are 
objectively recognized by people in a given community. As Dworkin asserts, despite 
the possibility to search for a correct answer, the task is difficult as it requires a 
superhuman who can take into account a wide range of ideas and interests when 
making a judicial decision in a given hard case. 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) similarly holds that law is inherently indeterminate as 
every hard case contains the ‘fundamental contradictions’ of controversial norms and 
values.
83
 Therefore, CLS emphasizes the ‘openness of the normative concepts used 
by the judiciary’ to reduce the risk of adjudicators’ bias in identifying the available 
choices in a legal dispute.
84
 The adjudicator should be given the opportunity to hear 
and pay respect to the relative positions of all stakeholders involved so as to avoid 
the problem of having one concept that predominates the other.
85
  
The central concept of legal pragmatism lies within the rejection of grand theory as a 
tool to resolve all disputes. Due to the open-ended nature of law, pragmatists assert 
that legal knowledge is not a matter of language, but rather a situational context.
86
 
Therefore, pragmatists perceive law as an instrument in analysing legal problems; to 
achieve ultimate goals, practical reason must take into account a new set of 
information that allows the adjudicator to assess any individual case in a more 
realistic way. 
Even though each school of thought has different philosophical paths to view and 
understand the issue of legal indeterminacy, all fundamentally agree that vague 
expressions of legal texts are omnipresent and persistent and this problem inevitably 
leads to indeterminacies in the application of the law in many hard cases. To resolve 
the problem of legal indeterminacy, they commonly suggest that a judge needs to 
search for the ‘general principles of law’ that can best describe the core values and 
norms that are important and mutually obeyed by people in a given community. 
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However, to ensure that different views and norms are taken on board, a given 
principle should also permit adjudicators to interpret the meaning of law by 
incorporating the context of the situation, in such a way that all competing interests 
are embraced and presented.  
In addition, based on a general application of this suggested approach, judge’s 
personal ideologies will not predominate the legal outcome, nor favor the hegemonic 
powers. This interpretative framework could be applied in reaching the correct 
answer in a particular hard case, especially in the context of international investment 
laws on indirect expropriation, which typically contain vague and open-ended legal 
texts that give rise to significant controversy surrounding the definition and scope of 
legal application. 
 
C. Legal Indeterminacy in the Context of the International Law on  
Foreign Investment Protections: Problems, Causes and Remedies 
In recent years, there has been a proliferation in the number of international 
investment treaties. A study conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) reveals the continued expansion of the network of 
international investment agreements. From 1999-2008, the number of concluded 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) increased significantly, from less than 2,000 in 
1999, to 2,676 at the end of 2008
87
 and 2,857 at the end of 2012.
88
  There has been a 
considerable amount of literature exploring reasons as to why BITs have become 
popular for investment promotion and protection. In essence, BITs are perceived as a 
tool to give foreign investors protection against arbitrary conduct by the host state 
government. BITs thus provide an advantage in attracting inward investment flow to 
boost economic growth within a country. 
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Consistent with the growing tendency of concluding BITs worldwide, there has been 
an increase in the number of investment disputes under the Investor-State Disputes 
Settlement mechanism (ISDS).
89
 Recourse to arbitral proceedings was introduced to 
settle disputes concerning the legitimacy and legality of governmental measures 
imposed by host state administrative, legislative, or judicial branches.
90
 International 
investment treaties thus guarantee a wide range of typical protection standards, 
which the host government must respect. They include, among other things, National 
Treatment, the Most-Favored-Nation clause, Fair and Equitable Treatment, Free 
Transfer, and Expropriation provisions. 
Subedi argues that this comprehensive set of protections is generally ambiguous and 
involves legal indeterminacy risks, which ultimately contribute to the development 
of multiple interpretative approaches
91
 and inconsistent arbitral awards.
92
 The next 
part of this Chapter will analyze the problems and causes of indeterminacy in BITs, 
and discuss some remedial approaches to resolve issues resulting from legal 
indeterminacy in international investment agreements.     
1. The Problem of Legal Indeterminacy in International Investment Law  
The problems of legal indeterminacy in international investment law have long been 
discussed. Basically, BITs are signed with the main purpose to protect and promote 
foreign investment. Historically, the antecedents of what constituted BITs evolved 
from customary international law. However, customary international law for 
investment protection has not yet been clearly formulated despite imposing 
obligations to commit to a minimum standard of treatment. Due to a failure to 
achieve customary international investment law among nations, most countries 
                                                 
89
 UNCTAD, 'Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)' (No 1, UNCTAD, 
April 2014) 2 (‘Recent Developments in ISDS’). 
90
 Robert S French, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement-A Cut Above the Courts?' (Paper presented at 




Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing, 
2008) 135-7. 
92
 Ibid 137-9. 
33 
largely adopt a similar framework of international investment agreements to reduce 
the problem of legal incoherence.
93
   
Although BITs have successfully established hard legal obligations for the host state 
government to follow, a number of commentators have raised concerns over arbitral 
interpretations of potentially broad and vague provisions in both bilateral and 
multilateral investment treaties. In responding to the problem of unclear treaty texts, 
some leading scholars have argued that arbitrators have expanded the meaning of 
texts far beyond the states’ initial commitments.
94
 Similarly, Subedi discusses the 
expansive nature of arbitral awards in a series of cases, stating that protections ‘will 
be stretched to argue that the host state concerned failed in its obligation to provide 
full protection and security to the foreign investor.’
95
 Regarding the problem of 
expansive interpretation, Van Harten argues that the ambiguity of the law on 
expropriation can lead to ‘a broad reading’ of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), 
in a manner that precludes some legitimate regulatory actions.
96
 Given this trend, the 
host state’s sovereign right to regulate is harmfully affected by a broad interpretation 
of private investor rights in the existing treaty texts.
97
  
In addition to the problems associated with an overly broad interpretation of BIT 
provisions, the current regime of treaty provisions also triggers multiple 
interpretative approaches and inconsistent arbitral awards. For example, when 
interpreting the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause, the Tribunal in Impregilo SpA 
v Argentina
98
 held that that the MFN clause is applicable to dispute resolution. In 
this case, the Province of Buenos Aires privatized all water and sewage services, and 
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an Italian company, Impregilo, through its subsidiary local company AGBA, entered 
into a concession contract for a term of 30 years with the Province in 1999.
99
 
However, in 2001, AGBA was experiencing some difficulties in collecting fees from 
customers during the economic crisis in Argentina.
100
 AGBA made requests to the 
provincial government to increase tariffs,
101
 however, the requests were rejected and 
the Federal Government enacted a law to freeze all utility contracts.
102
 In 2006, the 
Ministry of Public Services concluded that AGBA had violated the Concession 
Contract and it imposed fines on AGBA.
103
 Impregilo submitted a claim to 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against the 
Argentine Government for its failure to observe the commitments under the 
Argentina-Italy BIT.  
Argentina denied the claims and argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction as 
Impregilo failed to observe the requirement in the BIT that the dispute be submitted 
to domestic courts for 18 months before lodging the case for international 
arbitration.
104
 However, Impregilo claimed that, under the MFN provisions, it had 
the right to take up a more favorable investor-state dispute settlement term as found 
in other BITs. It asserted that since the MFN clause can extend to procedural issues, 
it can import a more favorable dispute resolution from the Argentina-US BIT by the 
virtue of the Argentina-Italy BIT.
105
 
The majority of the tribunal held that the MFN clause in the Argentina-Italy BIT 
permitted Impregilo to adopt a more favorable dispute resolution rule from the 
Argentina-US BIT. The tribunal asserted that the words ‘treatment’ and ‘all other 
matters regulated by this Agreement’, under Article 3 of the Argentina-Italy BIT, 
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extends to dispute settlement procedures.
106
 Thus the tribunal took a very broad view 
in interpreting the MFN provision.  
By contrast, the Tribunal in Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentina
107
 applied a 
different concept and refused to include dispute resolution in the ambit of the 
MFN.
108
 In this case, the claimant commenced ICSID arbitration proceedings in 
relation to numerous measures that the Federal Government of Argentina adopted 
during the regional economic crisis in 2001.
109
 Argentina argued that the tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction on the basis that Daimler failed to observe the dispute settlement 
requirements under Article 10 of the Argentina-Germany BIT, and that use of the 
MFN clause to bypass the dispute settlement requirements was prohibited.
110
 Based 
on the conditions set by the law, the dispute could only be submitted to international 
arbitration when the period of 18 months had elapsed from the moment when the 




Daimler argued that it did not have to submit the dispute to the domestic court as it 
could adopt more generous dispute resolution rules from other BITs.
112
 Daimler 
referred to Article 3 of the Argentina-Chile BIT, which states that either party may 
settle the dispute in a domestic court or by international arbitration, providing that 
the dispute cannot be settled amicably within six months.
113
 
In contrast to Impregilo SpA v Argentina
114
, the majority in the tribunal in Daimler 
Financial Services AG v Argentina
115
 held that the claimant cannot invoke an MFN 
provision in the Argentina-Germany BIT to avoid the agreed upon dispute resolution 
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rules and pick up more favourable dispute settlement methods.
116
 The tribunal 
asserted that the 18 months requirement was mandatory and both parties must 
observe the sequential process that they agreed upon.
117
 The Tribunal held that 
Daimler could not invoke the MFN clause to circumvent the agreed text.
118
 
In addition to the MFN clause, inconsistency has also been observed in the 
interpretation of the term ‘expropriation’. For example, in the context of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Tribunal in Metalclad v Mexico
119
 
interpreted the term ‘measure tantamount to expropriation’ generously to mean that 
any measure interfering with business’s legitimate expectation could amount to 
compensable expropriation. However, in Feldman v Mexico
120
, the NAFTA tribunal 
did not award in favor of foreign investors, confirming that such regulations were 
justified and not subject to compensation.  
Some commentators claim that when the legal texts are too broad and vague, 
arbitrators can decide cases based on their differing views of the applicable laws, and 
that also unavoidably affects the way the arbitrators assess factual details within 
these cases.
121
 Analysis of past arbitral interpretations reveals that the divergent 
decisions and awards are dependent on the experience, individual preference and 
judgment of adjudicators.
122
 This problem has concerned some legal experts due to 
contradictory legal rulings arising from very similar sets of questions or facts.
123
  
As noted above, legal provisions that are unclearly defined may lead to a ‘legitimacy 
crisis’ within the investment treaty arbitration system. This may result in the 
adoption of inconsistent interpretations and ultimately, inconsistent decisions by the 
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 Hueckel observes that ‘broad standards have led to inconsistent 
arbitral awards that undermine both the legitimacy of the system and the sovereignty 
of participating states’.
125
 This implies that the reviewing body must engage in a 
deeper analysis of investment treaty rights and display greater transparency in their 
decisions, to guarantee logical consistency in their legal reasoning. 
2. Causes 
The problem of legal indeterminacy is caused by both legal and non-legal factors. 
They include both textual ambiguity and the institutional structure of the arbitration 
system. 
(a) Unclear Legal Texts 
The problem of legal indeterminacy in investment treaties is largely attributed to 
unclearly defined text. One of the main reasons for this is the flexibility intended by 
the drafter to handle any unforeseen situations in the future. For example, in the 
context of what constitutes a protected ‘investment’, nearly all investment treaties 
include a non-exhaustive wide ranging list of economic activities falling within the 
scope of a defined protected investment.
126
. This is due to the avoidance by the 




Even though some treaties provide greater detail in their definition of investment to 
provide guidance to tribunals engaging in legal interpretation, they similarly include 
an open-ended, non-exhaustive list of assets to characterize investments protected 
under investment treaties.
128
 Such an expansive treaty language reflects the new form 
of investment protection mandated by neoliberal legal regimes. These expansive 
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norms are needed to promote the flow of investment, thereby ensuring economic 
progress. In other words, to accommodate new forms of protected investment 
activities in the future, legal texts have been drafted in an unrestrictive manner.
129
 As 
a consequence, arbitrators are at risk of reinterpreting phrases in treaty texts beyond 
the original intention of the states. This creates rules of secure investment 
protection.
130
 As a consequence, arbitrators are at a risk of reinterpreting phrase. 
In addition, the drafters of investment treaties intentionally leave some legal 
provisions vague and flexible so as to encompass subsequent more specific 
agreement. Given vastly different political, economic and social factors in each 
country, Hai asserts that ambiguous language is necessary as it is nearly impossible 
for the States to achieve agreement on detailed international obligations.
131
 To reach 
such general agreement, the treaties are thus normally drafted by resorting to ‘a 
compromise that glosses over their differences with vague, obscure or ambiguous 
wording, sacrificing clarity for the sake of obtaining consensus in treaties and 
conventions’.
132
 Therefore, broadly drafted text is an effective means to reach 
consensus on core provisions and to move negotiations forward. This approach is 
effectively a compromise between the competing interests of the contracting parties. 
For example, there is no consensus as to what constitutes actions breaching the 
obligatory standards imposed by ‘indirect expropriation’ and ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ clauses,
133
 despite the fact that these concepts are fairly common within 
the national laws of some countries.
134
 In order to find international consensus that is 
acceptable to all, it is arguably necessary to leave the text as wide open as possible to 
encompass the differences among countries.
135
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(b) The Structure and the System of Investor-State Arbitration 
Besides vague language, legal indeterminacy in investment treaties is also 
attributable to the structural characteristics of investor-state arbitration. Investor-state 
arbitration under international investment treaties has many unique characteristics. 
Firstly, it grants an investor the right to bring a case against the host State 
government directly. Secondly, the investor-state dispute is normally decided by 
appointed one-off ad hoc arbitrators, and to ensure neutrality and speediness, the 
award rendered by the arbitrators cannot be reviewed by the domestic court of the 
country which is the seat of arbitration. Even if a local court can set aside the arbitral 
award, the court can do so only on very limited grounds. Thirdly, the award rendered 
has a legally binding effect on the parties to the dispute, but no precedential effect 
binding upon similar cases in the future. Fourthly, confidentiality of proceedings 




Commentators have identified causes of interpretative problems as resulting from 
this structure of the existing investment arbitration system, ie: the ad-hoc nature of 
the arbitration system, the lack of binding effect of precedent, and the absence of any 
reviewing body. 
(i) Ad Hoc System 
Professor Thomas Walde found that clarity can be obstructed by the ad hoc nature of 
investment arbitration. Since the current system of arbitral proceedings is operated 
by ad hoc investment arbitrators, interpretations by them are ‘predominantly an 
effort by tribunals with a variety of expertise, experience, and time available to make 
sense, test, compare, reformulate, select, and,… to identify agreement from the 
opposing and disparate submissions by the parties.’
137
 Thus, personal educational 
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background and socio-political beliefs can greatly influence the ‘style of reasoning’ 
of the chosen arbitrators.
138
 
The influence of a personal professional background on the standards of review 
applied by various appointed arbitrators has been emphasized by Stephan Schill. 
According to his study, the dynamic in this complex area is pushed forward by a 
small group of specialists with different professional backgrounds. While a number 
of arbitrators with commercial law backgrounds granted protection rights to 
investors suffering from a State’s use of regulatory powers, without focusing much 
on the sensitivity of public interests, arbitrators with public law backgrounds were 
more aware of the importance of State autonomy and paid more deference to a 
State’s wider margin of discretion.
139
 As a consequence, different arbitral tribunals 
applied different standards to reviews of States’ regulatory activities, despite similar 
facts or investment rights.
140
 
(ii) No Precedent Doctrine 
Lack of progress in clarifying substantive rights is attributed to the absence of the 
doctrine of precedent in the investment arbitration system. A considerable number of 
scholarly writings indicate the problems arising from the non-binding effects of 
previous arbitral awards. Christoph Schreuer and Matthew Weiniger, for example, 
referring to Article 53(1) of the ICSID Rules, conclude that the provision requires 
only that the award bind the parties (ICSID 53(1)),
141
 and the awards in previous 
cases have no binding effect on subsequent cases.
142
 Due to the absence of legally 
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binding precedents, tribunals in different cases may take different views in 
interpreting the rules when making a decision.
143
  
The problem of the lack of precedent is also highlighted by Devrim Deniz Celik. 
Due to the lack of precedent in investment arbitration, tribunals can construe treaty 
texts by using different legal approaches to interpret vague treaty provisions.
144
 In 
the case of expropriation, the author identifies different legal methodologies used for 
determining the meaning of indirect expropriation, as found in Metalclad v Mexico
145
 
and Pope&Talbot v Canada.
146
 While the former case endorsed a liberal approach to 
protect investors, the latter endorsed the state’s rights to regulate in the public 
interest without compensation obligations. 
(iii) No Single Reviewing Body to Unify Interpretations 
Under the existing framework, ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration rules do not 
provide an appellate body with power to review arbitral awards under international 
investment treaties.
147
 Under regular ICSID rules, the arbitral decision is subject to 
internal ICSID review when each party to the dispute is a member-state of the 
ICSID. In such a case, the arbitral tribunal’s decision can be annulled only by an 
appointed ICSID reviewing body.
148
 Domestic courts in the country where the 
arbitration was situated are not empowered to review these cases.
149
  
Unlike the ICSID Additional Facility rules, which are applicable where one of the 
parties to the dispute is not a member of the ICSID Convention, cases may be 
reviewed by the courts within the country where the arbitration is situated.
150
 This is 
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similar to the UNCITRAL rules, which permit the national court of the place in 
which the arbitration is located to challenge the arbitral award.
151
 Nevertheless, the 
national court can only undertake a review within a very limited range of issues, 
which include neither legal error nor the issue of legal inconsistency.
152
   
Within the existing framework for investment arbitration, there is no single appeal 
mechanism for reviewing arbitral awards. Due to the lack of the reviewing 
mechanism, Subedi argues that it is impossible for arbitral tribunals to succeed in 
‘harmonizing different trends in interpreting the rules of foreign investment law and 
the somewhat divergent views of various investment tribunals’.
153
 This makes it very 
difficult to develop coherent and consistent legal interpretations of awards rendered 
under international investment treaties.
154
  
3. The Proposed Solutions 
To resolve the problems of legal indeterminacy, a number of approaches have been 
raised by legal scholars. Some of the proposed solutions include: textual 
clarification, a new institutional framework, or a new treaty interpretative method. 
(a) Improved Textual Clarity 
To address the problem of textual ambiguity, there have been significant attempts to 
make international investment rules as clear as possible. For example, in the 
NAFTA
155
 context, Canada and the United States jointly issued a binding 
interpretative statement through the NAFTA Fair Trade Commission (FTC) after 
they were repeatedly exposed as respondents under NAFTA Chapter 11 investment 
arbitrations,
156
 to clarify the nature and scope of the term ‘fair and equitable 
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treatment’ (FET) in Article 1105 of NAFTA Chapter 11.
157
 According to the FTC’s 
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, foreign investors are 
entitled to fair and equitable treatments which ‘do not require treatment in addition 
to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment’.  
Beyond the context of NAFTA, attempts have been made to clarify BIT provisions. 
The United States, for example, adopted a new Model BIT in 2004 to promote clarity 
in some key provisions. In the context of expropriation provisions, the US Model 
stipulates that:  
(a) the determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, 
fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact 
that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an 
indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and 
(iii) the character of the government action. 
Annex B of the US model also provides a clearer guideline to distinguish a normal 
use of regulatory power from indirect expropriation committing to compensatory 
obligations. It says that: 
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(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation. 
Canada similarly adopted a new model Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (FIPA) to be used as a guideline to clarify some key 
provisions.
158
 Concerning what constitutes a compensable expropriation,
159
 the 
Model FIPA requires that a non-discriminatory measure taken to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives will not constitute indirect expropriation, except in rare 
circumstances.
160
 This provision indicates that, non-discriminatory good-faith 
measures to protect public welfare objectives will be sheltered from liability and 
will, therefore, not be regarded as an indirect expropriation. 
Despite these attempts, vagueness and ambiguity are not totally removed from 
international laws. Rohan Perera claims that explicit criteria contained in US Model 
BIT could create more legal uncertainty in investment treaties.
161
 He argues that 
legal uncertainties surrounding the phrase ‘except in rare circumstances’ would give 
rise to a new area of controversy from the point of view of the host state, since any 
good faith non-discriminatory regulatory action on the part of a host State could be 
interpreted at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal as a measure tantamount to an 
‘indirect expropriation,… in a given situation’.
162
 It is therefore left to the tribunals 
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Although more strict and specific wording is desirable, some commentators argue 
that the ambiguity will persist, especially when the parties cannot totally agree on the 
negotiated text.
164
 The renowned legal philosopher Thomas Franck, for example, is 
inclined to accept this proposition asserting that, in order to promote international 
agreements, ambiguous terms and a certain degree of flexibility have to be 
maintained in treaty provisions.
165
  
Aaken supports this view and admits that to enable the states to reach international 
consensus and carry out their sovereign powers, making the written treaty text less 
specific and more flexible is advantageous.
166
 From the point of view of economic 
contract theory,
167
 parties conclude a contract only when perceived benefits exceed 
incurred costs.
168
 However, the parties may experience unforeseen situations that 
undermine the anticipated joint benefit, and in addition, contracts that are too strict 
and inflexible may negate the benefits for one of the parties.
169
 Without sufficient 
BIT flexibility, state parties may react in a manner unfavorable to the BIT which 
may undermine foreign direct investment protection.
170
   
Overall, full textual clarity is almost impossible. Although there have been many 
attempts to define legal text as precisely as possible, vague and ambiguous language 
still persists. Due to the omnipresence of vagueness in treaty texts, textual 
clarification is inherently difficult to achieve. It is therefore necessary to identify an 
interpretative approach which promotes greater transparency and logical consistency 
of legal reasoning, in order to strike a balance between a state’s exercise of its 
sovereign power and the protection of the rights of foreign investors pursuant to 
various international investment treaties.  
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(b) Amending the Arbitration Rules to Promote Predictability of Legal 
Interpretation 
To enhance consistency and predictability across investor-state awards, the existing 
body of work on institutional reform suggests that changes are needed in the system 
of investor-state arbitration. These suggested initiatives include the recognition of a 
doctrine of ‘precedent’, which requires subsequent cases to follow the rulings made 
by previous arbitrations.
171
 In addition, some advocate the establishment of an 
appellate mechanism for investor-state arbitrations through the ‘International 
Investment Court’ with a mandate to review awards under investment treaties in 
order to provide more consistent and coherent interpretations of legal orders.
172
 In 
support of these ideas, the ICSID released a discussion paper in 2004 to propose a 
reform plan for the institution’s arbitration rules.
173
 Among the major changes 
proposed by the ICSID were recommendations concerning preliminary procedure, 
publication of awards, access by third parties to the proceedings; and disclosure 
requirements for arbitrators.
174
 Besides the procedural rules, the Secretariat of the 
ICSID also recommended the creation of a single appellate body to review arbitral 
awards.
175
 Rather than being undertaken by different mechanisms for each treaty 
concerned, the Secretariat of the ICSID argued that an appellate body would help to 
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Whilst constructive, these ambitious ideas have made slow progress, and have not 
obtained support from all state parties.
177
 Trinh Hai says that it is inappropriate to set 
up an appellate mechanism for ad hoc arbitral tribunals under diverse investment 
treaties, and that this could ‘result in the same problems of inconsistency and 
possible interpretative errors when they would actually serve as the second tier of 
arbitral evaluation.’
178
 He argues that such changes are premature and would be 
difficult at this moment in time, as they demand a great deal of revision of the 
existing arbitration rules and many of them may dilute the benefits of arbitration 
systems, which derive from efficiency and finality.
179
 Some intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the South Centre, disagreed with the policy initiative proposed 
by the ICSID. It expressed concerns that the institutional reform is premature and 
that the benefits of the creation of an appeal mechanism would be outweighed by the 
costs, as poor countries will suffer from extended litigation proceedings.
180
 Some 
legal commentators argue that the creation of the appellate mechanism is unlikely to 
happen in the near future,
181
 and that this institutional reform would conflict with the 
existing ICSID arbitral rules which exclude any form of appeal against awards made 
by the appointed arbitrators.
182
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the implications of the proposed policy 
initiative are enormous. Even though the recommended amendments could improve 
the coherence and consistency of arbitral awards, a wider discussion of the possible 
amendment of the existing arbitral rules must, therefore, ensure that over-burdening 
cost implications are avoided and not borne by the contracting states. 
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(c) The Adoption of a New Interpretative Approach to Promote the Coherence of 
Legal Reasoning and Greater Transparency in the Decision-Making Process 
Both approaches discussed above face some difficulty. In the context of treaty 
drafting, ‘too precise legal text’ might impose excessive limitations on the 
adjudicator to accommodate unforeseen circumstances or changing conditions.
183
 As 
a consequence, an arbitrator’s individual bias would likely come back and play a 
critical role in tackling the contingencies, leading once more to the problem of 
jurisprudential uncertainty.  
Alternatively, the establishment of a single appellate mechanism could undermine 
the desirable feature of a speedy investment-treaty arbitration. The creation of a 
single appellate body is also contentious because the parties in the investment 
dispute could suffer from higher transaction costs and longer dispute settlement 
proceedings. In this way, the constitution of a single appellate body could 
disadvantage poor countries using the proposed facility. 
To avoid the deficiencies in both approaches, some commentators have proposed 
using ‘general principles of law’ found within the public law framework under both 
domestic and international law as a feasible solution to overcome the problems of 
vague treaty language and alleged bias in the arbitration system. Use of the ‘public 
law’ approach might overcome some interpretative difficulties, and also help 
maintain the viability of the current regime of arbitration. In order to formulate 
sustainable and certain arbitral jurisprudence, it is recommended that an arbitrator 
should resort to the public law method of legal interpretation for investment-treaty 
disputes. 
Although general principles of law within the public law framework are not 
completely free from ambiguity, the identified principle may provide for a coherent 
account of the adjudication process by arbitral tribunals when dealing with 
indeterminacy. Based on the theorists’ point of view, the role of coherence in legal 
reasoning cannot be overlooked, as it enables the adjudicator to reach judicial 
decisions that adhere to some extent with the settled law of an entire legal system or 
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with particular areas of law. MacCormick, for example, views coherence in terms of 
the unity of a principle in a legal system, contending that the coherence of a set of 
legal norms adheres to either some common value or principle.
184
 Likewise, Raz also 
views coherence in terms of the unity of the principle. On his view, the more unified 
the set of principles underlying a courts’ decision, the more coherent the law is.
185
 
When considering the role of coherence in legal reasoning, the interpretation of 
investment treaties based on the public law framework encourage an adjudicator to 
interpret the law in a more consistent manner, which contributes to enhanced clarity 
in the adjudication of subsequent cases.  
Since investment treaties are analogous to public law, permitting the individual to 
seek redress for injuries caused by members of public administration, analysis of 
legal norms embodied in domestic public laws is suggested by some commentators. 
Van Harten, for example, asserts the critical role of public law concepts in 
investment-treaty arbitration. Unlike conventional international commercial disputes, 
he argues that investor-state disputes largely involve a dispute arising from the 
exercise of a state’s sovereign power in the public interest.
186
 This special feature of 
investment-treaty arbitration requires the adjudicators to employ complex strategies 
to strike an appropriate balance between public and private benefits. Thus, to resolve 
investor-state disputes, Van Harten strongly advocates the use of public law concepts 
to deal with the regulatory relationship between the host State government and 
foreign investors.
187
 To advance a more coherent interpretation of laws, deference to 
state judgments akin to the principle of deference in domestic administrative laws is 
advisable.188 According to Van Harten, understanding the Administrative and 
Constitutional laws of countries can provide arbitral tribunals with useful guidance 
in dealing with matters that arise out of regulatory disputes.
189
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To find a reliable and consistent basis for treaty interpretation, a considerable 
amount of literature has focused on the task of refining treaty standards through the 
comparative study of public law concepts. One of the most recognizable studies in 
this field was undertaken in 2011 by the Working Group on General Public 
International Law and International Investment Law of the Transnational National 
Economic Law Centre of the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in 
Germany. This study demonstrated the benefits of the application of general 
principles of domestic law and conceptualized some key substantive laws in the 
international investment framework through the lens of German public law.
190
 The 
research argues that due to deficiency in relevant aspects of international investment 
law, the threshold of investment protections contained in investment treaties should 
be found in the legal norms of the domestic law of the host countries.
191
 This 
approach will potentially provide interpretative guidance for arbitrators applying 
investment treaties, and will ensure that the adjudicators’ discretion is limited and 
that the interpretation of vague standards of investment protection rights is made in 




Authors, such as Schill, also assert the utility of general principles of law as a source 
of treaty interpretation when dealing with vague terms in investment agreements. 
Schill argues that the application of general principles of law can be of help in 
identifying some ‘normative’ considerations within the investment arbitral 
processes.
193
 As Perkam asserts, arbitral decisions should not only be fair and free 
from personal bias, but also reflect the core fundamental principles of the legal 
system and the rights which have been legitimately relied on by both host states and 
foreign investors at the time when investments were established in the country 
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 Through legal rules, judicial decisions, soft laws and guidelines, some 
general principles can be singled out. These can provide interpretative guidelines for 
the arbitrators when encountering legal indeterminacy.
195
  
To identify the general principles of law in the context of indirect expropriation law, 
the ‘proportionality principle’ is overwhelmingly regarded as an internationally 
recognizable doctrine that emerged from the domestic public laws of civilized 
nations. Due to its widespread acceptance, this principle has often been adopted by 
international investment arbitrators when considering claims in which a State’s 
regulatory interference has affected an individual’s property rights. Since investment 
arbitrators have become mindful of the state’s rights to control, some have adopted a 
deferential ‘proportionality test’, by ascertaining the State’s justifications for 
interference and examining whether the regulatory interference imposes an excessive 
burden on the property owner.  
Even though the “proportionality principle” cannot dictate fixed correct legal 
answers to any legal question, and although it is not able to inform the adjudicators 
on how to weigh various interests and values in any case, it does offer procedures to 
govern a stable legal framework that adjudicators may use to justify their rulings.
196
 
Due to the multitude of analytical steps involved in the resolution of legal disputes, 
the proportionality principle is a useful tool for reconciling opposed values and 
interests, and to resolve conflicts between two sets of norms.
197
 The underlying 
principle may promote coherence in legal reasoning, and greater transparency in the 
decision-making process of international investment arbitrations. 
Following the brief advantages of public law regime, the role of ‘general principles 
of public law’ as a new source of legal interpretation will be examined later in 
Chapter Five, and the widespread use of the proportionality test as a general 
principle of law by domestic courts in the United States, the European Court of 
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Human Rights and selected developing countries (Thailand and Mexico) will be 
investigated in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight, respectively. 
 
D. Conclusions 
A vast literature has arisen pertaining to the issue of legal indeterminacy. Thinkers 
from legal positivism, critical legal studies and pragmatism alike question the causes 
and consequences of inconsistency and uncertainty in law. Essentially, the vagueness 
of legal text, the personal bias of adjudicators and the structure of adjudicating 
processes each contribute greatly to the inconsistency and uncertainty of investment 
treaty textual interpretation. From a theoretical point of view, when answering hard 
cases with imprecise legal text, adjudicators play a vital role in applying the rules to 
facts and, on many occasions, have to decide these cases on the basis of a personal 
assessment of the norms rather than on the basis of generally recognized legal 
principles. This problem leads to divergence and inconsistency of legal interpretation 
across different cases. 
A consideration of the existing literature in the field of international law on foreign 
investment protection highlights the problems of inconsistent and uncertain 
interpretation by arbitral tribunals often present in investor-state arbitrations. The 
erratic application of legal principles undermines the legitimacy of the arbitration 
system. The literature has identified the sources of indeterminacy of treaty 
interpretation. Aside from broad or vague legal provisions, the current structure, 
legal framework, and practice of the investor-state arbitration system also impedes 
consistency and certainty in arbitral tribunal interpretations of unclear legal texts. To 
better deal with these problems, various approaches to promote clarity and uniform 
interpretation of treaty text have been discussed. They include increased clarity of 
the treaty’s text, amendment of the current legal framework of the investor-state 
arbitration system, and the establishment of an investment appeal court.  
Nevertheless, the previously advanced solutions are considered to be impractical and 
not free from contention. In order to promote a practical legal solution, numerous 
critics have proposed to rely on general principles of law found in public law 
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framework as an interpretative guidance to achieve more logical consistency and 
greater transparency in decision-making process. Without having to replace the 
current arbitration system, the general principles of law approach can be applied 
directly and can be carried out in compliance with the international rules on treaty 
interpretation. In order to promote coherence and transparency in the international 
investment arbitrations, adjudicators cannot rely simply upon the wording of the text, 
but also have to apply fundamental doctrines generally accepted in public law. 
However, in spite of the advantages, this approach is not fully free from 
controversies as it may be difficult to identify relevant general principles of law 
directly applicable to the case. It is thus a key aim of this research to discover and 
prove the existence of generally accepted principles of law relevant to the topic of 
indirect expropriation under international investment treaties. 
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CHAPTER III  
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON EXPROPRIATION 
BEFORE THE AGE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: FROM CLASSICAL 
EXPROPRIATION TO REGULATORY TAKINGS 
 
The protection against nationalization of foreign-owned property has been widely 
discussed. Literature on the topic of classic expropriation has always focused upon 
an outright taking of private property by the state government, which results in the 
compulsory transfer by promulgated legislation of specific assets, or the ownership 
of rights over property, to the state government or a third party.
1
 This form of direct 
nationalization was popular and a major concern in public international law before 
the First World War.
2
 
However, since then, the issue of indirect expropriation, or regulatory takings, has 
become more prevalent as an issue in international law. Instead of taking the 
property directly, this new form of expropriation involves governmental regulation 
that negatively affects the utilization and enjoyment of property rights, to the extent 
that it has virtually the same effect as nationalization or direct confiscation.
3
 
Although the issue of indirect expropriation has not been regulated by international 
legal standards, the issue has sometimes been addressed and examined in arbitral 
decisions and international agreements.  
The objective of this Chapter is to articulate the evolution of international law on 
foreign investment protection against expropriation prior to the Second World War. 
The study conducted within this Chapter illustrates the developments in 
expropriation law, as perceived by both developed and developing countries, before 
the emergence of international investment treaties. The emerging concept of indirect 
expropriation, or regulatory takings, which gradually developed in the early periods, 
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will also be investigated. This Chapter demonstrates that the approaches of 
developed and developing countries in regards to indirect expropriation or regulatory 
expropriation conflicted with each other. The research will provide an overall 
account of the divergent standards of treatment of foreign investors, and explain why 
consensus in customary international law on expropriation law was unable to be 
achieved in earlier times. 
 
A. The Origin of International Law on Expropriation  
before the Second World War 
1. Early Development of International Law on Expropriation Proposed by 
Western Nations 
Back in the Middle Ages, the main approach to settling a dispute between nations 
relied heavily on diplomatic protection.
4
 To protect the interests of its nationals in 
overseas countries, capital-exporting countries generally exercised diplomatic 
protection on behalf of their injured nationals.
5
 In order to provide extensive 
protection for injured nationals, diplomatic protection could be carried out through a 
variety of approaches, namely by military forces, ad hoc commissions and arbitral 
tribunals,
6
 as well as by neutral international judicial forums like the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
7
 Central to the challenges experienced at this 
time were issues relating to unlawful expropriation of aliens’ property. 
During the colonial period, most non-Western countries were colonies. As Angie 
indicates, colonies were not granted independence and had no recognized 
sovereignty under international law.
8
 They were not considered to have power to 
enter into international treaties with other sovereign States due to their lack of 
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international legal personality; a requirement under international law.
9
 As a result, 
the concepts of expropriation in international law were generally advanced by 
Western nations. 
The United States was considered one of the first nations to seek protection for its 
nationals by means of international agreements. The United States negotiated and 
concluded a series of treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNs),
10
 
beginning with its first FCN agreement with France in 1778, the Netherlands in 
1782, and Sweden in 1783.
11
 
In the 19th century, investment protection was not the main focus of negotiated 
agreements. Instead, a typical concern was National Treatment and Most-Favoured 
Nation (MFN) status with respect to trade, mutual guarantees against discrimination, 




In the early formulae, no legal provision referred directly to the issue of 
expropriation.
13
 During the 1920s and 1930s, US FCNs generally contained a 
uniform protection standard, providing the nationals of each contracting party with 
‘the most constant protection and security’ and the protection ‘required by 
international law.’
14
 However, the FCN between the United States and Germany in 
1920 explicitly prohibited the expropriation of foreign properties, by saying that: 
The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive within the territories of the 
other, upon submitting to conditions imposed upon its nationals, the most constant 
protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect 
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that degree of protection that is required by international law. Their property shall not 
be taken without due process of law and without payment of just compensation.
15
 
This significant FCN called for only lawful expropriation, requiring that a property 
must be treated in accordance with international law, and that expropriation can be 
imposed only with the due process of law and a payment of just compensation.
16
 The 
broad language suggests that international law plays a superior role to national 
treatment standards, and the host state government could not be excused for non-
fulfillment of its international obligations by relying upon its own domestic law.  
Thus, international legal rules at that time played a significant role in determining the 
‘nebulous concept’ of protection and compensation, to which the State needed to 
adhere.
17
 Bonnitcha remarks that the underlying doctrine of protection announced an 
‘international law standard of expropriation independent of either discrimination or 
denial of justice in the treatment of foreign property’.
18
 In this respect, the broad 
scope of expropriation liability under international law was expansive enough to 
include all potential risks, not only the outright taking of physical assets, but also 
other regulatory interference that deprived an owner of property or economic value. 
The rule of protection against expropriation was emphasized again in the early 
1920s, when the US challenged the Mexican government to take responsibility for its 
unlawful expropriation behaviors. The most noteworthy incident took place in 1938 
when the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, wrote a letter to the Mexican Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs regarding the expropriation of American oil and agrarian 
investments in Mexico.
19
 In the exchanged correspondence, Secretary Hull called for 
full protection over expropriated property and expounded the now-famous doctrine 
called the ‘Hull Formula’. According to the Hull Formula, the State is allowed to 
                                                 
15
 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights,The United States-Germany, 44 Stat. 
2132, 2133-34 (enter into force 8 December 1923) art I cited in O'Connor, above n 13, 370. 
16
 Robert Renbert Wilson, United States commercial treaties and international law (Hauser Press, 
1960) 126; Vandevelde, above n 10, 205-6. 
17
 O'Connor, above n 13, 370. 
18
 Jonathan Bonnitcha, The Implications of the Structure of the Regulatory Expropriation Enquiry in 
International Investment Law (LL.M. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008) 18. 
19
 Andrew T. Guzman, 'Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties' (1998) 38(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 639. 
58 
nationalize, but the taking of an alien’s property by a host state requires ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective’ compensation.
20
  
As Sornarajah notes, the proposed standard was considered by Western nations as 
the customary international law minimum standard,
21
 aiming to ensure that ‘the 
freedom of trade and investment across state boundaries is guaranteed.’
22
 Based on 
the Hull Formula, whenever the state government engages in nationalizations or 
other types of regulatory measures, the government of the host state has an 
obligation to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation to the benefit party. 
Contrary to the practices of the US, European countries initially resorted more 
frequently to non-legal instruments. Sornarajah notes that the underlying protection 
mechanisms used by European nations were largely driven by colonial expansion.
23
 
Through the ‘imperial system’, some powerful European countries exerted direct 
control over their colonies.
24
 Due to their strong influence by colonization, there was 
no need to create a separate legal system or international laws to protect the benefits 
of European nationals in their colony states.
25
 In the case of States that had never 
been colonized, European countries asserted the legal principle of 
‘extraterritoriality’,
26
 which immunized aliens against the local laws of host states 
that were considered to be uncivilized and inferior to Western legal systems.
27
 The 
principle of extraterritoriality was advanced by Western European nations to protect 
the interests and commercial activities of their nationals in overseas countries.
28
 
Outside the sphere of their colonial power, Western countries concurrently 
developed a relationship with other countries based on equality.  O’Connor found 
that European countries started to build up external networks by signing international 
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agreements among themselves and other countries outside of their colonial control.
29
 
To protect the trade and commerce activities of their nationals in overseas countries 
from unlawful expropriation, European countries concluded a number of 
international agreements, which explicitly incorporated a clause that prevented 
foreign-owned property from being unlawfully nationalized by the host state 
government.
30
 Most international agreements required that, to be lawful, private 
property could not be taken without compensation.
31
  
2. Early Decisions of International Tribunals on the Concept of Indirect 
Expropriation 
The eminence of expropriation cases has long been discussed in international law. 
The main early form of expropriation involved deprivation of a foreign investor’s 
property through its confiscation and nationalization for use as a public utility.
32
 
Consequently, a growing body of international jurisprudence dealt with state 
regulatory interference that resulted in a deprivation of foreign-owned property 
rights and economic benefits. 
One of the oldest decisions concerning regulatory expropriation was the controversy 
between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the 19
th
 
century. The case was one of the very first significant cases to deal with the concept 
of indirect or regulatory expropriation, where the British trader’s rights over 
manufacturing and trading of sulphur were abolished by the orders of the Sicilian 
government. In 1838, Great Britain argued that Sicily had granted sulphur monopoly 
rights to French traders in breach of British rights to property protection under the 
1816 Treaty of Commerce.
33
 In early times, there was no restriction on the trading of 
sulphur in Sicily. Due to an increasing demand for sulphur within England and 
France, there was a dramatic increase in sulphur production and, as a consequence of 
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excessive production, sulphur prices decreased in the 1830s.
34
 To overcome this and 
maintain price stability, the French agreed on fixed-price contracts for a large 
quantity of Sulphur.
35
 The plan was greatly supported by many Sicilian mine 
owners, who expected to gain higher purchase prices from their production.
36
 The 
Sicilian government consequently granted a monopoly power to the French. This 
situation alarmed British firms and the British government claimed that the 
monopoly granted to the French had caused substantive economic loss to British 
companies, preventing them from trading their sulphur freely.
37
 To resolve the 
dispute, an adjudicating body was established. It held that the Sicilian granting of 
monopoly power to a single French company had affected British competitors’ 
property rights, and this justified the an award of compensation to the British owners 
of sulphur mines, the suppliers of sulphur and those that had been prevented from 
trading their product.
38
 In this case, the Sicilian government was ordered to pay 




In addition to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies dispute, the 
question of indirect expropriation was also addressed in the Norwegian Ship case.
40
 
One of the key issues decided by the tribunal in this instance was whether 
contractual rights could be subject to expropriation.
41
 In this case, there was a 
dispute between the United States and the Norwegian ship buyer. In response to the 
Norwegian claims of expropriation, the United States argued that it had expropriated 
only ships, and contractual rights could not be considered as property since ‘this 
property was an entity distinct from the material and other tangible things subjected 
to the property’.
42
 To decide the case, the Tribunal applied the internal laws of the 
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United States and Norway to determine what expropriatory actions had taken place.
43
 
The Tribunal held that the Fleet Corporation, a United States government entity, 
‘took over the legal rights and duties of the ship owners toward the shipbuilders’
44
 
and that amounted to ‘de facto expropriation’.
45
 The Tribunal thus asserted that the 
US authorities had to pay compensation not only for the requisition of tangible 
property, but also for all intangible property as well. 
Following the Norwegian Ship case, compensation was also awarded to American 
landowners in De Sabla v Panama,
46
 as a result of expropriation pursuant to a land 
reform policy of the government of Panama. Under a new land policy, the 
government could forcefully transfer temporary cultivator’s licenses over privately 
owned land to others.
47
 The government of Panama had made conveyances of 
portions of the claimant’s lands to Panamanian citizens on the ground that all the 
lands in question were public land.
48
 However, the government of Panama argued 
that the claimant failed to oppose all adjudications and applications, and that the 
claimant could not assert title over those public lands.
49
 
After considering all the evidence, the United States-Panama General Claims 
Commission (Commission) which was established under the conventions between 
the United States and Panama of 28 July 1926 and 17 December 1932, held that the 
Panamanian reforms were too unreasonably rigid and created hardship for the 
complainant.
50
 The Commission also held that, since the authorities should have 
afforded the owners of private property protection, they should deny applications for 
grants and licenses that conflicted with the land owned by the claimant. The 
Commission held that the license, despite being temporary, permanently deprived the 
landowner of title and encouraged trespassers to come onto the property and destroy 
all the timber and denude the soil by improper cultivation.
51
 The Commission 
asserted that such a license unlawfully made the land of De Sabla worthless as the 
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government order created a ‘constructive total loss of the property because of the 
breaking up of the continuity of the estate by adjudications, coupled with the damage 
done to forests and soil by the licensees.’
52
 The Commission ultimately granted De 
Sabla an indemnity in a claim for damages for violations of a foreign owner’s title to 
land in Panama.
53
 Thus, this case reflects the notion that the host government is 




The issue of regulatory expropriation and the standard of compensation were 
critically highlighted once again in the Chorzow Factory case, which concerned a 
nitrate factory located in the Polish city of Chorzow.
55
 In the Chorzow case, 
Bayrische Stickstoffwerke A.G., a German company, was granted a permit to 
operate a nitrate factory in Chorzow in the Upper Silesia region of Poland in 1915. 
The company was entitled to the rights to enjoy all contractual benefits arising out of 
the nitrate operation. However, during 1920-1922, the government of Poland 
introduced legislation to transfer the ownership to the Polish Treasury, permitting the 
Polish authority to take control over the nitrate factory as well as possession of its 
licenses, permits and patents.
56
 One of the key issues that the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) had to decide was whether State interference with 
contractual rights could be considered a compensable expropriation. The PCIJ 
decided that in addition to taking possession of the factory, Poland had deprived the 
foreign investor of the enjoyment of contractual rights and management of the firm. 
The Polish Government’s actions were unlawful, unless compensation was paid.
57
  
There are also examples of inconsistency in the legal approaches used by tribunals 
when deciding the expropriation cases, resulting in a denial of compensation for 
regulatory expropriation. In the Oscar Chinn case,
58
 for example, the tribunal held 
that a sharp reduction by the defendant government in tariffs on its own government-
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owned shipping line was not regarded as expropriation warranting a compensation 
claim by competing shipping companies. The government of the United Kingdom 
had brought the case on behalf of a British shipping firm, Oscar Chinn, against the 
Belgian Congo government. Although contractual rights are considered as property, 
protected by customary international law, the Tribunal in Oscar Chinn held that a 
speculative possibility of future profit-making is not protected and can be 
legitimately expropriated under international law.
59
 The Tribunal also disregarded 
the claim that the commercial situation of Oscar Chinn was a vested right.
60
 The 
Tribunal asserted that it was: 
unable to see in his original position - which was characterized by the possession of 
customers and the possibility of making profit - anything in the nature of a genuine 
vested right. Favorable business conditions and good will are transient circumstances, 
subject to inevitable changes.
61
 
The examples of judgments outlined above largely indicate that, prior to the Second 
World War, there was no precise single formula applied in indirect expropriation 
cases. Due to the lack of a specific legal doctrine, the ‘international minimum 
standard’ developed over the years into the core basis of the protection of foreign-
owned interests in foreign countries. Despite its success in providing protection, a 
broad and vague standard such as the ‘customary international minimum standard of 
treatment’ was unable to offer a satisfactorily ‘workable test’ to determine with 
certainty both the types of measures and the determinative threshold qualified as a 
regulatory expropriation under international law.
62
 Aside from the Oscar Chinn case, 
which excluded future profit from the notion of property, a number of early decisions 
fashioned the law of expropriation by expanding the scope of protection to include 
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not only physical seizure, but also the breach of a contract and the refusal of a 
permit. This generally validated broad claims for compensation under international 
law.  
 
B. Calvo Doctrine, Decolonization and the State’s Rights to  
Expropriate Private Property after the Second World War 
Faced with the expansive foreign protection provided in bilateral treaties, FCNs and 
the international minimum standard under customary law, some developing 
countries began to oppose these external standards of treatment imposed by 
advanced nations. Instead of surrendering to outside pressure, these countries 
maintained that they had the right to determine their own development goals and 
dealt with foreign investors in accordance with their own national legal orders.
63
 In 
this next section, the study will highlight legal changes which articulated the 
interests of developing countries after the Second World War. In addition to 
outlining the emerging concept of the Calvo Doctrine, this section also focuses on 
the establishment of the principle of State sovereignty in a series of United Nations 
Resolutions and their critical implications for the regulatory expropriation doctrine.  
1. Calvo Doctrine and the Challenges to the Traditional Standard of 
Expropriation Law  
To defend against external interference over their domestic affairs, some capital-
importing countries opposed the Western doctrine of international minimum 
standards of treatment and insisted upon state sovereign rights. In Argentina, for 





revitalized the essence of sovereign equality and rejected the customary international 
minimum standard of treatment, as well as the exercise of diplomatic protection and 
military interventions.
65
 He also asserted that discriminatory treatment favoring 
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Western powers is unacceptable and that foreigners should not be entitled to greater 
protection than the local people of the host State.
66
   
In the 20
th
 century, the Soviet Union, inspired by socialist doctrine, then rejected the 
concept of private property protection adopted by Western society.
67
 Based on 
socialist principles of property, the confiscation of private assets was a fundamental 
part of that country’s revolution to socialize the factors of production.
68
 To achieve 
the Soviet’s development goals, the government promulgated decrees to abolish 
private ownership in 1918, and acclaimed its right to nationalize private property 
without incurring an obligation to compensate or restitute the aggrieved party for the 
expropriated assets.
69
 The socialist countries of Eastern Europe also challenged 
Western practices, and carried out extensive expropriations of private property. As 
Brazell indicates, the regulation of alien property based on the traditional concept of 
state responsibility was problematic since ‘it addressed the concerns of one side, the 
investor’s home state, [and] [excluded] of those of the host.’
70
  
In response to the changing geopolitical and global economic structure, as well as 
dissatisfaction with Western positions, 1960-1977 was a period characterized by 
significant movement in expropriation programs in many developing countries,
71
 in 
order to end economic domination of resource exploitation by Western powers.
72
 
Burton observes that the nationalization of properties belonging to foreign investors 
after the Second World War came in many different forms, varying from outright 
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Expropriation of foreign-owned investment was directly related to political attempts 
to abolish the doctrine of private property protection introduced by industrialized 
countries.
74
 As part of a massive movement of nationalization, the taking of alien 
properties occurred in many countries worldwide, including the Soviet Union in 
1917, Mexico in 1938, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland between 
1945 and 1948, China in the 1950s, Bolivia in 1952, Egypt in 1956, and Cuba in 
1959.
75
 This proliferation of nationalizations covered a wide range of key resource 
industries, such as oil, mining and petroleum.
76
  
To end the inequality in economic and political relationships, newly independent 
small countries ultimately united in the call for a new system, which would ensure 
that every state could freely exercise full and permanent sovereignty within its 
territory, in order to regulate the activities of transnational corporations for the 
benefits of the host country.
77
  
2. A New Expropriation Regime to Promote State Sovereignty  
Since the right to expropriate alien property is a part of the State’s economic 
sovereignty, newly independent countries proclaimed their full authority to 
expropriate foreign-owned investment without incurring full compensation 
payments.
78
 To achieve these sovereign right goals, a series of United Nations 
declarations were negotiated and concluded. Although those declarations did not 
explicitly specify a position on the issue of regulatory expropriation, they generally 
affirmed a state’s right to expropriate foreign-owned properties, and rejected the idea 
that good faith expropriation is subject to compensation obligations under 
international law. 
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The first of these was advanced by some developing countries in 1962 as the 
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR 1962).
79
 The 
PSNR 1962 provided groundwork for assuring rights to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources. In the PSNR 1962, a new concept of expropriation was introduced 
in its Preamble: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons 
of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding 
purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the 
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules enforced 




Importantly, it highlighted the principle of self-determination and non-intervention in 
domestic affairs of developing countries.
81
 Moreover, it opposed the Hull Formula 
that called for prompted, adequate and effective compensation and, instead, 
introduced the term ‘appropriate compensation’.
82
 Based on this new standard, 
developing countries strongly affirmed their rights to expropriate private property on 
the ground of general national interests. To override the individual investor interests, 
the PSNR 1962 asserts that the determination of monetary damages must take into 
account economic, context, and historical and national self-determination factors.
83
  
The PSNR 1962 was controversial. Despite broad acceptance by and support from 
developing and many developed countries, a number of countries refused, and others 
were reluctant, to accept the PSNR 1962 as a general international norm.
84
  
In 1973, the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a new resolution on 
Permanent Sovereign and Natural Resources to promote the interests of developing 
countries. Resolution 3171 (PSNR 1973) states that: 
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[A]s an expression of their sovereignty…each State is entitled to determine the 
amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment, and that any disputes 
which may arise should be settled in accordance with the national legislation of each 
State carrying out such measure.
85
 
This Resolution explicitly granted a wide discretion to the State to implement 
expropriation in accordance with the national law. Without making a reference to 
international law, the Resolution proclaimed that a right to expropriation is a matter 
that falls under a State’s national law.
86
  
The Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), formed in May 1974 (Resolution 3201), strongly supported a State’s 
sovereign powers and insisted that the determination of compensation must be 
subjected to the national law.
87
 Also in 1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (the 1974 Charter) went a step further than this, elaborating upon the 
principles in the NIEO Declaration and asserting that every State has the 
responsibility to promote economic, social and cultural development, and progress 
for both its own people and those of developing countries.
88
 Moreover, it specified 
that each State has freestanding rights: 
[t]o regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national 
jurisdiction in accordance with its law and regulations and in conformity with its 
national objectives and priorities…[and] … in which case appropriate compensation 
should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant 
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent….
89   
Despite wide acceptance of these UN legal instruments by developing countries, 
Cassese asserts that these UN legal instruments could not be regarded as ‘declaratory 
of customary international law’ due to the lack of real consensus from within the 
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 For example, although the Charter was adopted by a 
majority of developing countries in the General Assembly, its resolutions are only 
specified as recommendations
91
 and most developed countries voted against its 
adoption or abstained from voting. While 120 countries voted in favor of the Charter, 
six countries voted against and ten countries abstained.
92
  
One of the most contentious issues was the standard of compensation for 
expropriation. Disagreement over the standard of compensation has occurred 
between developed and developing countries. While powerful European countries 
maintain that compensation must be determined according to the Hull formula, as 
required under ancient customary law on state responsibility, developing countries 
emphasize the application of national laws rather international law to determine the 
amount of compensation of expropriated foreign-owned properties.
93
 These 
contrasting approaches continue to underlie the positions of the developed and 
developing countries. However, in the last decade of the 20
th
 century, this 
controversy has seemed to decline, following the end of the Cold War and the 
changing landscape of economic order to focus more on the free market economy 
and economic growth.  
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3. The Implications of the New International Economic Order for the Right to 
Regulate  
The UN General Assembly Resolutions obviously encouraged UN Member States to 
reclaim their ‘full permanent sovereignty’.
94
 As former judge of the International 
Court of Justice, Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga asserted, the exercise of a sovereign 
right of the State to expropriate is lawfully acceptable
95
 and, in his opinion, the 
proposed NIEO reflected the growing trend toward ‘recognition of the right of each 
State to organize its economic structure as it chooses and to introduce all the 
economic and social changes which the government of the day deems desirable’.
96
 
The proposed legal regime thus allowed post-colonial States to assert full 
sovereignty to nationalize, expropriate and requisite alien’s property by omitting the 
obligation to pay full compensation, and by asserting the predominant role of 
domestic legislation in determining the appropriate amount of compensation.  
The adoption of the NIEO purported to have far-reaching implications on the manner 
in which each country exercises its regulatory powers. Although the state cannot 
refer to its domestic law as an excuse for failing to comply with international 
obligations and compensation payments,
97
 the host state government could invoke 
the supremacy of their domestic legislation as recommended in a series of 
subsequent UN Resolutions in order to deprive foreign investors of their property 
rights without paying the full amount of compensation. The quest for self-
determination could thus preclude the host State government from international 
responsibility when conducting an expropriatory measure that deprives the owner of 
the value of investment.  
Although the Charter and the NIEO Declaration were strong political statements, 
they were not legally binding and did not purport to be restatements of existing 
law.
98
 Part of the failure of the Charter and the NIEO was due to the unwillingness of 
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industrialized countries to adopt the PSNR Resolutions that did not serve their 
economic interests.
99
 Their conflicting ideas on transnational standards of 
compensation for expropriation between industrialized states and developing 
countries stimulated political tensions relating to the State’s right to regulate. A lack 
of shared principles in the international community made it difficult to predict the 
way in which the legal doctrine of expropriation should be applied in order to meet 
the expectations of the local society, the government and a foreign investor.  
In addition, the impact of the debt crisis of the 1980s also shifted the focus of 
developing countries from self-determination objectives towards more liberal 
investment policies.
100
 As a consequence, many developing countries ratified 
investment treaties. The changing positions of developing countries reflected not 
only the preference for liberalization, but also open market policies to attract the 
limited resource of foreign investment into their countries.
101
 The variations in 
international economic regimes undoubtedly affected the uniformity and consistency 
of legal spirit of the Charter and the NIEO in international law. 
To resolve international tensions and legal ambiguities and to reconcile conflicting 
interests between developed and developing countries, attempts have since been 
made to codify the substantive rights of investors as well as the compensation 
obligations of host state governments in the area of regulatory expropriation. This is 
not only to ascertain the meaning and scope of expropriation, but also to achieve a 
balance between the host state’s rights to regulate and investor interests.  
 
C. Early Attempts to Codify the International Standards for 
Expropriation by Non-Governmental Agencies 
The success of decolonization processes after the Second World War led to the 
intensifying of demands for economic sovereignty, resulting in a proliferation of 
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national expropriation programs undertaken worldwide.
102
 However, due to the 
vague standard of expropriation in customary international law, international codes 
on expropriation were needed. A diverse body of non-governmental agencies, 
therefore, sought to draft codes that addressed both direct and regulatory 
expropriation. 
The following two sections consider codes made during the 1960s-1970s, with a 
special focus on the Abs/Shawcross Draft Convention, the Harvard Draft and the 
OECD Draft Convention. Whilst these codes have never been adopted by 
governments, the proposed legal frameworks are illustrative of the attempts to 
harmonize the customary international law on both direct and indirect expropriations 
following the period of the Second World War. 
1. The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention 
In 1957-1958, the German Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment, 
under the chairmanship of Dr. Abs and Lord Shawcross, prepared a draft 
international convention for the protection of private property rights in foreign 
countries.
103
 The Abs/Shawcross Draft Convention (hereinafter the Abs/Shawcross 




To protect against expropriation, the Abs/Shawcross Draft states that: 
No Party shall take any measures against nationals of another Party to deprive them 
directly or indirectly of their property except under due process of law and provided 
that such measures are not discriminatory or contrary to undertakings given by that 
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The Abs/Shawcross Draft expressly includes not only direct expropriation, but also 
‘indirect’ expropriation in the corpus of an international law text. Although the text 
expressly distinguishes between direct and indirect expropriation, it does not 
articulate clearly the legal criteria for determining when a state regulatory action falls 
into the category of an indirect expropriation.  
Despite its lack of clarity, Schwarzenberger argues that a reading of the 
Abs/Shawcross Draft cannot avoid ‘the evaluation of objects and motives’ of 
governmental action.106 He asserts that since the Abs/Shawcross Draft was an 
attempt to resolve the ideological differences between developed and developing 
countries within the international economic system,107 a reading of it should take into 
consideration the ‘purpose of the measures’.
108
 Thus, from Schwarzenberger’s point 
of view, not all governmental interference amounts to compensable indirect 
expropriation. Rather, when deciding an expropriation claim, the adjudicator should 
take into account other non-legal factors in verifying the existence of compensable 
regulatory takings.  
2. The Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States 
for Injuries to Aliens  
Another attempt to codify expropriation powers was made through the Harvard Draft 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 
(hereinafter the Draft Convention). Upon the request of the UN Secretariat, the 
document was prepared in 1961 by rapporteurs Louis B Sohn and Richard R Baxter 
from the Harvard Law School. The Draft Convention was presented to the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in an attempt to develop the codified model 
law, based on the doctrine of international state responsibility for ‘acts’ and 
‘omissions’ of States causing an injury to an alien.
109
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In the context of expropriations, the Draft Convention was prepared based on the 
customary international law principle of a minimum standard of treatment for 
aliens.
110
 In Article 10(3)(a), it includes all forms of expropriation. Besides an 
outright taking of physical asset, it specifies that an expropriation can also occur 
when legislation results in:  
[A]n unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment or disposal of property 
so…that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property 
within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.
111
  
However, in Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention, it includes an exemption 
clause precluding some governmental interference from international state 
responsibility. It states that:  
An uncompensated taking of property of an alien or a deprivation of the use of 
enjoyment of property of an alien which results from the execution of the tax laws; 
from a general change in the value of currency; from the action of the competent 
authorities of the State in the maintenance of public order, health, or morality; or from 
the valid exercise of belligerent rights; or is otherwise incidental to the normal 
operation of the laws of the State shall not be considered wrongful.…112  
Regarding the compensation standard, Article 10(2) of the Harvard Draft Convention 
states that the taking of private property is wrongful if it is not accompanied by 
prompt compensation, which is referred to as ‘just’ compensation. What is meant by 
‘just’ compensation is quite vague. However, in Article 10(2)(b) of the Harvard 
Draft Convention, it establishes that ‘just’ compensation has to refer to the ‘fair 
market value’ of the property in question before the date when the value of the 
property was depressed by the expropriatory measure.
113
  
The Harvard Draft Convention provides a fundamental principle for the adjudicator 
to distinguish a compensable taking from a normal exercise of regulatory power. 
Although the Harvard Draft Convention was an academic project, it was cited in 
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several cases in the context of the minimum standard of treatment in 
expropriation.
114
 However, in the accompanying Explanatory Note, there is no 
explicit guidance regarding types of regulatory interference that might justify non-
compensation in some key areas. For example, in spite of the justification of 
exercises of power to maintain ‘public order, health or morality’, it is unclear 
whether the host state government is subject to international responsibility when 
imposing measures for environmental protection. For example, the government 
might need to regulate to protect endangered species through legislation,
115
 which 
permanently prohibits the operation of a business. Due to the vagueness of this 
provision, it is unclear if the host country imposing environmental protection law is 
granted a specific compensation exemption in the area it wants to regulate. 
Bonnitcha criticizes the unclear scope of what the term ‘public order, health, or 
morality’ really means in order to justify a non-compensation measure.116  
According to the Explanatory Note of Article 10(5), what is meant by a measure 
‘incidental to the normal operation of the law’, includes only a ‘deprivation of 
property rights’ by a court judgment in relation to ‘a civil case or a fine or penalty in 
criminal proceedings’.117 In other words, the damage caused by court actions is to be 
exempted from the compensation obligations under international law only in the case 
where the deprivation of private property rights is attributed to a court judgment in 
relation to civil or a criminal law, but not anything else.  
It is still questionable whether this clause is applicable to administrative law-related 
issues. If foreign investors have suffered from judicial decisions under domestic 
public law, it is uncertain whether the Harvard Draft Convention is to be interpreted 
in a manner that includes the effect of judicial review of administrative actions. 
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Despite a broad scope of legal exemption, many issues in the Harvard Draft 
Convention are arguably unclear and full of controversies. 
3. The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 
In 1967, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
prepared the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 
(hereinafter the OECD Draft).
118
 It provides that expropriations can be both ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’ deprivations of property. Article 3 of the Draft Convention states that: 
No Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his property a 
national of another Party unless the following conditions are complied with: 
(i) The measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; 
(ii) The measures are not discriminatory or contrary to any undertaking which 
the former Party may have given; and  




Again, there is no explicit rule to define the concept of indirect expropriation in the 
OECD Draft. Despite the apparent difficulty in identifying the nature of measures 
considered as indirect expropriation, the OECD Draft respects a State’s autonomous 
power, asserting that each country has sovereign power to control foreign-owned 
property in its territory for the sake of ‘political, social or economic ends’.
120
 In the 
accompanying Explanatory Note, the OECD Draft observes that a State may be 
subject to international responsibility if the government has an ‘intent’ to impose a 
‘wrongful’ regulatory measure causing the deprivation of foreign property rights.121 
Thus, it is a State’s intention to commit wrongful action that the adjudicators need to 
take into account when identifying the emergence of an indirect expropriation. 
                                                 
118
 OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property: Text with Notes and Comments 
OECD <http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/39286571.pdf>. 
119
 Ibid 17. 
120




4. Inconsistencies of Various Legal Texts Concerning Indirect Expropriation 
Even though the above international drafts have never been adopted as treaties, they 
provide a strong basis for the formulation of a standard of treatment in subsequent 
international treaties on foreign investment protection.  The protection against 
expropriation as found in the Abs-Shawcross Draft, the Harvard Draft Convention 
and the OECD Draft share some common principles drawn from the customary 
international law of minimum standards. In order to provide protection for foreign-
owned investments, the draft laws provide similar protections against all forms of 
expropriation and constrain the host state government from expropriating foreign 
investments directly or indirectly unless certain conditions are met. A comparative 
study of the above legal texts reveals that the term ‘indirect expropriation’ was 
repeatedly included in the draft conventions. Moreover, each of the legal texts has 
cited similar standards of compensation. In place of full compensation, each 
convention refers to the payment of just compensation. This may reflect an attempt 
to resolve the inconsistent standards of compensation for expropriation and to strike 
a balance between the needs of the public, on the one hand, and property right 
owners on the other. 
In addition to these basic features, each convention similarly sets out ‘exceptions 
clauses’, which exclude compensation obligations from following good faith and 
non-discriminatory regulations. These exceptions are generally accepted under the 




Nevertheless, in relation to the specific threshold for regulatory expropriation, the 
different draft texts propose diverse legal criteria to determine when a compensable 
expropriation has occurred. For example, the Abs/Shawcross Draft contains a vague 
term of indirect expropriation in the clause. Without specifying explicitly, the Draft 
simply proclaims that no party can indirectly deprive owners of their property rights 
without paying compensation. In the Harvard Draft Convention, in contrast, the term 
is delineated more specifically by proposing the concept of ‘unreasonable 
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interference’ as the critical criterion in determining indirect expropriation.
123
 This 
implies that the Harvard Draft Convention focuses on the ‘effect of interference’ as 
the key criterion in identifying the existence of a compensable expropriatory act. The 
OECD Draft, on the other hand, focuses on an ‘intent to commit a wrongful 
measure’ as a key criterion in finding an indirect expropriation.
124
 Ultimately, the 
lack of a consistent legal framework makes the subject less predictable.   
 
D. Conclusions 
This Chapter has captured the evolution of the international law on expropriation in 
the early periods, prior to the emergence of international investment treaties. The 
protection against nationalization has long been recognized in international law. This 
type of taking was considered a prime concern in public international law and mainly 
occurred when the host State forcibly removed the property owned by a foreign 
investor located within that host State. However, there was also an emerging trend to 
protect investors against regulatory interference by public authorities, since an 
increasing number of regulatory takings posed a new threat to foreign-owned 
property.  
Through a series of international treaties concluded by Western nations, the 
customary international law principles of minimum standard of treatment and full 
protection were codified to protect against regulatory takings. Any government 
conduct that fell short of the internationally acceptable standard was challenged and 
subject to international responsibility. Despite the prominent role of the customary 
international minimum standard of treatment, its vagueness has fuelled international 
tensions between developed and developing countries over the way in which 
international law should reconcile the protection of property rights with state 
regulatory autonomy. While Western countries developed legal doctrine and 
international legal rules to ensure maximum protection of property rights, based on 
the international minimum standard of treatment and the Hull Rule of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation, developing countries opposed these standards, 
                                                 
123




and affirmed the ‘national treatment’ standard, which held that an alien has no more 
rights than the citizen of a sovereign State. Through a series of UN General 
Assembly resolutions, developing countries supported all state’s sovereign rights to 
expropriate foreign-owned investment for their national development goals. Further 
affirming the state’s autonomous power, they also supported the ‘appropriate 
compensation’ standard, demanding less than full compensation or no compensation 
at all for any good faith regulatory interference. 
To resolve this political disagreement, there were numerous attempts to create 
international codes on expropriation that take into account the conflicting interests 
between developed and developing countries. Despite the common frameworks for 
expropriation clauses proposed by these codes, there were inconsistencies in the 
ways in which the boundary of ‘indirect expropriation’ was defined. Due to profound 
political disagreement and different legal frameworks, these problems have sustained 
ongoing uncertainty in a struggle between property rights protection, on the one 
hand, and state regulatory power to expropriate for social benefits, on the other. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: LEGAL PROVISIONS, DOCTRINES AND 
UNSETTLED BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The issue of ‘indirect expropriation’ has become the most controversial and 
important aspect of contemporary international investment law. In comparison with 
the rather stable concept of ‘direct expropriation’, drawing the precise boundaries 
around those types of government interference that will amount to ‘indirect 
expropriation’ has sparked enormous debate within international law.  
When does state regulatory interference become subject to compensation for an 
indirect expropriation under international law? To answer this question, this Chapter 
will examine the concept of indirect expropriation developed by the international 
tribunals established under key investment treaties, in the Post-World War II period. 
These investment treaties include the Iran-US Claim Settlement Declaration 
(Declaration), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). 
This Chapter will study the economic and political backgrounds, as well as the 
mechanisms to settle investment disputes provided by each forum. 
The following study provides a broad review of the treatment of indirect 
expropriation by tribunals in order to assist adjudicators in the interpretation of the 
meaning of an ‘indirect expropriation’ that is compensable under contemporary 
international investment law. This Chapter sheds light on the evolving nature of the 
relevant legal principles and, in the final part, a discussion of key factors 
contributing to the problems of legal uncertainty will be provided.  
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A. Dispute Mechanisms and Legal Principles of Indirect Expropriation 
under Contemporary International Investment Treaties 
1. Iran-US Claims Settlement Declaration   
(a) Background: The Reflection of Political Turmoil during the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution and the Creation of the Claims Settlement Declaration and the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
Historically, the establishment of the ‘Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims 
by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’ (or ‘Claims Settlement Declaration’) was the consequence 
of civil unrest and political tensions between Iran and the United States, during the 
1970s. The revolution in Iran was attributed partly to opposition against the Shah, 
who favored Western ways of development and announced a ‘White Revolution’
1
 in 
order to modernize the country in the areas of economics, science and technology, 
and military weaponry, according to Western standards.
2
 The program also included, 
among other things, land reform, nationalization of forests, and the sale of state-
owned enterprises to the private sector.
3
  
These development programs, coupled with huge economic growth in the country 
due to an oil boom, contributed to unequal wealth and development in Iran.
4
 
Discontent spread and resulted in uprisings in Iranian society.
5
 In addition to 
dissatisfaction with the ruling elites, the opposition was also attributed to discontent 
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over the predominance of foreigners and a capitalistic model of development that 
relied too heavily on foreign influences. Due to high economic growth in the 
country, Iran experienced a significant inflow of American corporations and 
multinational companies.
6
 This stirred discontent among the Anti-Shah groups, 
resulting in nationwide opposition. As Graham notes, the fear of Westernization 
grew because ‘the Shah’s modernization plans had permitted too many foreigners to 
work in Iran, [and] had made Iran too dependent on foreign technology and allowed 
Iran to be a tool of American imperialism’.
7
  
Significant change in the society boosted discontent among revolutionaries, 
especially Iran’s clergy. These changes led to an uprising and the subsequent 
proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 11, 1979. The newly set up 
government of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini undertook numerous public measures 
in an attempt to take control over Western enterprises.
8
 In addition to its 
expropriation programs, the revolutionists seized the American embassy in Tehran, 
and forced other American representatives and businessmen to leave the country.
9
 
Corresponding to this changing political climate, the new Iranian government 
enacted a new Constitution, as well as other statutes, to discourage and exert control 
over foreign companies hoping to invest in Iran.
10
 Some commentators consider that 
these incidences were greatly influenced by the attempts of an extremely 
conservative group of people who feared foreign influence and wanted to claim the 
independence of the country from Western powers.
11
 In response to the 
expropriations, the United States imposed import blocks on oil from Iran and froze 
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approximately US$ 8 billion in Iranian assets held within the United States and 
American financial institutions located abroad.
12
 
To resolve the conflict between the United States and Iran, the Algerian government 
acted as a broker, bringing the two countries into negotiations. Through the good 
office of Algeria, on January 19, 1981, the United States and Iran entered into an 
international agreement referred to as the Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, which is commonly known as the ‘Claims Settlement Declaration’ 
(‘the Declaration’).
13
 This document provided that American diplomats, and other 
personnel of the US embassy, had to be released.
14
 In return, the United States was: 
firstly, prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of Iran; secondly, mandated 
to suspend its claims relating to the hostage crisis before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ); and thirdly, required to return frozen assets back to Iran.
15
 
Paragraph 7 of the Declaration also required that a $1 billion security fund had to be 
reserved from Iran’s assets situated in the United States.
16
 The fund, managed by the 
Central Bank of the Netherlands, which is an escrow bank appointed by Iran and the 
United States, was mainly used to pay awards made by the Tribunal.
17
 So as to 
secure the payment of compensation pursuant to the Declaration, Iran was required 
to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the account.
18
  
(b) An Overview of the Dispute Settlement System of the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal 
Under the Algiers Accord, both Iran and the United States agreed to promote the 
settlement of disputes through the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (hereinafter 
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‘Tribunal’). The Declaration states that ‘[a]n international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-
the United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding 
claims’.
19
 Accordingly, the Tribunal is considered to be a ‘one-stop-shop’,
20
 where 
all claims are submitted, reviewed and decided by the Tribunal, with the assistance 
of its legal staff and administrative personnel who run the office in The Hague on a 
full-time basis.   
The Tribunal itself is made up of nine full-time arbitrators, comprising three chosen 
by the United States, three by Iran, and three chosen by a joint agreement between 
Iran and the United States.
21
 To adequately accommodate incoming cases, the 




The Tribunal was granted the authority to decide a wide range of claims. The 
Declaration stipulates that it is: 
established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States against 
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any 
counterclaim…if such claims and counterclaims are outstanding at the date of this 
Agreement, whether or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, 




To solve disputes, the Tribunal can apply the law it deems fit in the circumstances. 
The Declaration states that: 
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such 
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal 
determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of trade, contract 
provisions and changed circumstances.
24
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Due to a broad range of available choices of law, the Tribunal can apply either 
principles of commercial law or international law to a case. It is up to the Tribunal’s 
discretion to decide which rule it deems appropriate as a governing law.25 For 
example, the Tribunal in CMI International Inc. v Iran,
26
 a case that concerned the 
Respondent’s failure to buy contractual equipment from the Claimant, held that it 
was within the authority of the Tribunal to apply international law rather than the 
nominated law within the contract. Even though the Claimant referred to the contract 
law of Idaho as the appropriate governing law, the Tribunal declined to apply it and 
held that, in its search for ‘equity and justice’, it was more appropriate to apply 
international law and not ‘rigidly tie to the law of contract’ of Idaho per se.
27
  
Due to the Tribunal’s broad discretionary power, in choosing applicable laws, some 
legal commentators are concerned about the resulting legal uncertainty in the awards 
rendered by different groups of Tribunal Chambers.
28
 Despite criticism, the role of 
the Tribunal as a mechanism for dispute resolution in the area of international 
investment law is significant. Through its long history, the Tribunal has heard a vast 
quantity of disputes. Since its establishment in July 1981, it has resolved nearly 
4,000 cases. Among them, over 800 awards have been rendered.
29
 Thus far, the total 




The work of the Tribunal has also contributed greatly to the development of 
international investment law. Drahozal and Gibson take the view that the Tribunal’s 
awards are ‘an essential source for lawyers and parties involved in investor-state 
disputes’.
31
 Their empirical study found that about 32 percent of the awards decided 
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by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) referred 
to the awards rendered by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IRUSCT), and out 




(c) The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal Jurisprudence and the Impact of Civil Unrest upon the Evolution of 
Legal Doctrine 
Due to the social and political unrest in Iran and as a result of ‘anti-Western 
rhetoric’,
33
 foreign investments in key industries, such as oil and banking, were 
nationalized by the government. While the United States requested that Iran respect 
the principle of the ‘international minimum standard’, Iran argued that, according to 
the principles of international law,
34
 the country was entitled by sovereign right to 




The Tribunal has the jurisdiction not only to consider claims relating to 
‘expropriation’, but also ‘other measures affecting property rights’.
36
 In actual fact, 
only a small number of claims have involved the direct taking of private property 
through ‘formal nationalization or expropriation’,
37
 while a large number of claims 
have involved the ‘physical seizure or appropriations of property by Revolutionary 
Guards or … deprivations of property rights through the governmental appointment 
of temporary managers or other similar measures’.
38
 Therefore, one of the primary 
concerns facing the Tribunal is determining when certain governmental interference 
with foreign property is in breach of international law.  
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There is no settled understanding of the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘other 
measures affecting property rights’. The Tribunal has generally acknowledged the 
role of customary international law as a tool with which to analyze the issue.
39
 
However, due to the poor development of indirect expropriation principles within 
customary international law, the Tribunal has developed a body of jurisprudence 
aimed at distinguishing internationally accepted exercises of regulatory powers from 
expropriations. In one of its most highly cited cases, Starrett House Corp v 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
40
 the Tribunal held that: 
It is undisputed in this case that the Government of Iran did not issue any law or 
decree according to which the Zomorod Project or Shah Goli expressly was 
nationalized or expropriated. However, it is recognized in international law that 
measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that 
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and 
the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.41 [emphasis 
added] 
In the Award, the Tribunal held that the Iranian revolutionary government was still 
liable for its interference with private property, even though ownership had not been 
taken away, and it was to be subject to international responsibility if the alleged 
measure interfered in a manner that rendered property rights ‘useless’.  
A few years later, a similar concept was adopted by the Chamber Two Tribunal in 
Tippetts v TAMS-AFFA.
42
 Supporting an ‘effects-based’ analysis, which focuses 
primarily on the impact of the interference in contention, the Tribunal held that the 
State is still responsible for damage to property rights even though the ‘legal title to 
the property is not affected’,
43
 and that the government does not need to ‘acquire 
                                                 
39
 Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, 'The Approach of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal' in Indirect 
Expropriation in International law, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014) 83, 102 (‘The Iran-US Claims Tribunal Approach’). 
40
 Starrett Housing Corp v Iran (Award) (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Case No 32-44-1, 19 
December 1983) (Starrett). 
41
 Ibid [154]. 
42
 Tippetts v TAMS-AFFA Counsulting Engineers of Iran (Award) [1986] 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 
219 (Tippetts). 
43
 Ibid [225]. 
88 
something of value’ from the alleged interference.
44
 Interestingly, however, whilst 
the Tribunal in Starrett utilized the legal threshold of ‘uselessness’ to delimit 
property deprivation, the Tippetts Tribunal articulated a clearer principle of property 
deprivation amounting to expropriation.
45
 It held that:  
While assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically 
and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the 
government, … such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the 
owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this 
deprivation is not merely ephemeral. The intent of the government is less important 
than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control 
or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.
46
 (emphasis added) 
The Tribunal emphasized, that to be considered an expropriation, the interference 
must deprive the owner of fundamental rights of ownership and this deprivation 
must be more than ‘merely ephemeral’. The Tribunal also stressed that the intent of 
the government is not as important as the impact upon the investor. Accordingly, 
both the Starrett and Tippett cases were based on an analysis of effect, rather than an 
analysis of a state’s intentions. 
Nevertheless, the role of a state’s intent was recognized in SEDCO v National 
Iranian Oil Co.
47
 In this case - the only case in which the doctrine of ‘police power’ 
was expressly employed by the IRUSCT
48
 - the Tribunal concluded that Iran had no 
international responsibility to pay compensation for a transfer of stock as part of the 
nationalization of a private bank that left the bank less assets to cover all of its 
incurred debts. By referring to the genuine and inherent ‘police power’ doctrine 
under customary international law, the Tribunal stated that it is ‘… an accepted 
principle of international law that a State is not liable for economic injury which is a 
consequence of bona fide regulation within the accepted police powers of States’.
49
 
However, like previous awards, the Tribunal acknowledged that the impact of a 
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measure was a more important consideration than the state’s intent, but held that the 
State is liable only if the governmental interference is ‘substantial and excessive’.
50
  
Despite the continued validity of the ‘police power’ doctrine, a great number of 
indirect expropriation claims initiated under the IRUSCT have been resolved through 
the use of the ‘effects-based’ doctrine.
51
 The predominant status of ‘effects-based’ 
analysis, over the ‘police power’ doctrine, was also echoed in ITT v Iran.
52
 In this 
case, the Tribunal expressly affirmed that ‘the intent of the government is less 
important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of these 
measures…is less important than the reality of their impact’.
53
 The denial of a 
‘police power’ defense was further emphasized in the case of Phelps Dodge.
54
 In this 
case, the Tribunal held that a State measure motivated by financial, economic or 
social concerns does not give rise to a ‘police power’ defense to an expropriation 
claim.
55
   
The predominance of the ‘effects-based’ approach adopted by the Tribunal in Iran-
United States Claims was largely influenced by the socio-political context of the 
time.
56
 During the Islamic Revolution, the Tribunal envisaged a considerable 
caseload resulting from ‘irregular measures’ carried out by Iran.
57
 Some 
commentators affirm the validity of the approach used by the Tribunal in light of the 
prevailing circumstance during that period. Heiskanen, for example, claims that ‘it 
was not necessary for the Tribunal specifically to address the due process issue in 
each case’ as ‘failure to comply with due process could be effectively presumed’.
58
 
In this context, the Tribunal’s ‘effects-based’ analysis was justified when dealing 
with the conduct of Iran, where irregular expropriations of foreign properties were 
widespread and the absence of minimum standards of due process could rationally be 
expected.  
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Even though the Tribunal frequently utilized the ‘effects-based’ doctrine, there are 
some practical problems in the application of this concept to an expropriation 
analysis. For instance, the Tribunal has encountered some difficulty in characterizing 
the property rights that ought to be subject to expropriation analysis. As Swanson 
acknowledges, whether a state action affecting property rights could amount to 
expropriation, depends on how wide the scope of property rights is conceptualized 
and defined.
59
 In the Starrett case, for example, the Tribunal deemed the government 
measure destroying the entire value of the investment a compensable expropriation, 
regardless of the magnitude of the controlling power retained by the foreign 
investor.
60
 In contrast, the Tribunal in the Tippett case expressed that regulatory 
interference could only be regarded as a compensable expropriation when the 
government measure in question deprives the investor of their fundamental rights in 
the investment.
61
 Although both Tribunals similarly focused on the impact of 
government conduct on the investors’ property, they proposed different criteria with 
which to identify the emergence of a compensable indirect expropriation. Ultimately, 
this type of divergence could impact the Tribunal’s expropriation analysis and, as a 
result, the ability of a State to exercise its public powers. As Swanson cautions, ‘if a 
host state action affecting one fundamental right can amount to a taking, even when 
the owner is not deprived of substantially all value in his investment, the ability of 
the host state to regulate will be curtailed’.
62
 This absence of a clear standard would 
arguably perpetuate uncertainty and unpredictability within the legal framework 
applicable to both foreign investors and host state governments dealing with 
expropriation disputes.  
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2. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
(a) Background: The Promotion of Trade and Investment Liberalization in the 
North America Region  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
63
 is a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico. The NAFTA represents a key 
milestone in the area of international economic agreements, encouraging integration 
between countries with different economic backgrounds.
64
 It contains a 
comprehensive list of substantive and procedural laws that aim to promote a 
continuing dialogue on regional trade integration, and a neo-liberal economic 
regime.  
The NAFTA was preceded by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(hereafter Canada-US FTA),
65
 which came into effect in 1989 following negotiations 
that first commenced in 1985.
66
 The main objective of the Canada-US FTA was to 
eliminate both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The Agreement was considered 
to be one of the first international agreements to address the issue of trade in 
services, and provide a dispute settlement mechanism as well as a joint national body 
to examine the remedial actions taken by each State Party.
67
 Both the United States 
and Canada were, therefore, traditional proponents of liberalization. 
Aside from advancement in services pertaining to dispute resolution, the Canada-US 
FTA was rather limited in scope and application. As Molot remarks, the Canada-US 
FTA covered a narrow range of protected properties, which excluded ‘portfolio 
investment’, discarded the Most-Favoured-Nation clause (MFN), and relied on state-
to-state dispute resolution.
68
 To expand the economic bloc beyond the Canada-US 
FTA, the NAFTA was negotiated under circumstances largely dictated by the United 
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To build up an effective trade bloc, both the United States and Canada agreed upon 
the ‘value of going beyond’ the existing investment protection provisions.
70
 
Mexico’s position was, however, quite different from the other two countries. Before 
joining the economic bloc, Mexico was very active in its support for the ‘Calvo 
Doctrine’, which opposed the superiority of foreigners, asserting that the settlement 
of international disputes should rely upon domestic judicial powers.
71
 Nevertheless, 
Mexico finally decided to sign the NAFTA in an attempt to expand its export market 
and attract more foreign direct investment to the country.
72
 Against this backdrop, 
some commentators conclude that the NAFTA is quite unique in the sense that it is 
‘the first time that this type of … agreement has been concluded between two highly 
regulated developed countries and a less-developed country’.
73
 
Although the NAFTA represents an important milestone in the development of 
international economic law, its progressive neoliberal regime also triggers significant 
criticism and controversy, particularly in relation to its effect on the lives of 
citizens
74




(b) Key Substantive Rights under NAFTA Chapter 11, Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms and Arbitral Jurisdictions 
The principles and norms governing the NAFTA primarily focus on the elimination 
of barriers to trade and investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico, 
and the promotion of a predictable legal framework that is conducive to the creation 
of clear rules governing the commercial relationships among them.
76
 In general, 
NAFTA calls for the gradual reduction of both tariff and non-tariff barriers between 
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 These principles are addressed in its Preamble, which 
acknowledges a wide recognition of free trade, greater legal certainty, and the 
enhancement of competitiveness, together with an increased awareness of welfare 
and environmental protection.
78
 One of the unique characteristics of the NAFTA is 
the inclusion of the provisions on investment promotions and protections. Chapter 11 
of the NAFTA, includes a wide array of new investment rights and protections that 
are unprecedented in scope and power.
79
 A comprehensive list of substantive rights 
is contained in Chapter 11 Section A, while the procedural rules of investment 
regimes are contained in Section B.   
Specifically, Section A addresses the obligations of the host state government and 
the foreign investors’ rights.
80
 Key provisions include, for instance, the National 
Treatment obligations, the Most-Favored Nation obligations, the prohibition of 
Performance Requirements, and the protection against Expropriation. In relation to 
the National Treatment provision, Article 1102 obligates Parties to ‘accord to 
investments of investors of another Party treatment that is no less favorable than that 
it accords, in like circumstances, to those of its own investors’.
81
 This provision 
requires the foreign investor not to be treated differently from existing domestic 
investors. Similarly, Article 1103, the Most-Favored-Nation clause, states that 
Parties must accord foreign investors treatment that is ‘no less favorable than it 
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party’.
82
 
Therefore, the host state government must provide protections to foreign investors 
that are equivalent to those obtained by any other Party or a non-NAFTA state.  
Article 1106 of NAFTA also prohibits the host country from placing ‘Performance 
Requirements’ as a condition of entry and establishment approval. This provision 
streamlines the protection standard, following the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) which provides that no Member shall apply a 
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trade-related investment measure inconsistent with Article III (National Treatment) 
or Article XI (Quantitative Restrictions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).
83
 The Illustrative List of prohibited measures under TRIMs is 
included in the ANNEX
84
 and this list is largely adhered to by NAFTA Article 1106, 
which includes, for example: the determination of a certain level or percentage of 
export quota; the requirement of locally produced materials; and the requirement of 
technology transfer to local entrepreneurs.
85
 This provision aims to prevent 




Along with the above key provisions, NAFTA also contains a provision that entitles 
foreign investors to seek compensation for harm resulting from state actions 
‘tantamount to expropriation’ and ‘indirect expropriation’.
87
 While the 
characterization of ‘direct expropriation’ is relatively uncomplicated, it is far more 
difficult to ascertain the types of government regulatory interference that will be 
considered tantamount to an ‘indirect expropriation’. This gives rise to some 
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concerns regarding ‘the scope of application and the uncertainty about what exactly 
constitutes an indirect expropriation requiring compensation’.
88
  
In Section B, NAFTA provides a procedural framework available to investors to 
settle investment disputes between NAFTA Member States. One of the most striking 
features of the NAFTA Chapter 11 procedural framework is that its arbitral 
proceedings, which are ‘private in nature’, permit individual investors to make 
claims directly against the actions of the host governments of NAFTA States.
89
 As 
Ranieri notes, this unique dispute settlement mechanism would ensure ‘equal 
treatment among the NAFTA investors in accordance with the principles of 
international reciprocity, and due process before an impartial tribunal’.
90
 The Parties 
can refer the dispute to arbitral institutions that contain different arbitral regimes. 
The Parties can choose either the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), the ICSID 




In addition, Chapter 11 sets out rules concerning the arbitrators. Generally, an 
investment tribunal works on an ad hoc basis and consists of three arbitrators.
92
 One 
arbitrator is selected by each of the Parties to the dispute, and the third is selected 
through the mutual agreement of the Parties and acts as a presiding arbitrator.
93
 The 
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear issues brought under NAFTA Chapter 11 and is 
required to decide cases according to the applicable principles of international law.
94
 
NAFTA’s institutional arrangement is a simple one, consisting of two main bodies: 
the NAFTA Secretariat and the Free Trade Commission (FTC).
95
 Under Article 
2002, the Secretariat works as an administrative body to assist the FTC, panels, and 
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 The NAFTA Secretariat, constituted by a ‘national section’ from each 
member state, is located in separate national offices situated in Ottawa (Canada), 
Mexico City (Mexico) and Washington, D.C. (the US).
97
 It helps to facilitate the 
operation of the Agreement and to ensure that day-to-day operational works can run 
smoothly. 
Distinct from the Secretariat, the FTC oversees and handles disputes that may arise 
regarding the application and interpretation of the Agreement.
98
 The FTC is an 
authorized panel comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties,
99
 
including the US Trade Representative, the Canadian Ministry for International 
Trade, and the Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development.
100
 The 
power of the FTC is technical, specific and obligatory, so the interpretation issued by 
the FTC is binding on a tribunal.
101
 Besides facilitating legal interpretations, NAFTA 
Chapter 11 also provides a mechanism to assist the arbitral panel in dealing with 
factual issues. At the request of a disputing party, the panel can appoint independent 
experts to report to it on any factual information, including environmental, health, 
safety or other scientific matters.
102
 This mechanism helps the panel to acquire 
knowledge and expertise that it may otherwise lack when deciding the dispute. 
Nonetheless, receiving information from a third party is not mandatory; it is 
dependent upon the exercise of a panel’s discretion.  
Despite their perceived effectiveness and flexibility, the ad hoc tribunals based upon 
the commercial arbitration model are less accountable, transparent and accessible 
than permanent tribunals and have arguably created incoherent legal principles.
103
 
Brower II suggests that these problems have arisen as result of: (1) a lack of 
continuity in appointments to serve in Chapter 11 disputes;
104
 (2) a great emphasis 
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on confidentiality in proceedings and less systematic reporting of decisions than that 
might be expected of domestic courts;
105




(c) Doctrines of Indirect Expropriation and Social Pressure to Change the 
Regime 
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA endorses a State’s power to expropriate private property 
for public purposes. However, such taking of private property is conditional upon the 
satisfaction of specified criteria. This principle is spelled out in Article 1110 of the 
NAFTA, which provides that: 
[N]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment, except: (a) for a public 
purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; and (c) on payment of compensation in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
107 
As previously discussed, conduct that amounts to ‘direct’ expropriation is not 
difficult to discern; a review of relevant literature confirms that this form of 
expropriation essentially involves the taking of ownership over a physical asset.
108
 
By contrast, the phrases ‘tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ and 
‘indirect expropriation’ are particularly problematic.  
Through various attempts at interpreting the broadly defined terms of ‘indirect 
expropriation’ and ‘tantamount to expropriation’, a series of NAFTA tribunals have 
developed a body of legal principles designed to distinguish normal public powers 
from regulatory powers that are subject to international responsibility. The tribunals 
have derived the meaning of these terms by drawing upon relevant customary 
international law.
109
 Pursuant to this customary international law, there is no 
restriction on the host government’s ability to enact a law that regulates private 
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property in order to achieve some public benefit. However, the government is liable 
for any harmful impact that such a measure may have on the affected parties.
110
 In 
this respect, a large number of NAFTA tribunals have employed an ‘effects-based’ 
approach when analyzing claims of indirect expropriation. 
In carrying out the ‘effects-based’ approach, a large number of NAFTA tribunals 
have focused their analysis on harmful impacts affecting the ‘use’ or ‘control’ of 
property.
111
 For example, in SD Myer Inc v Canada
112
 – a case that involved a claim 
by an American Company against orders of the Government of Canada banning the 
export of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) out of Canada - the Tribunal utilized the 
‘effects-based’ doctrine as a primary indicator of expropriatory conduct. The 
Tribunal accepted that ‘[e]xpropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership 
rights; regulations a lesser interference’.
113
 It further asserted that ‘[a]n expropriation 
usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its 
economic rights’.
114
 Even though the Tribunal agreed that the ban was motivated by 
a desire to protect the Canadian PCB industry from American competitors, it found 
that the ban was temporary, and that the Claimant had failed to demonstrate that the 
alleged export ban genuinely affected and eliminated the Claimant’s economic 
benefits, so as to amount to an indirect expropriation requiring compensation under 
Article 1110.
115
 Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the measure was not an 
expropriation violating the NAFTA Chapter 11.
116
  
A similar approach was later supported by the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc v 
Canada.
117
 This case concerned an allegation by an American company against the 
Government of Canada on its export ban of lumber from Canada to the United 
States. The Tribunal rejected the expropriation claim because the government 
measure was not ‘sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property had 
                                                 
110
 Suzy H Nikiema, 'Best Practices: Indirect Expropriation' (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, March 2012) <http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1577> 9. 
111
 Alberto R V Salazar, 'NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-
Advertising Law' (2010) 27(1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 31, 39. 
112
 SD Myers Inc v Government of Canada (Partial Award) (2001) 40 ILM 1408 ('SD Myers'). 
113
 Ibid [282]. 
114
 Ibid [283]. 
115
 Ibid [287]-[288]. 
116
 Ibid [288]. 
117
 Pope & Talbot (Interim Award) (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 26 June 2000) (‘Pope & Talbot 
Inc’). 
99 
been taken from the owner’.
118
 The Tribunal also held that it is ‘the degree of 




One of the most contentious NAFTA cases dealing with the issue of indirect 
expropriation, is Metalclad v Mexico.
120
 In this case, Metalclad, a US corporation, 
launched a claim against Mexico over its decision not to grant a construction permit 
for the operation of a landfill facility; even though the permit had previously been 
confirmed through various representations by the Mexican federal government.
121
 
An Ecological Decree, issued by the local government to establish a rare cactus 
protection area,
122
 permanently prevented Metalclad from the operation of its waste 
landfill.
123
 In this case, the Tribunal decided in favour of the foreign investor and 
strongly endorsed the ‘effect rule’,
124
 ordering Mexico to compensate Metalclad for 
the deprivation of its investments’ value pursuant to a regulatory taking. The 
Tribunal held that a denial of the construction permit prevented the Claimant from 
actualising its’ planned business operations, and amounted to expropriation. 
Moreover, the Tribunal held that the Ecological Decree also constituted an indirect 
expropriation in violation of art 1110 of the NAFTA. The Tribunal asserted that to 
find an indirect expropriation, it need ‘not decide or consider the motivation or intent 
of the adoption of the Ecological Decree’.
125
  
According to this case, the Tribunal adopted an expansive ‘effects-based’ analysis in 
interpreting the meaning of indirect expropriation. It held that the enactment of an 
ecological decree to protect a rare cactus area, by the local municipality, which 
permanently prohibited the operation of a landfill by an American company, 
interfered with the company’s use of property. In the Tribunal’s words:  
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 Ibid [103]. The Tribunal held that ‘expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate 
and acknowledged takings of property,…, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of 
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100 
expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged 
takings of property…, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of 
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, 
of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not 
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.
126  
The Tribunal also advanced the ‘effects-based’ concept by stating, that to establish 
an expropriatory effect, it was unnecessary to ‘decide or consider the motivation or 
intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree’.
127
  
The decision of the Tribunal in Metalclad raised a number of controversial issues, 
especially by reason of its expansive interpretation of the standard of protection for 
foreign investors. As Molot noted, the tribunals have always referred to the NAFTA 
Preamble as a guiding interpretive principle in order to promote a predictable 
commercial framework for business planning and investment.
128
 Therefore, from the 
Tribunal’s view, the NAFTA is oriented to the protection of trade and investment, 
and failing to provide a predictable framework would amount to a breach of 
obligations under Chapter 11.
129
 However, through its expansive definition of 
expropriation and the absence of any public policy considerations, some 
commentators believe that the Metalclad Tribunal ruled in favor of investors who 
seek to exploit the benefits of Chapter 11. Despite providing a stable and predictable 
framework for Metalclad’s business, some commentators assert that the criteria 
formulated in Metalclad would restrain the State’s regulatory capacity as ‘substantial 
interference was enough to establish expropriation, and it was unnecessary to ask 
why that interference had occurred’.
130
  
There has been much debate regarding the appropriateness of the legal standards 
adopted by the Tribunal in the Metalclad case. Public interest groups, as well as 
NGOs, placed pressure on the governments of the Member States to take serious 
action to address the fear of high levels of foreign investment protection conferred 
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 NAFTA States, especially Canada and the United 
States, appeared to modify their positions.
132
 The debates were rigorous in these two 
advanced countries that had become defendants in a number of disputes and were 
suffering from a pervasive threat of legal challenges to internal public policy under 
Chapter 11.
133
 As a result, both countries played an active role in urging NAFTA 
partners to make changes to the investment protection regime.  
A particularly critical development was the enablement of ‘non-disputing party 
participation’ or amicus curiae in the arbitral proceedings. The significant role of 
amicus curiae in influencing the arbitral award was apparent in Methanex v United 
States,
134
 which is considered to be the first example of the Tribunal exerting its 
power to accept an amicus submission.
135
 Essentially, this development improved 
the transparency and legitimacy of NAFTA arbitration mechanisms. 
Methanex, a Canadian-owned business, made an investment protection claim against 
the US government in 2005, regarding the ban imposed on MTBE (methyl tertiary 
butyl ether) by the State of California. During the proceedings, Methanex referred to 
the legal standard in Metalclad v Mexico, which focused on the ‘effects-based’ 
approach as its key analytical framework.
136
 Methanex claimed that the California 
ban took ‘a substantial portion of its investments… and handed them to the US 
domestic ethanol industry’, a move that was ‘tantamount … to expropriation within 
Article 1110’.
137
 In its Amended Statement of Defense, the United States argued that 
the ban was not expropriatory as Methanex failed to prove that the investment had 
actually been taken by a state measure.
138
 
In the final decision, the Tribunal rejected Methanex’s claim and departed from the 
Metalclad standard. Instead of adopting a solely ‘effects-based’ doctrine, the 
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Tribunal applied the classic ‘police power’ approach, which confers all necessary 
rights upon the government to enact laws that are in the public interest.
139
 Finding 
that the ban did not violate Article 1110, the Tribunal stated that: 
Methenax is correct that an intentionally discriminatory regulation against a foreign 
investor fulfills a key requirement for establishing expropriation. But as a matter of 
general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which 
is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign 
investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensatory unless specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government…
140
 
The Methanex case is considered to be the first NAFTA award to accept the ‘police 
power’ approach.
141
 The swing from the ‘effects-based’ doctrine to the ‘police 
power’ approach was very much welcomed by groups critical of NAFTA.142 Some 
commentators attributed this to the participation of amicus curiae in the investment 
arbitration.
143
 Through the submission of amicus briefs, the Tribunal was able to 
consider the concerns raised by a group of NGOs -that international investment law 
should be reinterpreted to include environmental protection.
144
 The NGOs contended 
that ‘the interpretation of The Chapter 11 of NAFTA should reflect legal principles 
underlying the concept of sustainable development’.
145
 The direct involvement of a 
group of civil society thus provided an opportunity for the Tribunal to obtain further 
information and apply a broader approach, which takes into account non-economic 
factors when discussing the merits of a case.
146
  
Nevertheless, the impact of the 2005 Methanex decision is somewhat unclear and 
may not be sustained in the long run. One of the reasons for this is that the 
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arbitration award has no binding effect; in the absence of the doctrine of precedent, 
tribunals in subsequent cases are not bound to interpret and apply the legal principles 
in the same manner.
147
 In addition, the status of amicus curiae is uncertain as their 
participation rights do not necessary materialize in every single case. A tribunal can 
deny the request for amicus participation at its discretion, and has no duty to receive 
third party submissions.
148
 Accordingly, the arbitral panels in subsequent NAFTA 




Indeed, a return to the ‘effects-based’ approach occurred in the 2007 case, Archer 
Daniels,
150
 where the Tribunal held that:  
[t]he test on which other Tribunals and doctrine have agreed… is the effects test. 
Judicial practice indicates that the severity of the economic impact is the decisive 
criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to 
expropriation has taken place ... There is a broad consensus in academic writing that 
the intensity and duration of the economic deprivation is the crucial factor in 
identifying an indirect expropriation…
151
 
The ‘effects-based’ standard has been used in a number of subsequent cases, 




 Each of these was 
similarly decided on the basis of the severity and degree of interference with the 
property rights or economic value of the investment concerned. However, in the 
more recent case of Chemtura,
154
 the arbitral panel recognized the applicability of a 
‘police power’ rule, as described in Methanex,
155
 and held that the challenged 
regulatory measure ‘constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent’s police powers 
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because the Canadian agency had acted within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory 
manner, motivated by a public purpose’,
156




The above cases heard under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, highlight that an unclear legal 
provision relating to expropriation triggers the issue of interpretative inconsistency. 
Divergent applications of the provision by arbitral tribunals have resulted in an 
incoherent legal distinction between normal regulation and compensable 
expropriation. This inconsistency not only raises uncertainty for foreign investors, it 
also prevents the host state governments from undertaking active regulations for 
bona fide public purposes, due to potentially expensive compensation obligations.  
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
(a) Background: The Promotion of Bilateral Investment Protections through the 
Newly Codified Rules in the Post-World War II Era 
The development of BITs was primarily attributed to significant limitations and 
uncertainties surrounding the international law of foreign investment protection,
158
 
which resulted in a strong demand to standardize the protection of foreign 
investment through the codification of rules within BITs. 
Prior to the emergence of BITs, the protection of foreign businesses was carried out 
through Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties.
159
 Initially, the FCN 
treaties focused on trade relationships between developed nations based on the 
‘principle of symmetry, reciprocity, and mutuality’.
160
 The success of FCN treaties 
was widely recognized due to their role in protecting property rights acquired by an 
alien. The comprehensive legal content of FCNs covered not only trade relations, but 
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Despite their widely recognized role in promoting trade and commerce, FCN treaties 
were criticized for the limited investment protection they provided, as they primarily 
focused on the issue of trade relations.
162
 Since there was no specific rule governing 
the protection of foreign investments,
163
 the adjudicators hearing matters under FCN 
treaties applied the vague customary international law of state responsibility relevant 
to the dispute.
164
 Moreover, the complex and comprehensive nature of FCN treaties 
was designed to deal only with ‘symmetrical economic exchanges’ between like-
minded developed countries, rather than asymmetrical power among parties.
165
  
The shift from FCN to BITs became necessary after the Second World War, when 
many small countries enjoyed newfound independence. Due to a surge in 
decolonization, capital-exporting countries, which were mainly developed nations, 
had a strong demand for international legal order in order to ensure a sound and 
secure ‘investment’ environment within developing countries.
166
 Then the first BIT 
was signed between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959.
167
  
The early BITs were well regarded,
168
 and there was enormous growth in their 
adoption during the 1990s.
169
 Several factors contributed to the popularity of BITs. 
First, unsuccessful negotiations for a multilateral agreement on investment 
liberalization encouraged both developed and developing countries to change their 
positions and to begin negotiations at the bilateral and regional levels.
170
 The failures 
of negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the at Annual 
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Meeting in of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Council (OECD) at Ministerial level in 1995 and on investment liberalization at the 
Cancun Round of the WTO in 2003 were demonstrative of the sensitivity that 
surrounded investment issues, at both national and international levels, and the 
extent to which this concern could conflict with national interests.
171
 To overcome 




In addition to the unsuccessful investment liberalization negotiations at multilateral 
levels, the success of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s also stimulated 
international commitment to market liberalization
173
 and property rights protection 
across the globe.
174
 The favoring of free trade and property rights protection helped 
promote economic freedom and development.
175
 As a consequence, countries 
(especially developing nations during the world economic crisis of the 1990s)
176
 
entered into more BITs, in the hope that this would foster greater investor confidence 
and more foreign direct investments (FDIs).
177
  
The role of BITs is still widely recognized today, despite a decline in the annual 
number of concluded BITs since the mid-1990s.
178
 Although there has been a steady 
decrease in the number of newly signed BITs each year, the number of new claims in 
investment disputes, between 1995 and 2014, has reached a record high and the 
number continues to increase over time.
179
 Such an increase in the number of 
disputes appears to suggest that BITs are still workable legal instruments upon which 
countries could rely. In spite of their effective role in providing investment 
protection, BITs have been criticized for codifying the ‘asymmetrical economic and 
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political relationship that existed between capital exporting and importing states’.
180
 
As a result of being shaped by Western countries, BIT programs were intended to 
protect the benefits of capital-exporting countries. In addition, early BITs were 
criticized for the vagueness of their treaty provisions.
181
 Legal ambiguity allowed 
arbitral panels to interpret the legal texts in inconsistent ways,
182
 and perhaps 
according to an ‘expansionary spirit’ that favored the interests of foreign investors.
183
  
(b) Overview of the Scope of BIT Protection, Jurisdiction and the Dispute 
Settlement 
BITs generally protect a broad range of properties and investments. The term 
‘investment’ in the early BITs was usually defined very briefly, but included all 
categories of assets entitled to protection.
184
 However, in subsequent BITs, a broader 
formula containing a series of illustrative examples of assets entitled to protection 
was adopted.
185
 Although BITs have utilized different approaches in defining 
protected investments, they have typically incorporated all of the kinds of property 
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rights that make up an investment; regardless of whether they are tangible or 
intangible, property or contractual rights, or rights of control or management.
186
 An 
open-ended definition is often preferred in order to ensure the flexibility of the 
treaty’s application.  
In addition, the parties are subject to agreed substantive rights and obligations as 
well as procedural rules. Most BITs contain similar substantive protection standards 
despite some variations in the legal wording of details.
187
 The majority of BITs also 
incorporate the traditional concept of a ‘minimum standard of fairness in the 
treatment of foreigners and investments’.
188
 Typically, they contain provisions such 
as National Treatment, Most-Favored-Nations Treatment, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, Free Transfer of Funds and the Protection against Expropriation.
189
 
Whenever a dispute arises, the affected foreign investor can bring claims directly 
against the host state government under the investment treaty. Although some BITs 
call for the settlement of disputes between contracting parties through inter-
governmental arbitrations,
190
 the majority of BITs grant investors the right to pursue 
arbitral proceedings under investor-state arbitration systems.
191
 In the context of 
investor-state arbitration, each State generally commits itself in advance to consent 
to ad hoc international arbitration,
192
 and is strictly bound by the arbitral awards 
rendered.
193
 Presently, the affected investors can submit the investment claims 
through ICSID arbitration or other forums of non-ICSID arbitration, such as United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
194
 
When an investment dispute arises, an arbitral tribunal usually applies the laws as set 
out in the governing BIT. Normally, under investment treaties, both contracting 
parties have the freedom to agree on the applicable substantive law to be used to 
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settle the dispute, and the arbitrators are bound by such an agreement.
195
 As 
indicated by a 2014 survey by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), however, there is no uniform framework within current 
investment treaties for setting out the applicable substantive laws. In the majority of 
treaties, the arbitral panel is normally required to decide the dispute based on 
treaties, international law, and the domestic law of the host State.
196
 Nevertheless, in 
practice, arbitral panels tend to apply international legal principles to address an 




(c) Doctrines of Indirect Expropriation and the Evolution from the Sole-Effects 
Doctrine to the Principles of Proportionality 
A survey of recent BITs, conducted by UNCTAD, revealed that virtually all BITs 
explicitly prohibit the host country from taking any direct expropriation measure, 
and any other measure that has an equivalent effect, without providing 
compensation. However, not all BITs address the issue of indirect expropriation in 
the same fashion.
198
 For example, Article 5 of the BIT between Lebanon and 
Malaysia
199
 does not include the specific issue of indirect expropriation in the 
agreement, but Article 6(1)(a) of the BIT between Kuwait and Lithuania
200
 (2001) 
generally addresses protection from direct and indirect expropriation. Article 5(2) of 
the BIT between France and Uganda
201
 (2003) goes a little bit further by including 
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explicit guidance regarding the level of interference that would be considered ‘a 
measure tantamount to expropriation’. The survey showed a remarkable trend 
towards increasing the clarity of the expropriation provisions within BITs, as much 
as possible.
202
 The inclusion of more explicit criteria with which to identify measures 
that amount to a compensable expropriation would improve legal certainty and foster 
coherent interpretative approaches rendered by arbitral tribunals. 
Although BITs have codified indirect expropriation provisions in many different 
ways, the problem of language ambiguity, concerning the parameters of ‘indirect 
expropriation’, arguably remains. As a result, inconsistent legal approaches are often 
adopted; while some arbitral decision-makers have applied the ‘effects-based’ 
doctrine to the investigation of indirect expropriation under international law, others 
have departed from this dominant principle and applied the ‘proportionality test’. 
A series of decisions demonstrate the dominance of the “effect-based” test. The 
Tribunal in Wena Hotels,
203
 for example, referred to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in 
its application of the ‘effects-based’ doctrine, and held that Egypt’s ‘non-ephemeral’ 
deprivation of foreign ownership constituted a regulatory taking.
204
 In Santa 
Elena
205
, the Tribunal affirmed that the purpose of a measure couldn’t be used to 
avoid compensation; ultimately, a measure that caused disruption to an investment 
was subject to compensatory obligations.
206
 In the Occidental case
207
 , the Tribunal 
concluded that there had been ‘no deprivation of the use or reasonably expected 





 the Tribunal found that the host state’s interference 
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with the execution of a contract was the exercise of public authority.
210
 This Tribunal 
also held that the measure carried out by Argentina, through a Decree, to terminate a 
contract between Siemens and the Government of Argentina for the provision of 
services related to immigration control, was ‘by itself and independently…an 
expropriatory act’.
211
 The Tribunal further asserted that the Decree was permanent, 
and thereby affected the termination of the contract.
212
 The Tribunal granted a 
compensation award against the Government of Argentina because the measure was 
unlawful and there was no clear evidence to show that the Decree was enacted for a 
public purpose.
213
 In Aguas del Aconquija (Vivendi II),
214
 the Tribunal emphasized 
the role of the ‘effects-based’ approach; although it accepted the importance of the 
State’s intent, it was the effect of the measure that was said to be decisive in 
determining the occurrence of indirect expropriation.
215
 Indeed, the Tribunal found 
that the measure had a ‘devastating effect on the economic viability of the 
concession’ and rendered it ‘valueless’.
216
  
Although arbitral panels under BITs predominantly apply the ‘effects-based’ 
doctrine, another series of arbitral decisions, handed down at a similar time, were 
approaching the notion of indirect expropriation differently, and adopting alternative 
tests to analyze expropriation claims. For example in 2001, the Tribunal in the CME 
case
217
 recognized the ‘police-power’ as a defense and held that a non-discriminatory 
general regulation could not constitute an indirect expropriation.
218
 The question of 
intent was again highlighted in the Saluka case,
219
 where the tribunal expressly 
endorsed the view that, under international law, ‘States are not liable to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory 
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner … that are aimed at the general 
welfare’.
220
 However, the Tribunal admitted that there is still no clear line in 
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international law to distinguish between legitimate non-compensable regulatory 
power and expropriation.
221
 Based on its ‘police power’ perspective, the Tribunal, 
nevertheless, decided against the foreign investor, declaring that the regulatory 
conduct of the Government of the Czech Republic was within the ambit of a regular 
power, and was not considered to be an indirect expropriation.
222
 
One of the most remarkable shifts in the legal paradigm came in 2003, when the 
Tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico
223
 declared a more innovative doctrine with which to 
analyze expropriation claims, by combining both ‘effects-based’ and ‘police-power’ 
approaches.
224
 The Claimant in Tecmed was a Spanish Company that had acquired a 
hazardous industrial waste landfill in Mexico in 1996 through its Mexican 
subsidiary, Cytrar. Tecmed was given the authorization to operate the landfill from 
the National Ecology Institute of Mexico (INE) and had been granted a permit that 
could be extended every year at the applicant’s request. However, in 1998, the 
renewal of the permit was denied, and the Mexican government took action to close 
the landfill.
225
 In its analysis of the expropriation claim, the Tribunal investigated 
whether Tecmed ‘was radically deprived of the economic use and enjoyment of its 
investments, as if the rights related thereto - such as the income or benefits related to 
the Landfill or to its exploitation - had ceased to exist’.
226
 The Tribunal found that 
compensable expropriation had occurred.
227
  
In determining the existence of the compensable expropriation in the case of 
Tecmed, the Tribunal’s evaluation was not based solely on the ‘effects-based’ 
doctrine; rather, it also took into account the proportionality of the measure.
228
 To 
prove the expropriation, the Tribunal stated that it is necessary to examine ‘whether 
such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected 
thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments’ [emphasis added].
229
 By 
acceding to the host State’s defense, in conducting a proportionality analysis, some 
                                                 
221
 Ibid [263]. 
222
 Ibid [265]. 
223
 Tecmed (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003) (‘Tecmed’). 
224
 Ursula Kriebaum, 'Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State' 
(2007) 8 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 717, 727-79. 
225
 Tecmed (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003) [38]-[45], [110]. 
226
 Ibid [115]. 
227
 Ibid [117]. 
228
 Ibid [118]. 
229
 Ibid [122]. 
113 
commentators opine that the Tecmed Tribunal became more deferential to the state’s 
authority to exercise its legitimate power, when assessing a reasonable relationship 
between the interests of the host state and foreign investors, ie: the impact of the 
measure on the investors and objectives of the state measure.
230
 Noting failure to 
meet the appropriate balance, the Tribunal concluded that:  
[I]t would be excessively formalistic, in light of the above considerations, the 
Agreement and international law, to understand that the Resolution is proportional to 
such violations when such infringements do not pose a present or imminent risk to the 
ecological balance … without providing for the payment of compensation.
231
 





 and Continental Casualty cases,
234
 which also took into account both the 
necessity and proportionality of the measure when assessing the existence of indirect 
expropriation.  
The variation in the methodologies used in the aforementioned cases does not only 
result in uncertainty regarding the outcomes rendered by tribunals in BITs, but also 
fails to define a satisfactory balance of interests between host states and investors 
under an investment treaty.
235
 In an attempt to resolve these issues, the United States 
adopted a new model BIT in 2004,
236
 and the revised one in 2012,
237
 which aimed at 
clarifying some key substantive issues.
238
 These model BITs similarly provide the 
following modified substantive rule on expropriation: 
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(a) the determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, 
fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(iv) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact 
that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an 
indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(v) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and 
(vi) the character of the government action. 
Annex B of the US model, both 2004 and 2012, similarly set out a clearer guideline 
to distinguish a normal exercise of regulatory power from indirect expropriation 
triggering compensatory obligations. It states that: 
...(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation. 
Besides the United States, some other developed countries such as Canada have also 
followed this approach and drafted similar guidelines on the definition of 
expropriation in foreign investment protection law.
239
 Canada's new Model Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA),
240
 stipulates that: 
...(c) Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are 
so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having 
been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives ... do not 
constitute indirect expropriation. 
Under the leadership and influence of the United States, other countries have 
similarly re-negotiated new investment treaties.
241
 The rise of a new generation of 
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BITs is reflective of an endeavor to redress problems inherent within early BITs.
242
 
The new model does not only clarify the legal text, it also adds a more substantive 
consideration of state sovereignty protection and sustainable development issues.
243
 
Yet, the new model BITs still suffer from the problem of language ambiguity. For 
example, in the US model BIT, the phrase ‘except in rare circumstances’ in Annex B 
of the expropriation clause is open-ended, and potentially problematic, as it leaves 




4. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)  
(a) Background 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (the TPP) is the most recent regional trade 
and investment agreement concluded by twelve countries across the Asia-Pacific 
region.
245
 At the beginning of negotiations, there were only four countries forming 
the bloc,
246
 which were the United States, Australia, Peru and Vietnam.
247
 After five 
years of negotiations, the TPP has developed into a comprehensive and ambitious 
agreement that promotes greater economic integration among contracting countries, 
which include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.
248
  
The TPP has five key objectives. Firstly, it aims to eliminate both tariff and non-
tariff barriers across a wide range of manufactured goods and services. Secondly, it 
aims to facilitate the creation of jobs and cross-border production and supply chains. 
Thirdly, it promotes new innovations, development of the digital economy and the 
role of state-owned enterprises. Fourthly, it encourages new players in the economy, 
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such as small-and-medium enterprises, by providing assistance through trade-
capacity-building programs. Lastly, the TPP will be used as a platform for further 
economic integration in the future.
249
 
The TPP is a significant agreement and is formulating a great deal of strategies to 
expand the market between countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As indicated by 
Lewis, the TPP is an ambitious attempt to establish a free trade pact with countries 
that have already taken part in other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). He also 
predicts that, since the TPP goes beyond the traditional agreements to cover a wide 
range of issues, such as intellectual properties, labour and environmental standards, 
and cross-border trade in services, the TPP will attract many more countries from 
both sides of the Pacific, capturing a greater cross-border trade and investment 
flow
250
 and that it could potentially serve as a ‘model of open regionalism’,
251
 which 
‘open[s] the pathway to a free trade area across the entire Asia-Pacific region’.
252
   
Despite the benefits of the TPP, on 23 January 2017, the US President signed an 
Executive Order to formally withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. The withdrawal was due to the concerns over the potential impact of the 
TPP on US manufacturing and job losses, resulting from the ease with which US 




 (b) A Brief Picture of the TPP 
The TPP, like most of the FTAs, contains both trade and non-trade issues. In relation 
to trade, it largely aims to eliminate tariffs among the TPP member countries, 
pursuant to the proposed mandates as agreed by the TPP countries. In addition to 
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tariff reductions, the TPP also focuses on the elimination of other trade restrictive 
measures that could potentially result in technical barriers and trade distortions. The 
TPP members have also set rules for cross border trade in services but each of them, 
however, could submit a list of sensitive sectors which need to be exempted from the 
TPP obligations. 
In addition to the trade issues, the TPP provides rules for non-trade issues. Despite 
its similarity to other FTAs, the TPP includes provisions that have impacts far 
beyond any other typical FTA and the WTO, in certain areas, such as competition 
policy, intellectual property protection, investment protection and environmental and 
labor regulation. The conclusion of the TPP, with its new ambitious standards, is 
marked as an important step in the ultimate goal of trade and investment 
liberalization in the region. 
Apart from the trade and non-trade issues, the TPP also includes specific procedures 
for the settlement of disputes between States and between States and investors.
254
 In 
relation to the former, the TPP aims to guarantee ‘a fair, transparent, timely, 
effective and binding procedure’ for settling disputes between the TPP Parties.
255
 
Specifically, the TPP is designed to resolve disputes in three main areas: the 
interpretation and application of the TPP, a failure to carry out the measure in 
compliance with the obligations under the TPP, and an unfair nullification of 
benefits expected by a TPP Party.
256
 In the context of disputes between State and 
investors, settlements must be carried out through a neutral international arbitration. 
The TPP includes key provisions designed to safeguard the neutrality of arbitration, 
such as transparent arbitral proceedings, amicus curiae submissions, non-disputing 
Party submissions, review procedure for interim awards, binding joint interpretations 
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 DFAT, Summary of the TPP, above n 249, 5.  
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(c) A New Paradigm of the Indirect Expropriation in the TPP’s Investment 
Chapter  
In the Investment Chapter, the TPP contains the fundamental protection standards 
that can be found in other typical investment treaties, such as National Treatment, 
the Most-Favored-Nation treatment, the minimum standard of treatment, the 
treatment in case of armed conflict or civil strife, and the free transfer of funds and 
investment. However, the expropriation provision of the TPP carves out clearer 
guidelines for arbitral tribunals to identify the circumstances in which a state should 
be held accountable for the harm caused through its regulations.  
Annex 9-B of the TPP Investment Chapter, which clarifies the scope and 
applicability of the expropriation clause, sets out the legal threshold with which to 
distinguish a normal regulation from a compensable indirect expropriation, in 
accordance with the US Model BIT. To determine indirect expropriation, Article 
(3)(a) of Annex 9-B states that a tribunal must consider each dispute on case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the economic impact of the government action, the extent 
to which the government action interferes with distinct and reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government action.
258
 In addition, 
Article (3)(b) of Annex 9-B establishes that, ‘except in rare circumstances’, the 
measure is not considered to be a compensable expropriation if the regulation is 
applied on a ‘non-discriminatory’ basis and to ‘protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment’.
259
  
Moreover, this Chapter of the TPP also provides exemptions in Article 9.8.5, stating 
that the expropriation liability is not applied to the ‘issuance of compulsory licenses 
granted in relation to intellectual property rights’ in accordance with the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)’, or to the 
‘revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that the 
issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter 18 (Intellectual 
Property) and the TRIP Agreement’.
260
 
                                                 
258
 TPP art 3(a) of Annex 9-B. 
259
 Ibid art 3(b) of Annex 9-B.  
260
 Ibid art 9.8.5. 
119 
Exemptions from expropriation liability are also contained in other Chapters of the 
TPP to protect the host government from liability associated with any harm arising 
from a regulatory measure relating to financial and tobacco controls. Article 29.3 
states that, in exceptional circumstances, the State may adopt a measure to counteract 
serious financial situations, if the measure is non-discriminatory and designed to 
protect legitimate public welfare interests. Likewise, Article 29.5 recognizes the 
ability of the State to deny benefits that flow to investors in relation to claims on 
tobacco control measures. 
Although the TPP expressly broadens the State’s right to regulate, the expropriation 
provision appears to retain significant ambiguity. For example, Annex 9-B, which 
provides public welfare exemptions, does not elaborate upon the ‘rare 
circumstances’ in which a non-discriminatory measure can be considered an indirect 
expropriation requiring compensation.
261
 Due to the ambiguity of this language, 
investors are likely to claim that their circumstances are rare and that the State 
should, therefore, not avoid international responsibility.
262
 Moreover, some legal 
scholars claim that the new IP-related exemptions for compulsory licensing measures 
have a very limited impact.
263
 For example, Article 9.8.5 states that a compulsory 
license is free from liability only if the measure satisfies the conditions required by 
the WTO’s TRIPs or those contained in the TPP’s Investment Chapter. In this 
respect, the private companies suffering from a compulsory license measure
264
 could 
challenge the host state government and pursue investor-state arbitration only if they 
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can prove that the regulatory interference does not meet the conditions required by 
TRIPS or the TPP’s Investment Chapter.
265
  
In spite of some concerns regarding inherent ambiguity, the TPP is not yet 
practically realized and, to date, no claim on indirect expropriation has been brought 
to arbitration. As the TPP has just been concluded by the Member States, each TPP 
country is now required to follow its own domestic treaty-ratification process before 
the agreement can be enforced.
266
 Therefore, the manner in which the agreement will 
be interpreted by the arbitral tribunals is not yet known.  
B. Analysis of Past Jurisprudence on Indirect Expropriation under 
Contemporary Investment Treaties: Concurrence, Differences and 
Causations 
1. General Characteristics of Expropriation Clauses under Investment Treaties  
In general, the basic standard of protection against expropriation contained in the 
IRUSCT, NAFTA, BITs and the TPP is the customary law ‘minimum standard of 
treatment’. Under customary law, the host state government has the sovereign right 
to regulate commercial businesses and take the property of an alien,
267
 but is subject 
to compensatory obligations when such conduct results in the deprivation of property 
rights or wealth of protected foreign investors.
268
 These key principles are explicitly 
included in virtually all international investment treaties and require lawful 
expropriation to be: in the interests of the public, as provided by law; made on a non-
discriminatory basis; and subject to compensation.
269
  
The IRUSCT, NAFTA, BITs and the TPP also contain codified rules allowing a 
protected foreign investor to make claims regarding both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
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expropriation. Again, what constitutes a direct expropriation is quite obvious. It 
involves the outright seizure or legislative nationalization of the physical assets of a 
private party. However, what constitutes indirect expropriation is much more 
complicated as there is no uniform definition, but there have been many attempts to 
define the scope and application of this legal concept (as seen in the Model US BIT 
and the TPP). Various treaties use different phrases to signify ‘indirect 
expropriation’, including ‘indirect taking’, ‘de facto’, ‘creeping’, ‘constructive’, 
‘disguised’, ‘consequential’, ‘regulatory or virtual expropriation’.
270
 Notwithstanding 
apparent differences, each phrase similarly characterizes a measure as expropriatory 
if it ‘involves total or near-total deprivation of an investment but without a formal 
transfer of title or outright seizure’.
271
 
2. Overview of the Legal Standards on Property Protections from Indirect 
Expropriation 
The tribunals charged with considering claims of expropriation have attempted to 
develop various guidelines to define the concepts of property and expropriation. 
Despite these attempts, various judgments and awards provide inconsistent legal 
interpretations of these critical issues. 
When considering the scope of affected properties, all surveyed treaties similarly 
concern a broad range of protected property rights. It was found that virtually all 
surveyed investment treaties include not only tangible property, but also intangible 
property and other contractual interests. In relation to this broad range of protected 
property, arbitral tribunals generally accepted that the host state government is 
subject to international responsibility to compensate investors for loss of property 
even when actual ownership rights or formal titles have not been destroyed or taken 
away.  
However, the surveyed arbitral tribunals sometimes applied an even more expansive 
concept of protected property rights. This was particularly evident within the 
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NAFTA investment dispute in Metalclad v Mexico.
272
 The arbitral tribunal in this 
case interpreted the meaning of an investment in an expansive fashion, by including 
‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefits’, i.e. an expected stream of benefits 
not yet realized as part of protected rights.
273
 According to this reasoning, tribunals 
might declare the occurrence of indirect expropriation whenever investors believe 
that their investment activities have been impacted by new policies or laws that 
disappoint the investors’ legitimate expectations.
274
 
When considering whether measures qualified as compensable expropriations, the 
arbitral tribunals for IRUSCT, NAFTA, BITs and the TPP have generally accepted 
that an indirect expropriation may include a wide range of regulatory actions taken 
by a host state government. Indirect expropriations can range, for example, from the 
appointment of a manager to control a private business, to the freezing of bank 
accounts and exchange controls, a cancellation of permit, excessive taxation, the 
enactment of restrictive environmental protection laws, or even IP-related claims 
concerning compulsory licensing and tobacco control. Each of these measures, taken 
by host state governments, has at some point in time been considered as having an 
effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization, therefore, falling within the 
definition of ‘indirect expropriation’ or ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’. 
Despite the complexity of the regulatory actions scrutinized, the arbitral tribunals for 
all treaties surveyed (except the TPP)
275
 have developed a framework within which 
to identify the boundaries separating non-compensable state measures from 
compensable indirect expropriation. Generally, international jurisprudence focuses 
on the ‘effects-based’ approach to distinguish the two forms of government 
regulation. The arbitrators in IRUSCT, NAFTA and BITs tribunals most often 
decide their cases using the effects-based doctrine as the sole determinant of indirect 
expropriation. Disregarding the state’s intent and the inherent characteristics of the 
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measure, these tribunals have held that a substantial deprivation of rights to use and 
control property constitutes an illegal interference that may breach international law. 
The ‘effects-based’ doctrine has often been cited by arbitrators of the IRUSCT, 
NAFTA and BITs tribunals. The doctrine has been widely used to ensure an 
investor-friendly environment and protect the interests of aliens. These tribunals 
have usually required a high threshold of interference to find expropriation. As 
opposed to a transitory impact, the doctrine requires a lasting and substantial 
deprivation of property rights or investment value to be utilized as an exclusive 
criterion in the examination of an expropriation claim. The doctrine was heavily 
employed by the IRUSCT, when deciding cases arising from social unrest in Iran in 
the late 1970s, which culminated in the vast expropriation of foreign-owned 
investments. The ‘effects-based’ doctrine was understandably supported by the 
IRUSCT tribunals since the State of Iran failed to comply with international 
minimum standards and its measures were, presumably, politically motivated and 
undertaken in bad faith. The ‘effects-based’ approach has also been frequently 
referred to by arbitral tribunals formed under other international investment 
agreements, including NAFTA and BITs.  
However, following a surge in investment disputes experienced by both developed 
and developing countries, there was a need to combine foreign investment protection 
by host states with wider ideas of host state domestic social responsibility and 
accountability. 
276
 From the perspective of both the United States and Canada, a host 
state’s ability to regulate has been adversely impacted by NAFTA, as both countries 
are becoming major respondent states to investment treaty disputes. Their exercises 




Following social pressure from civil society and interest groups, States and arbitral 
tribunals have expressed an inclination to depart from the traditional ‘effects-based’ 
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approach, and have developed competing concepts to preserve host-state regulatory 
autonomy.
278
 To preserve the State’s rights to control domestic social policy, arbitral 
tribunals have applied various degrees of scrutiny over policy justification. While 
some use the concept of ‘police-powers’, others emphasize the ‘doctrine of 
proportionality’. These two competing approaches employ distinct methodologies to 





, deploys a strict public purpose element as the decisive criterion, 
thereby affirming that a regulatory measure made in good faith can never attract the 
duty to compensate,
281





, examines the proportionality of the relationship between the ‘effect of the 




3. Legal and Non-Legal Factors that Create Inconsistency and Incoherence in 
the Applications of Indirect Expropriation Clauses 
The inconsistency in the concept of indirect expropriation found in past arbitral 
jurisprudence is indicative of the tension between the right to regulate and the right 
to be protected in changing socio-economic circumstances. Legal and non-legal 
explanations of the legal inconsistencies and incoherence surrounding the various 
applications of indirect expropriation clauses are presented here.  
(a) Legal Aspects 
(i) Unclear Legal Text 
It is obvious that the inconsistency in arbitral decisions is largely attributable to 
ambiguity with the investment treaty texts. As a matter of pragmatism, it is necessary 
to draft legal provisions broad enough to cover a range of contingent circumstances, 
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as broadly drafted text provides parties and adjudicators with the flexibility to deal 
with unforeseen issues.
285
 In addition to these practical benefits, open-textual 
language in an international treaty can assist negotiation processes to move forward 
as such provisions help the contracting parities to reach a consensus easily, no matter 
how vague the treaty text is.
286
  
Notwithstanding these advantages, broadly drafted text can also promote inconsistent 
interpretations, which may destabilize investment protection regimes,
287
 by 
increasing the adjudicative discretion available to arbitrators. This problem has even 
been highlighted in the TPP. Some critics assert that inherent ambiguity in 
investment treaties could give rise to ‘expansive interpretation’ by arbitral 
tribunals,
288
 leading to the incorporation of a wide range of prohibited regulatory 
interferences, which might impede host state’s legitimate regulatory powers in key 
areas such as the environment, taxation, and export controls.
289
 
(ii)  Lack of the Doctrine of Precedent and the Absence of Appeal Mechanism 
Incoherence and inconsistency in legal doctrine concerning indirect expropriation is 
also derived from the ad hoc nature of arbitration. When deciding a case, an arbitral 
tribunal follows the rules of a specific arbitration treaty to which the parties have 
agreed. As a result, ad hoc arbitration allows the parties to achieve consensus 
regarding the rules best suited to their transactions and needs, and to reach decisions 
that are final and binding upon the consenting parties only.  
To a large extent, the lack of any precedential effect in arbitral decisions contributes 
to the inconsistencies and incoherence of legal reasoning inherent in the arbitral 
system.
290
 The nature of non-binding precedent is established in Article 53 (1) of the 
ICSID Convention, Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL and Article IV of the Claims 
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Settlement Declaration establishing the IRUSCT. Despite different wording, they 
each provide that the decisions of the respective tribunals have no legally binding 
force except as between the parties to a particular dispute. Future arbitral tribunals 
have no duty to follow the judicial decisions of previous tribunals as authoritative 
statements, and each tribunal is ‘at liberty to cite or not to cite previous decisions of 
other tribunals on similar questions of law’.
291
 
The problem is further pronounced due to the absence of an appeal mechanism 
within the investment arbitration system. Under the WTO, the Appellate Body (AB) 
can review, modify or set aside the findings of a panel. The AB thus acts as a last 
resort to correct possible legal errors committed by arbitral panels. The advent of the 
AB in WTO jurisprudence promotes consistency and predictability within dispute 




In contrast, the existing system of international investment arbitration has no single 
appellate body to review decisions of investment tribunals.
293
 In addition, under the 
existing investment dispute settlement system, an arbitral decision can be reviewed 
only under narrowly defined conditions. In the case of an arbitration governed by the 
ICSID Convention, the Secretary-General of the ICSID, by request of a Party, has 
the power to annul awards which manifestly fail to meet due process standards or 
were unfairly conducted.
294
 The Secretary-General has no other power to correct 
awards rendered by the ICSID tribunals. In the same vein, under the UNCITRAL 
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 The ICSID Convention states that ‘Either party may request annulment of the award by an 
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds: (a) 
that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its 
powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a 
serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or ( e) that the award has failed to state the 
reasons on which it is based’. See ICSID Convention opened for signature 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 
159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) art 52(1). 
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Rules, the award is subject to challenge in the national court of the seat of 
arbitration. Awards are subject to challenge only in the event of some serious 
procedural mistake or a conflict with the host state’s internal public policy.
295
  
The lack of binding precedents and the absence of an appellate mechanism in 
investment arbitrations can result in inconsistent decisions and makes it difficult to 
ascertain the applicable legal standards or the proper interpretative approaches to 
employ. For example, while most investment tribunals use the ‘effects-based’ 
approach to assess indirect expropriation claims,
296
 the ‘police power’ doctrine was 
nevertheless adopted in some NAFTA awards (such as Methanex
297
) and BIT 
arbitrations (such as Saluka
298
). In addition, the ‘proportionality test’ was used by 
NAFTA arbitrators in Archer Daniels
299





 These contradictory awards introduce further uncertainty to this field of 
law. 
(b) Non-Legal Aspects  
In addition to the legal factors described above, inconsistent and incoherent 
interpretations of texts on expropriation may also be attributed to non-legal factors 
that influence the operation of the international law of investment protection. The 
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impact of non-legal factors cannot be underestimated, as arbitrators’ personal 
backgrounds and ideological positions can inevitably affect their arbitral decisions 
and, consequently, the development of investment treaty jurisprudence. 
Both history and experience reaffirm that non-legal factors can affect the attitudes of 
individual decision makers, and result in inconsistency and incoherence across 
various decisions.
302
 This proposition is supported by the study of Gus Van Harten, 
who claims that ‘different legal attitudes, economic strategic and institutional 
factors’ significantly influence the performance of arbitrators and the coherence of 
their judicial decision making.
303
 
As Schill points out, different investment tribunals may have different perspectives 
and philosophies about the role of law, the state and the function of dispute 
resolution.
304
 While certain groups of arbitrators with profound commercial 
backgrounds rely heavily on commercial law principles, other panels listing 
arbitrators with public international law backgrounds may approach the issue using 
general principles of law.
305
 Variations in professional backgrounds, legal culture 
and legal ideologies impact the ways in which investment arbitrators deal with the 




A reading of international investment awards on indirect expropriation illustrates this 
critical issue. In the context of the Iran-US Claims Tribunals, for example, the 
downfall of the Shah and the setting up of a revolutionary government in Iran caused 
social turmoil, due to a strong demand to restructure the economy and a massive 
expropriation of foreign investments in the country. The Iran-US Claim Tribunal was 
thus established to settle conflicts between the Iranian government and American 
investors. Being generous to foreign interests, the Tribunal expanded the scope of 
measures that could amount to expropriation. Deploying the ‘effects-based’ doctrine, 
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the Tribunal frequently held that ‘any measure that led to deprivation in the value of 
the investment could amount to expropriation’.
307
 In this context, the Tribunal’s 
‘expansive interpretation’ was reflective of a strategy to deal with the irregular 
expropriations by the Iranian government, during a particularly tumultuous time.
308
  
Expansive interpretations by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal have also affected the 
approaches taken by other tribunals under NAFTA and BITs. As discussed in the 
previous section, a key objective articulated in the arbitral awards of NAFTA and 
BITs is to provide protection for property rights. This attitude towards the protection 
of property rights, over competing interests, was also shaped by the overwhelming 
success of economic liberalism following World War II, when policies for the 
promotion of inward economic development and rapid growth were adopted by most 
countries.
309
 The success of economic liberalism not only accelerated the free flow 
of trade and investment across countries, but also the protection of property rights of 
foreign investors. A strong ethic of protection of property thus permeates 
international arbitration practices and influences the ways in which international 
arbitral tribunals form their analyses. In the early period of NAFTA and BITs, we 
have seen that a series of arbitral tribunals adopted liberal interpretations of 
investment treaties, deciding repeatedly in favor of investors, irrespective of the 
state’s intent in carrying out the regulations in question.
310
 
Due to this perceived bias in favor of the protection of investors, many host countries 
have started questioning the appropriateness of an extremely high protection 
standard. Some advanced countries, like the United States and Canada, together with 
NGOs that have interests in the environmental and human rights aspects of arbitral 
proceedings, are exerting pressure upon investment tribunals to depart from the 
traditional approach. This evolving interpretation was obvious in the 2005 Methanex 
case, where the Tribunal adopted an approach that was more sympathetic to the 
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sovereignty of the host State, in order to enable a regulatory space for 
expropriations.
311
 Besides rejecting the traditional ‘effects-based’ doctrine, the 
Methanex Tribunal made an important contribution to public participation in 
investment arbitral proceedings through the acceptance of submissions from an 
amicus curiae.
312
 The Tribunal’s contribution was a response to public pressure 
arising from a perceived failure to protect social interests, in some high profile 
regulatory areas. Therefore, within the new approach formulated by Methanex, the 
public interest concern is acknowledged and amicus curiae participation in the 
proceedings is permitted for the purposes of providing information and expert 





C. Conclusions and Legal Challenges 
This Chapter has studied the development of international jurisprudence on indirect 
expropriation in three renowned international agreements. Prior the Second-World 
War, the principles of the international law of indirect expropriation were unsettled. 
After the Second World War, rules on expropriation, based on customary 
international law, were codified through numerous investment treaties. Each of the 
agreements examined within this Chapter explicitly contains provisions safeguarding 
foreign investors from both unlawful direct and indirect expropriation of their 
property, both tangible and intangible. Nevertheless, there is still no coherent legal 
principle or jurisprudence with the ability to clearly and consistently distinguish 
normal exercises of governmental regulatory powers from expropriatory conduct 
triggering a legal obligation to compensate property owners.  
At the heart of this issue is the lack of a clear guideline and threshold standard with 
which to delineate practices that may constitute indirect expropriations. The very 
nature of ad hoc arbitration prevents arbitrators from adhering to the standards 
                                                 
311
 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson (eds), International Investment Law and 
Sustainable Development Key Cases from 2000–2010 (International Institute of Sustainable 
Development, 88. 
312
 Ibid 81. 
313
 Methanex (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 3 August 2005). 
131 
established by previous adjudicators. Moreover, non-legal factors, such as personal 
background and ideological divides influence the divergent attitudes of arbitrators 
charged with formulating the awards. Consequently, different bodies of arbitral 
tribunals have applied a variety of legal standards to address indirect expropriation 
questions despite encountering similar substantive provisions and sets of facts. 
On the whole, the ‘effects-based’ approach is still the dominant methodology 
employed by investment arbitrations, especially those appointed under the IRUSCT, 
the NAFTA and BITs. However, an increasing number of arbitral tribunals have 
departed from this traditional rule and have adopted alternative tests, emphasizing 
either ‘police power’ or ‘proportionality’, to analyze expropriation claims, which 
signifies a revival in the emphasis of the state’s sovereignty to regulate.   
Although the surveyed arbitration regimes suffer from the aforementioned legal 
deficiencies and systematic limitations, investment arbitration is still considered to 
be the most effective way to resolve investment disputes. In light of advantages, such 
as cost effectiveness, flexibility, finality of awards, and political independence, 
investor-state arbitration is the most reliable way to resolve complex public-private 
conflicts.
314
 To preserve the inherent strength of the investor-state arbitral system, a 
considerable number of recent academic publications have proposed various 
methods for improvement. These include: introducing several public interest 
dimensions,
315
 promoting the consistency and coherence of the unity of legal 
reasoning, and encouraging greater transparency in arbitration systems.  
In the next Chapter we will discuss the rationale for using a ‘comparative public law’ 
approach for the purpose of developing interpretative guidance for unclear legal 
provisions in investment arbitrations concerning expropriation claims. It will be 
argued that the proposed approach will contribute greatly to the consistent and 
coherent interpretation of vague terms in the area of international investment law, 
without demanding significant reform to the existing system of investment 
arbitration. This new approach may assist in establishing justifiable decisions that 
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adhere to the most common legal standards found within current international law, as 
well the domestic public laws of countries with different legal traditions.
316
 
Ultimately, it will be contended that the proposed approach has the potential to 
neutralize ideological bias arising from the personal, professional and educational 
backgrounds of arbitrators in international investment disputes.
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A CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO TREATY 
INTERPRETATION   AND THE ROLE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
LAW TO PROMOTE LEGAL CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ON INDIRECT 
EXPROPRIATION 
 
As the previous Chapter revealed, there is no uniform standard of interpretation that 
can be used to identify, with satisfactory consistency, the occurrence of indirect 
expropriation. The issue becomes even more complex in cases where foreign 
investors are economically impaired by a public measure of the host government that 
is claimed to have been implemented to serve a public interest. The ambiguities and 
complexities of current standards of interpretation have contributed to the legal 
uncertainty and incoherence that characterizes the assessment of indirect 
expropriation claims before arbitral tribunals. As a consequence, the manner in 
which these standards are applied by arbitral decision-makers is, arguably, 
influenced by extra-legal factors such as personal biases, which adversely impact the 
legitimacy of international investment-agreement arbitration. 
In this Chapter, a public law framework is proposed as a more coherent method of 
legal interpretation for international investment treaties. To support the potentiality 
of the public law framework, this Chapter begins with an overview of the traditional 
interpretative approach under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).
1
 It then analyzes the limitations inherent within the traditional approach to 
treaty interpretation, which draws upon the ordinary meaning of words and the 
treaty’s objectives and purposes. Following this analysis, it will be argued that 
international arbitral tribunals should refer to general principles of law as a potential 
source of treaty interpretation in relation to investor-state disputes. Since 
international investment law generally concerns the protection of foreign investors 
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against arbitrary conduct by host state governments, the nature of investment 
arbitration is analogous to the review of administrative conduct under domestic 
public law. Investment treaties can, therefore, be described as a body of law that 
reflects the ‘hierarchical relationship’ between superiors and subordinates.
2
 In this 
respect, the control of the legality of the state’s conduct exercised under an 
investment treaty is functionally comparable to administrative or constitutional 
judicial review in domestic law.
3
  
This Chapter will then highlight the current practices of arbitral tribunals when 
reviewing indirect expropriation claims. It analyzes how, and to what extent, current 
arbitral tribunals utilize legal principles drawn from public law frameworks, at both 
domestic and international levels, to define vague treaty provisions and resolve 
disputes, in the area of indirect expropriation. Although arbitral tribunals frequently 
defer to public law concepts when resolving disputes, the precise criteria adopted by 
these tribunals are arguably uncertain and unpredictable.
4
  
In order to better respond to these problems, this Chapter will articulate the potential 
benefits of deploying the ‘general principles of law’ approach to search, by means of 
a comparative study, for legal principles commonly accepted in public law at both 
domestic and international levels. It is argued that these commonly accepted 
principles may increase unity of legal reasoning for vague provisions, and assist in 
developing a normative framework for the law of indirect expropriation under 
international investment treaties.  
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A. The Conventional Treaty Interpretation Rules under the Vienna 
Convention and Their Limitations 
1. A Current Framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) 
The VCLT is an international legal instrument that codifies the international 
customary law of treaty interpretation, binding all nations.
5
 The VCLT outlines the 
specific rules pertaining to treaty interpretation in public international law. The 
applicable general rules are found in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. In essence, 
Article 31 specifies the primary means of interpretation,
6
 whilst Article 32
7
 is only to 
be used to confirm a meaning found via the primary means, or to determine meaning 
when the primary means does not produce a clear result.
8
  
Fundamentally, when interpreting treaty texts pursuant to the VCLT, adjudicators 
must bear in mind three distinct elements. First, the treaty must be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with ordinary meaning. This fundamental principle is 
articulated under Article 31(1) of the VCLT. In addition, given that the term exists 
within a treaty, Article 31(1) also requires that deference be paid to the objective and 
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purpose of the treaty. Article 32 stipulates that in order to ascertain the correct 
meaning, adjudicator can also refer to the original intention of the parties as a 
supplementary means of interpretation.
9
  
2. The Limitations of the Conventional Interpretative Approach under the VCLT 
when Construing an Ambiguous Text in International Investment Treaties 
International investment treaties generally impose an obligation on the State parties 
to provide investment protection for foreign investors covered by a treaty. To ensure 
that the rights of foreign investors are protected, investment treaties generally 
establish standards of treatment within substantive and procedural rules. Despite the 
provision of comprehensive standards of treatment and protection, in typical 
investment treaties, key provisions contained within these treaties are often vague. 
Due to the presence of ambiguity in many key provisions, such as the provisions on 
Fair and Equitable Treatment and Indirect Expropriation, arbitral tribunals frequently 
engage in the formulation of definitions.
10
 In this way, investment arbitral tribunals 
inevitably need to utilize the VCLT as a guide for treaty interpretation.
11
 
In spite of the significant influence of the VCLT, the application of the interpretation 
rules has encountered some difficulty. One of the reasons for this difficulty is that 
unclear legal provisions within investment treaties make it hard to interpret terms 
based on the ordinary meaning of the text. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
typical treaty texts are deliberately crafted to ensure that provisions are broad enough 
to cover the unforeseen circumstances that may arise after the treaties come into 
effect.
12
 Whilst the flexibility of open-textual provisions is important, ambiguous 
language also leads to inconsistent interpretations by the various arbitral tribunals. 
Some commentators even claim that arbitral tribunals adopt different interpretative 
approaches when interpreting international agreements with similar rights and 
obligations, as well as treaty language.
13
 A good example of this occurred in the 
context of challenges to measures implemented during the economic crisis in 
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Argentina in 2001, where different arbitral tribunals adopted distinct interpretations 
of the scope and application of the ‘necessity defense’.
14
  
In addition to the difficulty of ascertaining the ordinary meaning of ambiguous treaty 
text, some commentators claim that interpreting provisions in light of the treaty’s 
objectives and purpose is also problematic. As discussed by Bücheler, arbitral 
tribunals have so far used two different strains to understand the role of an 
international investment treaty when interpreting its provisions. While some arbitral 
tribunals focus on the role of international investment treaties in the protection of 
foreign investment,
15
 others argue that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are 
created in order to promote a balance between development objectives and investor 
benefits.
16
 Thus, interpretative techniques focused on upholding a treaty’s objectives 
and purpose might not be the most effective means of ensuring coherent and 
consistent interpretations by arbitral tribunals.
17
  
Due to inherent problems in applying the conventional approach of the VCLT to 
investment treaty disputes, arbitral tribunals might interpret investment treaties in an 
inconsistent and unpredictable manner.
18
 As illustrated by Fauchald - in a study of 
the variation of legal reasoning cited in investment treaty disputes, by International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitral tribunals - arbitrators 
tend to use a broad range of interpretive arguments and sources when deciding cases. 
Although arbitral tribunals often interpret rules by relying on decisions in earlier 
investor-state cases, Fauchald points out that the interpretative arguments are based 
on other sources, which include legal doctrines espoused within academic 
publications, treaty preparatory works, customary international law, objectives and 
purposes and state practices.
19
 The divergent methods and sources of treaty 
interpretation adopted by investment arbitral tribunals undoubtedly make it difficult 
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to develop a body of consistent and coherent case law. To produce sound arbitral 
awards, attempts have been made to look for a better interpretative approach that can 
potentially resolve the challenges and tensions posed by the current regime of 
interpretation rules. In more recent times, arbitral tribunals and scholars, alike, have 
turned to the ‘general principles of law’ as a potential source of guidance for treaty 
interpretation. This conceptual framework could be adopted in relation to relevant 
rules of international law within the context of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 
 
B. Searching for a New Potential: The General Principles of Law and Its 
Recognizable Role as a Source of Legal Interpretation in  
Public International Law 
Pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, adjudicators can interpret treaties based on 
any rules of international law applicable to the circumstances faced by the parties. 
Legal scholars and practitioners normally consider the ‘rules of international law’ in 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT by making reference to all sources of international law 
as stated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.
20
 Therefore, ‘a general principle of law 
recognized by civilized nations’ stipulated by Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute is 
labeled as one of the sources of law applicable to the resolution of disputes between 
parties under international law. This Article authorizes the adjudicators to draw 
relevant principles that are universally accepted in legal systems around the world in 
order to fill any gaps produced by vague provisions.
21
  
To search for these ‘general principles of law’, one should not simply rely upon 
broad generalizations; but rather, one should draw these principles from a 
‘comparative survey’ of the world’s legal systems.
22
 Cassese held that the source of 
this comparison is fundamentally based on legal doctrines commonly shared by 
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‘major legal systems of the community of nations’.
23
 When adopting this approach, 
the comparative study should resort to the principles shared within both common law 




There is a growing body of literature that advocates the advantages of this approach 
for modern society. One of the most frequently highlighted advantages of the 
‘general principles of law’ methodology is its ‘residual nature’; that is, its ability to 
fill gaps in treaties and customary law, when those sources of law are neither clear 
nor complete.
25
 The strength of this approach was confirmed by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the case of Furundzija 
decided in 1998.
26
 In this case, the Trial Chamber used the ‘general principles of 
law’ approach to clarify the indeterminate meaning of the term ‘rape’, in the context 
of war crimes. The Chamber held that the definition of this term could not simply be: 
drawn from international treaty or customary law, nor is resort to general principles of 
ICL or to general principles of international law of any avail. The Trial Chamber 
therefore considers that, to arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on the 
criminal law principles…it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common 
to the major legal systems of the world.
27 
This judgment reflects that the ‘general principles of law’ must be discovered from 
the commonality and representativeness of legal doctrine generally accepted by 
civilized nations.  
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To be universally applicable, the examination of ‘general principles of law’ must 
satisfy at least two additional conditions. Firstly, as mentioned by Jaye Ellis, the 
general principles of law should be a ‘viable source of law in a heterogeneous 
society’
28
 and the distilled legal doctrine should not be considered as ‘a discrete, 
autonomous entity but as part of a much larger and very complex narrative’.
29
 Judge 
Stephen in Dražen Erdemović case,
30
 held in his dissenting opinion that, in order to 
arrive at a solution by way of the ‘general principles of law’, ‘the enquiry must go 
beyond the actual rules and must seek the reason for their creation and the manner of 
their application’.
31
 From his point of view, international jurists are encouraged to 
discover general principles not only from the legal text, but also, other non-legal 
factors with which the legal doctrines were derived and framed.  
Secondly, the search for ‘general principles of law’ should not be limited to 
principles embedded in municipal law, but should also acknowledge those found 
within the context of international law. In the Corfu Channel Case,
32
 which 
concerned questions regarding Albanian civil liability for the mining of the Corfu 
Channel, the ICJ stated that:  
[T]he fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers 
has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that 
State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim 
of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving 
rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to 
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all 
systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be 
regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and 
leading logically to a single conclusion.
33
 [emphasis added] 
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The Court judgment thus implied that the application of ‘general principles of law’ 
should expand to broader normative considerations, which respect other international 
obligations generally recognized by civilized countries and the international 
community. This view is supported by Moshe Hirsch, who asserts that even if the 
principle is present in municipal law, it is not automatically transposable to the 




Although the use of general principles of law may fill gaps when interpreting vague 
provisions in international laws, some limitations to this remain. As Nolan and 
Sourgens have commented, to demonstrate that the principle is regarded as a general 
legal principle, there must be sufficient state practice to authenticate its adoption into 
the legal system.
35
 In addition, the level of acceptance must be strong enough for the 
purpose of establishing the general principle, regardless of any diversity in legal 
traditions.
36
 Moreover, the said principle must be transposable at the international 
level.
37
 These requirements might cause some difficulty for adjudicators. This may 
lead to a decrease in use of general principles of law in the resolution of international 
disputes in the 21
st
 century, which are inherently intertwined with complex layers of 
stakeholders and interests. 
Due to the increased complexity of conflicts in the contemporary world, no complete 
set of laws to adequately address all issues faced by adjudicators currently exists. 
One of the common issues for adjudicators is conflicts arising from human activities 
that ultimately affect the global environment. To ensure that a substance or activity 
posing a threat to the environment is prevented from causing extensive harm, the 
‘precautionary principle’ is used to deal with unfavourable human pollutions. 
Briefly stated, the precautionary principle permits the host state to negate the 
possible risks stemming from the introduction of new products or any human activity 
that consequently cause a threat to the environment or human health, even where 
scientific proof of the relationship between the risks and consequence is not firmly 
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established. This principle is deeply incorporated in the domestic laws of many 
countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway and Canada.
38
 However, whether this principle will become relevant to 
international law and therefore be regarded as a general principle of law is 
questionable. This is because the United States, despite incorporating the principles 
into its domestic law,
39
 has voiced strong opposition against the principle’s binding 
nature at the international level.
40
 Based on this, there may be difficulty in 
transforming the principle at a domestic level to an international principle. This gives 
rise to concerns on the effectiveness of the general principles of law under art 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the modern world.  
C. The Application of the General Principles of Law in  
International Investment Treaties 
Although the practical application of the ‘general principles of law’ approach is 
prominent in the field of public international law, to date, this concept plays a less 
significant role in the area of international investment law.
41
 According to the study 
by Fauchald, who conducted an empirical analysis of the use of ‘general principles 
of law’ as an interpretative tool in investment treaties by ICSID tribunals from 1
st 
January 1998 to 31
st 
December 2006, tribunals have applied ‘general principles of 
law’ as a source of legal interpretation in only eight out of 98 tribunal awards.
42
 
Nevertheless, a number of investment arbitral tribunals in more recent cases have 
adopted the ‘general principles of law’ approach to solve interpretive tensions.
43
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Despite the minor presence of the ‘general principles of law’ in current investment 
treaty jurisprudence, some commentators argue that this approach should not be 
underestimated and overlooked. Schill, for example, asserts that since international 
investment agreements are not limited to inter-state relations, but also govern the 
relationship between public and private entities, the search for universally 
recognized legal principles, especially from public international and domestic law, 
can help arbitral tribunals to identify some certain standards in investment treaties.
44
 
He also stresses that because investment treaties share core functions with public law 
in resolving public-private disputes, ‘general principles of law’ could provide 
interpretive guidance for arbitral tribunals attempting to achieve an optimum solution 
in the reconciliation of conflicting interests between states and private entities.
45
 He 
argues that the crafting of arbitral decisions based on standards commonly accepted 
by civilized nations would promote the development of a strong system of ‘arbitral 
precedent’, according to which both the parties in a particular investment dispute as 
well as non-parties in subsequent, analogous cases will be bound.
46
 
Similarly, the Working Group on General Public International Law and International 
Investment Law of the Transnational Economic Law Centre, which is a sub-branch 
of the International Law Commission,
47
 has demonstrated how international 
investment law can be influenced by the ‘general principles of law’ and vice versa. 
Its research devised a new legal approach to define vague international legal 
provisions for investment protection, by taking into account the domestic law of the 
countries.
48
 According to its research, which specifically focused on the issue of ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’, the standard of treatment embodied in investment 
agreements generally adheres to the rule of law of host countries.
49
 The approach 
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proposed by this working group is to search for the ‘common features that those 
legal systems establish for the exercise of public power’ by means of a ‘general 
principles of law’ methodology.
50
 This approach has the potential to ensure that the 
adjudicators’ discretion is limited and interpret vague investment rights in 
compliance with the standards commonly accepted under both domestic and 
international law.
51
   
Although the applicability of the general principle of law is not free from ambiguity 
and vagueness, the discovered principle may, at the very least, create a common base 
to which coherent accounts of law are addressed, which indirectly contributes to the 
clarity of vaguely drafted provisions. As MacCormick states; a ‘value coherence’ 
with the established law is regarded as a necessary condition for a decision to be 
legally justified, even in a difficult case.
52
 According to MacCormick, when the legal 
decision contains a principle which formulates the joint policy or common value, the 
ruling achieves value coherence with some part of, or all of, the existing law.
53
 The 
value coherence in rulings therefore help to establish and clarify general trends in 
law and the consistency of legal rulings in subsequent cases. When connecting this 
underlying principle to international investment law, the value coherence could 
arguably be identified from the commonly accepted principles inherent in domestic 
public law that governs the relationship between the host state and individuals. Such 
value coherence characterises the influence of social, political and moral 
considerations commonly agreed within the community.  
 
D. Domestic Public Law Comparison as a Potential Source of 
Interpretation under Investor-State Arbitration 
The proliferation of international investment treaties has generated criticism from a 
wide-range of sources, including States, foreign investors, civil society and 
academia, due to the frequent presence of poorly articulated legal principles within 
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some vaguely crafted provisions. In the context of investment treaties, this issue has 
not only produced uncertainty and incoherence in the application and interpretation 
of law, but has also exacerbated the tension between public and private interests in 
investment protection.  
This next section of the Chapter tries to argue that international investment 
arbitration could be regarded as a form of public law adjudication. As such, the 
construction of ‘general principles of law’ could be made through an analysis of the 
core values found within the domestic public law of major legal systems. In order to 
illustrate the nature of the relationship between international investment law and 
public law, this section begins with a discussion of the distinctiveness of 
international investment treaties and their departure from both traditional public 
international law and international commercial law. It then discusses how the 
importation and adaptation of a public law framework could enhance legal certainty 
and the stability of legal expectations for both States and investors. 
1. Key Characteristics of the International Investment Treaty as a New Field of 
International Law  
The system of international law binds members of the international community to a 
set of agreed values and standards.
54
 International law is frequently referred to as 
‘public international law’ and this traditional concept determines the relations 
between states in all their myriad forms.
55
 However, in the context of international 
commercial law, it contains a body of rules with which to govern international 
business- and sales- transactions between countries. Due to the proliferation of 
international business transactions, international commercial rules have been created 
to remove the impediments to trade that are embodied in local laws, and to promote 
cross-border business flows.
56
 However, since the 1990s, which saw an upsurge in 
foreign investment flows across countries and a corresponding rise in the number of 
investment arbitrations, the international law of investment protection has become an 
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increasingly important area of study. The growth in international investment has 
resulted in the development of a discrete area of law, distinct from the traditional 
genres of international law and characterized by its own unique features.
57
  
This section analyzes the distinction between international investment law, on the 
one hand, and public international law and international commercial law, on the 
other, in relation to four key issues: subject of law, scope of review, interpretative 
approaches and dispute settlement mechanisms. This section also develops a 
framework to argue that international investment agreements are neither examples of 
purely public international law nor purely international commercial law, but rather a 
specific area of international law that governs the relationship between States and 
individuals and imposes upon States the obligation to protect foreign investments. 
(a) Subject of Law 
According to traditional principles of public international law, only States have 
personality under international law and only States can bring claims against other 
opposing States before an international forum.
58
 In international commercial law, by 
contrast, an individual is a subject of law and has the right to invoke a claim against 
an opposing contracting party.
59
 The relationship between the contracting parties 
under both traditional public law and international commercial law is generally 
described as an ‘equality of parties’ in each sphere of law.
60
 
Under an investment treaty, however, an individual foreign investor who is covered 
by the treaty’s provision is considered to be a subject who can directly initiate 
arbitration against the host state government, for the recuperation of compensatory 
damages, in an international arbitration forum.
61
 The relationship between a 
protected foreign investor and the host state is generally characterized as a 
‘hierarchical relation’ between a superior and a subordinate wherein the state is 
entitled by sovereign right to unilaterally impose binding decisions on a foreign 
investor, either through an administrative order or the implementation of domestic 
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 Even though the state acts in a public capacity, a private investor can bring the 
matter before an international arbitral tribunal as a dispute between a state and a 
foreign investor.
63
 Therefore, the investment treaty elevates the legal rights of an 
individual to entitle him/her to pursue a claim directly against the host state 
government, unless specified otherwise. A natural person or an enterprise can, thus, 
be the subject of obligations and rights at international law, and is entitled to make a 
claim against the State directly through the investment treaty. 
(b) Scope of Review  
Traditional public international law typically involves disputes between two states. 
The aim of public international law is to provide criteria with which to settle disputes 
between equal sovereign nations, on the basis of mandates set by the United 
Nations,
64
 or procedural rules under the ICJ.
65
  
International commercial law governs business matters between private commercial 
actors of more than one country. The rights and obligations of the commercial parties 
are governed by the contract under private law.
66
 This is different from an 
investment treaty where the rights invoked by a foreign investor are derived from the 




International investment laws largely stipulate the standard of treatment that the host 
state government needs to respect.
68
 Typically, an international investment treaty 
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covers a wide range of issues, including: the legality of the conduct of host state 
government vis-à-vis foreign investors; regulatory oversight over public utilities; and 
the state’s rights to terminate commercial permits. The scope of investor protection 
is mainly determined by the range of obligations assumed under a treaty, following 
the terms agreed upon by the State parties.
69
 As such, by preventing host states from 
engaging in abusive uses of government power, international investment law is 
analogous to public law, which concerns the control of regulatory or administrative 
acts taken by states.
70
  
(c) Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
The settlement of disputes under public international law is fundamentally structured 
to handle conflicts between states by means of diplomatic protection, or in other 
domestic courts or agreed forums, acceptable under public international law 
principles.
71
 However, public international law usually requires the exhaustion of 
local remedies within the host states prior to requesting diplomatic protection or 
international dispute remedies. Furthermore, in relation to the right to seek remedies 
under public international law, only the government of an aggrieved foreign investor 
(as opposed to said investor) is eligible to invoke compensation from the host state 
alleged to have committed the wrongful acts.
72
 
This is different from an international commercial law where the settlement of 
disputes generally occurs in accordance with agreed terms stipulated in the contract. 
The jurisdiction to arbitrate, under international commercial law, is typically based 
on a contractual commitment between the specific parties to arbitrate on specific 
issues.
73
 As a result, the parties in a commercial arbitration have full control over the 
arbitral proceedings,
74
 and therefore, enjoy full autonomy in determining matters 
such as the applicable law, the composition of the tribunal, and the location at which 
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the arbitration will occur.
75
 The award rendered by arbitral tribunals can also be 
enforced worldwide under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (known as New York Convention 1958),
76
 and the national 
courts of the country in which the enforcement is sought may only refuse the foreign 
arbitral awards on limited grounds.
77
 
In context of an international investment law, States mutually consent, by treaty, to 
commit themselves to compulsory arbitration in the event of a dispute with foreign 
private investors.
78
 The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to consider a case is not 
derived from a contract in the private sphere, but from a prospective offer to arbitrate 
made by the state parties.
79
 Pursuant to the nature of investment arbitration, ‘consent 
without privity’ is a hallmark of the settlement of disputes under investment 
agreements.
80
 As Van Harten puts it, arbitration under investment treaties is a type of 




Although the procedural rules for arbitration in investment treaties are similar to 
those made under private commercial international contracts,
82
 treaty-based 
investment arbitration usually involves claims associated with the exercise of state 
sovereignty, and not the breaching of obligations arising out of purely commercial 
acts by the host state government.
83
 Therefore, arbitral tribunals, under investment 
treaties, have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide issues regarding state 
sovereignty and public interests, and this type of dispute settlement power is not 
found in typical commercial arbitration contracts.  
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All in all, investment treaties have unique characteristics distinct from both purely 
traditional public international law and purely international commercial law. The 
distinctiveness of investment treaties mandates, therefore, the development and 
application of new ways of legal thinking. Accordingly, the next section of this 
Chapter will discuss the rationale for, and relevance of, the development of a new 
public law framework, applicable to investment treaty disputes. 
2. Rationale of Public Law Framework and Its Practical Utility in Investor-State 
Dispute Analysis 
As the awareness of the public law dimension of investment treaties is steadily 
growing, the application of a public law framework to investment treaties is 
conceptually justifiable, and is becoming an increasing focus within academic 
scholarship. Further reasons for this focus include:  
(a) Public Law as a Governing Rule for Unequal Relationships   
Firstly, the investment treaty is a legal instrument that governs the relationship 
between a State and foreign investors. Unlike traditional public international law and 
commercial law, the investment treaty reflects the existence of a ‘vertical 
relationship between host state as governors and private investors as governed 
party’.
84
 The current regime of investment treaties is thus comparable with the 
function of domestic public law, which governs the unequal relationship between the 
State and individuals.  
(b) Public Law as Governing Rules for Regulatory Disputes  
Secondly, public law thinking could help arbitrators to formulate a new method of 
analysis when confronting conflicts between a State and foreign investors. Investor-
state arbitration is not purely a commercial dispute, nor is it an inter-state dispute; 
rather, it is a ‘regulatory dispute’ wherein the host state government unilaterally 
imposes legislative or administrative orders on the foreign investor.
85
 Under a typical 
investment treaty, the parties’ objectives include not only the admission and 
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promotion of foreign investment, but also the setting of standards of treatment for 
foreign investments within the host country.
86
 If the host state government 
unlawfully imposes an administrative order, the aggrieved foreign investor can bring 
a compensation claim against the host state for its breach of international obligations, 
and the arbitral tribunals then play a role, much like that of a judicial review body, in 
hearing and resolving the matter. The process of settling a regulatory dispute under 
international investment law is, thus, similar to that of a national administrative or 




(c) Public Law as a Potential Source of Legal Interpretation to Strike Justice and 
the Fair Balance between State and Private Interests  
Under the current regime, a typical investment treaty aims to protect foreign 
investments from abusive regulatory interference by host state governments.
88
 If 
broadly formulated, the investment protection mechanisms could, nevertheless, 
permit foreign investors, who have suffered harm as a result of legitimate regulation, 
to sue the host state government in an arbitral tribunal for a significant amount of 
compensation. This type of protection limits the exercise of legitimate power, by a 
host state, to regulate for the common good.
89
  
Critiquing the restriction on the state sovereign right to control, Fuentes questions 
the legitimacy of the existing system of investment treaties and arbitration. He 
argues that the current system of investment law poses a serious threat to the 
fundamental values of the rule of law and democracy; heavily favoring foreign 
investment at the expense of state sovereignty.
90
 Been and Beauvais even claim that 
investment treaty-based tribunals have interpreted vaguely crafted provisions in a 
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Given these problems surrounding the existing investment treaty-based protections, 
the utility of domestic public law, as a source of interpretative guidance for 
international investment treaties, should be considered as instrumental in clarifying 
vague obligations and striking an appropriate balance between private and public 
interests. This position is also advocated by Fuentes,
92
 in a study examining the 
influence of international investment law on domestic law and national priorities. 
The author argued that, although investment tribunals exercise a power similar to 
constitutional or administrative tribunals, they use private law principles without any 
consideration of the rules within domestic public legal orders to settle claims 
between States and private entities.
93
 This lack of deference to national authorities 
could potentially (and irrationally) impose a stricter standard of protection for 
foreign investors than that provided for domestic investors.
94
  
In addition to clarifying the meaning of vague terms, the use of a public law 
framework would enable arbitral tribunals to better frame their decisions, by 
deferring to domestic laws and national authorities, in a manner which promotes 
justice and the balance of competing interests.
95
 When determining whether a breach 
of an international investment treaty is reasonable or justifiable on the basis of the 
national interests of the affected party, the incorporation of the opinions of national 
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies could help to ensure that arbitral tribunals 
adequately consider all relevant ‘voices’ representing democratic values,
96
 as well as 
the ‘expertise’ of the state authorities over some complex issues with which the 
arbitral tribunals are not familiar.
97
 This could prevent investment tribunals from 
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arbitrarily second-guessing government decision-making and ensure that they are 






 a constitutional law expert, presented a similarly critical study of 
the international investment system. He supports the application of domestic public 
law in investor-state arbitration. While he focuses on the public law dimensions of 
international investment disputes, he also provides an analysis of the constitutional 
implications of investor-state arbitration. According to Schneiderman, the strong 
protection of foreign investment favors foreign investors too heavily and 
‘destabilizes the functioning of democratic processes, represented by other 
constitutional rules’.
100
 Therefore, he argues that rather than relying on different 
standards of treatment, foreign investors should be subject to the same standards that 
are applicable to local people, and those foreign investors should utilize alternative 
means of investment protection, such as investment insurance, to safeguard 
themselves from unforeseen policy risks that might arise unexpectedly.
101
 
In order to find the ‘minimum standards of treatment’, with which an investment 
treaty could ‘achieve effective and operative balance of conflicting interests’, 
Mahmood suggests that the protection of foreign investment should be in line with 
standards accepted in national and international human right regimes.
102
 Mahmood 
also argues that the government should commit to a duty under the doctrine of 
‘social contract’ between state and citizens, and it should have freedom to regulate 
according to its democratic mandate.
103
 Therefore, even though the state has 
committed itself to international obligations, the interpretation of investment treaties 
should be guided by the some social norms and the underlying role of the state in 
providing the required minimum standards of protection to its citizens, as recognized 
by local and international laws.
104
 By means of the ‘minimum standards of 
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treatment’ approach, international arbitrators could utilize both domestic and 
international human rights law, as a source of interpretive guidance, in order to 
ensure that all common goods and interests are properly evaluated.  
From the foregoing discussion, it can be argued that the adoption of a ‘public law 
framework’ could be highly instrumental in shaping the legal analysis of 
international investment disputes, particularly, in circumstances where public and 
private interests collide. As an investment agreement reflects the relationship 
between a host state and foreign investors, reference to legal doctrines found in the 
public law jurisprudence of national legal orders could potentially help arbitrators to 
interpret treaty provisions in a clear, consistent and effective manner. 
 
E. The Application of the General Principles of Public Law in the 
Context of Indirect Expropriation Law 
In this section, the focus will be on the applicability of the concept of ‘general 
principles of public law’ in relation to ‘indirect expropriation’ provisions. The 
section evaluates the existing analytical frameworks that arbitral tribunals use in 
assessing the existence of compensable indirect expropriations. Due to different 
degrees of arbitral tribunals’ deference to domestic laws/policies in analyzing 
indirect expropriation enquiries, the section will propose that arbitral tribunals 
should make use of the ‘general principles of public law’ that are commonly adopted 
in civilized nations, as a useful interpretive guide in confronting indirect 
expropriation claims. 
1. Deference to Domestic Public Law in the Existing Jurisprudence on Indirect 
Expropriation 
As discussed, there is no sound and coherent principle with which to determine the 
existence of a compensable indirect expropriation under the current regime of 
international law. Due to the shortcomings of the existing legal principles discussed, 
tribunals are confronted with the ‘dilemma’ of choosing between conflicting legal 
155 
standards when analyzing the tensions between public and private benefits.
105
 Often, 
the choice between these standards is dependent on the exercise of discretion by each 
tribunal.
106
 The use of public law principles has been advocated as providing a 
predictable methodology with which to interpret the relationship between the state 
and individuals. To date, there are generally three basic frameworks that are variably 
used by current investment tribunals to decide when a compensable indirect 
expropriation has occurred. These include: strong deference, moderate deference and 
non-deference to domestic public law. 
(a) Strong Deference to Domestic Law/Regulation 
In some cases, investment tribunals have strongly recognized the state’s intent 
behind an interference with foreign-owned property when approaching an indirect 
expropriation claim. To decide whether there is an expropriation requiring 
compensation in such cases, tribunals have acknowledged the State’s capacity to 
regulate in favor of public interests. Since it is a fundamental commitment of a 
government to ensure that social interests are satisfactorily addressed, investment 
arbitral tribunals occasionally defer to the concept of ‘police power’ inherent in 
domestic and international laws; according to which the national government cannot 
be held liable for harm suffered by an individual as a result of legitimate 
regulation.
107
 The right to regulate without paying compensation is not only accepted 
under national law, but is also widely recognized by international legal orders.
108
  





 took into account the purpose of the respective State interferences. In 
Saluka, the Claimant submitted that the Czech National Bank (CNB), which is the 
central bank of the Czech Republic, breached the BIT between the Netherlands and 
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 by imposing an unlawful administrative order over a private 
bank. In this case, the arbitration followed the alleged unlawful privatization of the 
Czech banking sector following a period of Communism in 1990.
112
 The Czech 
Republic privatized Investiční a Poštovní Banka (IPB), (one of the major banks in 
the Czech Republic) and sold its State-owned shares to Nomura Holding Company, 
which were later transferred to Saluka Investment BV (a subsidiary company of 
Nomura set up under the law of the Netherlands).
113
  
However, due to mismanagement in the administration of the company, in lending a 
large amount of non-performing loan portfolios,
114
 the CNB stepped in and provided 
financial assistance to all banks, including IPB that suffered ‘liquidity’ problems in 
‘payment ability both in Czech currency and in foreign currencies’.
115
 To deal with 
the issues, the government decided to force the sale of IPB to Ceskoslovesnka 
Obchodni Banka (CSOB). Due to the ‘forced administration’ measure, Noruma was 
deprived of its 46 percent shareholding in the IPB.
116
 As a result, it initiated claims 
against the Czech Republic for breach of the BIT on the violation of numerous 
provisions including Article 5 concerning the expropriation. 
The Tribunal decided that, even though the Czech Republic deprived the Claimant of 
its interests, the exercise of regulatory action by the host state government was 
justified. The Tribunal pointed out that, under established international laws, a State 
has no duty to compensate foreign investors affected by the normal course of 
regulatory acts adopted in a ‘non-discriminatory manner under bona fide 
regulations’.
117
 After reviewing the facts, the Tribunal acknowledged that the 
decision of the CNB to impose forced administration on the bank was made in 
accordance with domestic laws, which aimed to stabilize the damaged domestic 
economy.
118
 Thus, the Tribunal held that the CNB’s decision was lawful and 
permissible under Czech law, as well as established international laws, and did not 
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fall within the meaning of compensable deprivation under Article 5 of the BIT 
between the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.
119
 
Methanex v United States
120
 is another important case that illustrates the prominent 
role of domestic public law in the decision-making process of an investment arbitral 
tribunal. Methanex Corporation, a foreign investor and producer of methanol (the 
main ingredient of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE)), brought a case against the 
United States under NAFTA investment chapter 11 to seek compensation regarding 
a dispute arising from California’s environmental legislation. In this case, the 
Canadian Claimant, Methanex Corporation, was greatly impacted by legislation 
passed by the State of California to ban MTBE. The company complained that after 
the enactment of the law, it experienced a loss of $150 million.
121
 In addition, the 
Claimant also criticized the legislation for being discriminatory because it benefited 
US ethanol producers.
122
 Methanex alleged that California breached NAFTA’s 
investment protection provisions, including Article 1110 on expropriation.  
The Tribunal found that MTBE caused tremendous negative effects on public health 
and the environment. When interpreting the expropriation provision, the Tribunal 
reasserted the State’s legitimate right to enact environmental measures despite their 
impacts over investor’s expected economic benefit.
123
 Rejecting the allegation of the 
Claimant, the Tribunal held that:  
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects … a 
foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless 
specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then 
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The aforementioned cases postulate the supremacy of domestic law, as well as the 
superior position of public bodies, to enforce measures that are needed to safeguard 
public welfare and social benefits. 
(b) Moderate Deference 
Some investment tribunals have approached the interpretation of expropriatory 
behaviours differently by focusing on the rationality and the ordinary meaning of the 
measures when identifying whether an indirect expropriation has occurred. To 
analyze the issue of indirect expropriation, these tribunals have, to some extent, 
deployed a pubic law framework to reconcile conflicting interests. 
In Alex Genin v Estonia,
125
 for example, the Tribunal found that the ‘reasonableness, 
soundness, legitimacy’ and ‘propriety of the State’s decision’ to revoke a banking 
license were the key factors in deciding whether the government’s conduct qualified 
as an indirect expropriation.
126









In contrast to Genin, Gemplus and Feldman, however, the Tribunal in Tecmed
130
 
relied on a ‘proportionality test’ to examine the occurrence of indirect expropriation. 
In analyzing the issue, the Tribunal considered whether the relationship between the 
‘effect’ and ‘purpose’ of the governmental measure satisfied a ‘proportionality 
test.’
131
 Inspired by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), the Tribunal held that:  
[I]n addition to negative financial impact of such actions or measure, the Arbitral 
Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be characterized as 
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expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest 
presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments.
132
  
Despite a considerable methodological difference between Genin, Gemplus, 
Feldman and Tecmed, they are all alike in examining the validity of the exercise of 
public powers over individuals, by referring to standards of ‘reasonableness’ and 
‘proportionality’. Even though these concepts are the hallmarks of public law 
jurisprudence, the applicability of these concepts within the field of international 
investment law is full of controversy and uncertainty. For example, since 
‘reasonableness’ is a normative concept drawing upon ‘moral considerations’ and ‘a 
series of practical and normative requisites for judging decisions’,
133
 Kriebaum 
suggests that the proportionality test employed by the Tecmed Tribunal is a better 
solution than the open-ended concept of reasonableness. She points out that the 
doctrine of proportionality commits tribunals to disclosing the method it has used in 
weighing the public interest of the host State against the effects of the measure on 
the individual investor.
134
 However, some argue that despite its advantages, the 
application of the proportionality test tends to rely too much on the discretion of the 
arbitral tribunal as to what it believes is an appropriate balance between public and 
private interests, respectively.
135
 As a consequence, the methods produced by 
different tribunals might reflect a diversity of techniques to estimate the relative 
weight assigned to each interest group in diverse situations. This might arguably 
aggravate the problem of legal indeterminacy in investment treaties. 
(c) Non-Deference towards Domestic Public law/Policy 
Non-deference means that the sole factor used to indicate whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred is the ‘effect’ of the governmental measure on the 
investment. Some investment tribunals have explicitly stated that the intent of the 
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state, and its motivation to implement a public policy, is not relevant to deciding 
whether a governmental interference amounts to an indirect expropriation.
136
  
One of most prominent cases applying this line of reasoning is Metalclad v 
Mexico,
137
 which was discussed in Chapter Four. The Tribunal strongly adopted the 
‘effect-based’ rule to decide whether the Ecological Decree issued by the local 
government to protect rare cactus amounted to expropriation in violation of the 
states’ commitment under the NAFTA’s.
138
    
The approach used by Metalclad Tribunal has been criticized by several legal 
scholars. Dubava pointed out that the Metalclad Tribunal not only provided 
excessive protection to foreign investors, but also overlooked ‘the possible police 
powers exceptions or inner limits of the indirect expropriation standard.’
139
 Thus, the 
award imposed an adverse effect on a state’s legitimate power to regulate for 
environmental protection and social interest goals. The same criticism applies to the 
expropriation award in Santa Elena v Costa Rica.
140
 In this case, the Claimant’s 
tourist resort was expropriated by a governmental decree to turn the area in question 
into a preservation area.
141
 The Tribunal held that the obligation to pay compensation 
to aggrieved investors remained even though the governmental measures were 
motivated purely by environmental purposes.
142
  
From the decisions in Metalclad and Santa Elena, it is obvious that some arbitral 
tribunals have considered the impact of a state measure on the investor’s rights to use 
and enjoy their property as the primary factor indicating the occurrence of indirect 
expropriation. In the course of such legal reasoning, the tribunals had to disregard 
any legitimate state intent to expropriate private property. In applying this analytical 
framework, the tribunals have interpreted international investment treaties primarily 
as an instrument to protect foreign investments, and have attributed less significance 
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to a host state’s duty to pay compensation under domestic laws when determining 
whether a compensable expropriation has occurred. 
2. General Principles of Public Law and the Proposed Comparative Study in the 
Context of Indirect Expropriation Inquiries 
An examination of the development of indirect expropriation jurisprudence 
demonstrates that tribunals have variably adopted a wide range of public law 
approaches to analyze this issue. These approaches have ranged from emphasizing 
the State’s ‘police power’ to applying a proportionality/balancing test, and to 
prioritizing investor interests. The absence of a uniform approach suggests that the 
parameters of indirect expropriation are still ill defined, and that this area of law 
lacks a conceptual framework with the potential to operate as a ‘practical tool for 




Consequently, diverse interpretative approaches applied by arbitral tribunals make it 
hard to know when a certain legal standard/concept should prevail over another, in 
any given circumstance. What is needed is a legal framework within which to 
conceptualize the appropriate standard of treatment and assist arbitral tribunals in 
determining when state actions are exempted from international responsibility and 
when the interests of investors should be prioritized. 
To develop this theoretical framework, a growing body of scholarship has 
recommended the utilization of the ‘comparative law’ approach to distill the ‘general 
principles of law’ of civilized nations; these ‘general principles’ can then assist in 
reconciling civil liberty and national security considerations in the context of indirect 
expropriation. Mann, for instance, asserted that although the State is generally liable 
under international law for its breach of contract, a mere regulation giving rise to 
interference with private property may not attract liability under international law.
144
 
He suggested that the matter could be investigated by considering whether the state’s 
interference is tantamount to the acquisition of property owned by a private party, 
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which requires compensation according to extant state practices in most civilized 
countries.
145
 Mann proposed that the issues needing to be taken into consideration 
include the extent of property rights protection, the concept of taking, as well as the 
legal doctrines regarding compensation, etc.
146
 
This analytical framework was subsequently endorsed by Dolzer in 1986.
147
 He 
emphasized the role of ‘general principles’ recognized by domestic laws, as a useful 
tool to examine the doctrinal concept of indirect expropriation under international 
law. He found that the concept of indirect expropriation was interpreted differently 
by various adjudicators,
148
 and that major capital exporting countries, such as France, 
Germany and the United States of America, formulated investment treaties to protect 
their investments located in overseas countries but that these treaties notoriously 
suffer from a lack of clarity and ‘fall below the mark of acceptability’ in defining 
what constitutes an indirect expropriation.
149
 Dolzer argued that the boundaries of 
indirect expropriation should be established on the basis of rules comparable to those 
found in domestic legal orders.
150
  
This line of analysis was later supported by Levesque, who emphasized the role of 
‘general principles of law’ drawn from national laws concerning the ‘protection of 
property rights’.
151
 In her view, the idea of a ‘property owner’s legitimate 
expectation’ can play a significant role in providing judicial guidance on the question 
of who should bear the burden and risk of government intervention.
152
 In a highly 
risky industry, the private property owner should reasonably expect a high level of 
government control and possible interference. Any good-faith regulatory change 
causing additional burden on the investor should not impose a financial burden on 
the government. As private property has a ‘social junction’,
153
 she also argues that 
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international investment tribunals should apply not just customary international law, 
but also domestic laws, drawn from both developed and developing countries, 
regarding the protection of private property. These laws could form a ‘minimum 





A survey of scholarly writings as well as the decisions of various tribunals reveals 
that the concept of indirect expropriation remains unclear and inadequately defined 
in international investment law. This problem causes a lack of consistency and 
coherence of legal reasoning in international arbitral proceedings. In response to 
vague legal rules, investment arbitrators have often disregarded the public law 
perspective, and consequently, provided excessive protection to foreign investors. 
This approach ultimately restrains the State’s sovereign right to regulate in the public 
interest.  
The problem of legal uncertainty is also attributed to the ad hoc nature of 
commercial arbitration, which contributes to the dysfunctional development of the 
standard of protection in investment treaties. Moreover, open-ended standards of 
protection can directly impact investors, who may face unpredictable international 
arbitration outcomes.  
Consequently, there is growing criticism of the legitimacy of arbitration systems, and 
a demand for interpretative guidance in order to mitigate the problem of vague treaty 
texts. The special public-private bridging features of international investment 
treaties, as mentioned above, indicates that a ‘public law approach’ to the 
identification of the general principles of international law could provide this sort 
after guidance for treaty interpretation. Ultimately, there is a need to develop a stable 
legal framework with which to resolve legal ambiguities and to strike an appropriate 
balance between public and private interests. 
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To improve the consistency and coherence of legal reasoning of the vague provisions 
in investment treaties, a universal set of general principles of public law could 
provide constructive guidance for investment treaty interpretation. Deference to the 
‘general principles of law’, through the comparative law study in the light of Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT and Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, could enable the 
identification of common legal principles, which synthesize domestic and 
international legal principles that are universally recognized by civilized nations. It is 
not suggested that arbitrators transplant doctrine, but that they take into account the 
institutional settings, contextual factors and norms in which the common legal 
principles are embedded. The resultant principles would establish generally 
applicable legal standards and the coherence of legal reasoning, without the need to 
favor any specific legal tradition or system. 
The aim of the following Chapter, therefore, is to search for the innovative legal 
rules that can contribute to the formation of a common legal doctrine in the field of 
indirect expropriation law. To find these legal principles, a comparative public law 
analysis of decisions by domestic courts, in the United States, Thailand and Mexico 
and the jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
will be undertaken. The following chapter seeks to draw a clearer and more 
comprehensive picture of the international rules on indirect expropriation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER THE US CONSTITUTION: THRESHOLDS, 
CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION 
 
The current United States Constitution guarantees the protection of individual rights 
and freedoms. It also incorporates basic institutional limits on the government’s right 
to take private property for public use. The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution 
(hereafter ‘the Takings Clause’) provides that ‘… nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation’.
1
 The provision thus imposes a legal 
restriction on the government’s authority to seize private property without paying 
just compensation. However, what constitutes a government action that is subject to 
this ‘just compensation’ obligation is surrounded by controversy.  
In relation to the Takings Clause, the US Supreme Court (‘the Court’) typically hears 
two types of lawsuits; these are a ‘condemnation’ and a ‘taking’.
2
 While the former 
lawsuit involves a formal expropriation, whereby the government takes possession of 
a physical asset from a private property owner through legislation and in exchange 
for a monetary payment, the latter involves a regulatory action affecting property for 
which the property owner can obtain compensation only through litigation. The first 
type of government action is clearly compensable; however, the latter has drawn 
much attention and debate, due to the ambiguity surrounding the exact conduct that 
ought to constitute a ‘regulatory taking’ and necessitate compensation under the 
Takings Clause.   
This Chapter aims to analyze the conceptualization of regulatory takings developed 
by the US Supreme Court, and to identify the distinction between non-compensable 
exercises of public authority and compensable regulatory takings. This Chapter 
commences with a discussion of the original understanding of the Takings Clause 
and examines the genesis of ideas regarding the proper relationship between 
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government conduct and private property rights from the 19
th
 century. It then 
investigates takings jurisprudence as developed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The examination will address evolving legal concepts through constitutional 
interpretation by the Supreme Court from the early 19
th
 century until the present. It 
will be demonstrated that the Court’s rulings reflect a range of legal reasoning 
approaches that have served to promote the prevailing legal values, norms and ideas 
of justice of a particular period of time, within a matrix of social, economic and 
political relations. Following this section, the Chapter examines recent trends in 
judicial decision-making, and legal approaches that the Court has employed in 
response to contemporary regulatory takings disputes. The Chapter will expose the 
legal approaches that the Court has used to identify compensable regulatory takings 
and will anticipate future cases that are likely to be resolved in this broad area of 
law. 
 
A. The Genesis and Historical Development of the Protection against 
Property Takings in American Laws 
Modern American takings law is largely based upon centuries of English legal 
principles concerning the state sovereign right to control private property. Both the 
genesis and subsequent development of American takings law reveal the 
complexities associated with this issue and the dominant nature of political and 
social structures within American society.  
1. The Genesis and Conceptualization of State Sovereign Power in the Colonial 
Period  




 By the time 
Christopher Columbus reached America in 1492, the ‘Doctrine of Discovery’ was 
well established in the Christian World.
4
 As a consequence of the predominance of 
Christianity, Western European nations claimed a divine right to take control of all 
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the land in non-Christian countries and used Christian ideology to justify war, 
colonization and slavery.
5
 The right of discovery was not surprisingly permeated in 
American law and was intertwined with the notion of white supremacy, which 
emphasized the superiority of Western civilization and Christianity over indigenous 
people including Native American Indian people, tribes and their lands.
6
  
Based on this concept, the English Crown empowered various agencies to establish 
colonies in America, and legally infringed on sovereign rights and properties of the 
American Indian nations.
7
 According to Power, various interest groups founded a 
number of colonies. For example, Jamestown, which was established in 1607, was 
founded by a London-based company; Plymouth Colony was founded in 1620 by the 
Plymouth Company; and Maryland and Pennsylvania were established by a group of 
businessmen in 1632 and 1681, respectively.
8
 
In accordance with their exclusive rights to govern the newly founded areas, the 
colonies’ settlers were granted the authority to enact laws to control and regulate the 
land.
9
 In the early colonial period, most colonial charters followed the legal template 
outlined within Magna Carta, in order to constrain any arbitrary exercise of power 
by the King against the governed.
10
 Nearly all of the founding documents in the early 
period with the exception of the colonial charter of Massachusetts and Carolina, 
failed to incorporate a compensation requirement as a means of protecting individual 
property rights.
11
 Rather than granting property holders a ‘substantive right’ to 
protection against governmental intrusion on property rights, most colonial charters 
and state constitutions imposed a requirement of ‘procedural regularity’.
12
 For 
example, the 1683 New York Charter of Liberty and Privileges did not contain a just 
compensation clause, but it followed Article 39 of Magna Carta (1215), by declaring 
that ‘[n]o free man shall ... be dispossessed…except by the legal judgment of his 
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peers or by the law of the land’.
13
 Pennsylvania’s Constitution similarly stated that a 
‘freeman cannot be dispossessed of freehold without due process of law’.
14
 
Likewise, in the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey Chapter XVII, it 
was declared that an individual cannot be deprived of real or personal property 




As can be seen from these provisions, the taking of private property was generally 
not subject to a compensation obligation. It revealed that colonial and early state 
governments showed limited respect for the protection of private property rights.
16
 
Although modeled on the British legal system, American legislative bodies were 
granted absolute sovereignty and supreme legal authority over other political 
institutions.
17
 As Gold observed, the legislature had ultimate power to determine the 
circumstances under which compensation should be provided, in the absence of any 
real democratic consensus, and the mere approval of state legislatures was sufficient 
to take over individuals’ properties.
18
 As a consequence, a court could not order the 
executive government to provide compensation unless an explicit compensation 
requirement was incorporated within legislation. 
Uncompensated takings by American executive governments, pursuant to 
authorizing statutes, were widespread. Colonial governments regulated not only land 
use, but also business operations and economic policies.
19
 An early Massachusetts 
ordinance, for instance, provided that the state could seize the land title if the owner 
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did not utilize the land within the period of three years.
20
 In Colonial Virginia, the 
government could even seize land that had been improved, if the owner abandoned 
it.
21
 In 1669, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted the Mill Act in order to 
encourage individuals to build watermills.
22
 This Act allowed a person who wanted 
to build a water-powered gristmill to obtain private land under an 80-year lease. 
Even though compensation was required under this Act, it was for an amount less 
than the market value of the land taken.
23
 
In the early colonial period, ‘takings by executives, without approval by the 
legislature’ drew much more attention than ‘uncompensated takings per se’.
24
 
Although compensation was required when governmental interference deprived 
people of their property rights, the executive and the courts had no obligation to pay 
compensation if no obligation was imposed by the legislature,
25
 or if the relevant 
legislative instrument was construed as authorization to take property without 
compensation.
26
 In practice, no colonial charter mandated compensation when a 
legislative regulation affected private property rights, and courts generally did not 
order compensation in such circumstances. 
2. Declaration of Independence 
During the colonial period, the British Empire exercised great influence over 
colonial governments. Although the colonies had the authority to govern themselves, 
their enacted legislation could not conflict with the main policies of the British 
Parliament. To ensure the unity of the colonies, the British Parliament regulated the 
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The extent of the control retained by the British Empire triggered dissatisfaction 
among the governed and, in particular, merchants. Unfairly treated by the British 
Empire, some American colonies rose against the imperial power of the 
Parliament.
28
 As a result of widespread discontent, following Acts of the British 
Parliament that deprived the governed of their protected rights and liberties,
29
 
thirteen American colonies joined together to declare their independence from the 
English Crown in 1776.
30
 
Having experienced the threat of uncompensated legislative acquisition in the past, 
three newly independent colonies - in search of a new system of law - adopted 
constitutions that restricted governmental rights to expropriate property without 
paying compensation. These were the Vermont Constitution of 1777, the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Despite 
some variation within their legal text, all three constitutions similarly rejected the 
uncompensated acquisition of property by the legislature. 
(a) Vermont Constitution of 1777 
Vermont was the first state to enact a Constitution, in 1777, to prevent the eminent 
abuse of power by the legislature and executive.
31
 The Vermont Constitution 
declared that:  
private property ought to be subservient to public uses when necessity requires 
it; nevertheless, whenever any particular man’s property is taken for the use of 
the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.
32
  
This constitutional provision was implemented to resolve the growing distrust 
towards governments that impeded the property rights of citizens. As Professor 
Treanor has pointed out, this compensation requirement reflected the historic 
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difficulty that the people of Vermont faced in 1764, when King George III had given 
certain land to New York, and Vermont governors denied their citizen’s rights over 
this land, despite the fact that they had originally held grants in relation to this from 
New Hampshire.
33
 Through the passage of state legislation, the governors of New 
York tried to deprive citizens of Vermont of possession and enjoyment of their 
property rights in connection with this area of land.
34
 Following the Declaration of 
Independence (1776), the Constitution was enacted to ensure that the state 
legislatures amended legislation in order to provide greater protection for individual 
rights and private property. 
Whilst the Vermont takings clause required the sovereign power to appropriate 
private property for public use in exchange for compensation, Gold has observed that 




(b) Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
A compensation clause appeared in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. 
Professor Treanor has pointed out that the inclusion of the compensation requirement 
was a result of the ‘fear of legislatures and heightened concern for individual 
rights’.
36
 During the period when the Constitution was drafted, there were enduring 
conflicts between competing interest groups in society; including conflicts between 
the patriots of farming interests on the one hand and liberal forces and the royalists 
on the other hand.
37
 To ensure adequate property protection, the Massachusetts 
Constitution declared that:  
[N]o part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or 
applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of 
the people…[a]nd whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any 
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Gold remarks that the Massachusetts Constitution embraced a new insight that was 
different from the Vermont Constitution. Apart from the inclusion of the 
compensation requirement, the Massachusetts Constitution stipulated that property 
could not be taken without the consent of the owner or the state legislatures.
39
  
Given the degree of its advancement of private property protection, it was unclear 
whether this legal text was actually intended to provide compensation for ‘regulatory 
takings’. Even though Theophilus Parsons, who was a member of the 1788 
Massachusetts Convention and the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, supported a broad interpretation of the compensation clause to guard 
against ‘indirect consequences of physical invasions of land’,
40
 the courts in Gedney 
v Tewksbury (1807)
41
 and Perry v Wilson (1811)
42
 interpreted the clause narrowly to 
cover only the acquisition of real property through formal expropriation laws, and 
not through other legislative Acts in general.
43
 Case law jurisprudence was 
inconsistent on the issue of whether the compensation clause was applicable to the 
taking of physical property only or to all other cases dealing with regulatory takings.  
(c) The Northwest Ordinance 1787 
The Northwest Ordinance, which is sometimes referred as the ‘Ordinance of 1787’, 
was a legislative act passed by the Confederation Congress of the United States.
44
 
The Ordinance was enacted, not only to guarantee individual property rights, but 
also, to function as a charter for the new states in the early period.
45
 The territory, 
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subject to this Ordinance, included all the land in the west of Pennsylvania and 
northwest of the Ohio River.
46
 
The Ordinance was enacted to respond to social and economic issues that impacted 
the stability of the national government. The first of these issues involved significant 
political pressure arising from the increased migration of squatters and speculators to 
the region. In order to bring the region and its land under the control of government, 
the establishment of a law and order regime was perceived as essential to the 
administration of the state government and the establishment of the land titles.
47
  
The Ordinance included legal provisions that centered on the guarantee of individual 
property rights
48
 as well as the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest.
49
 To guard 
against the arbitrary taking of property, the Ordinance stated that: ‘ 
[n]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of 
his peers, or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it 
necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to 
demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same. 
And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and 
declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, 




Due to the unclear scope of its applicability, some legal commentators have asserted 
that the protection afforded by the clause ought to be interpreted in the broadest 
manner possible. Gold asserts that, according to an expansive reading of the legal 
text, the takings clause includes not only physical assets, but also ‘contract rights’.
51
 
Moreover, the clause itself was designed to protect business interests from ‘every 
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 A desire to protect private interests in the 
Ordinance would arguably broaden the extent of protection as far as possible. 
(d) Some Remarks on the Original Understanding of the Taking Clause and the 
Regulatory Takings Issue 
Following the outbreak of war between England and her American colonies, the 18
th
 
century American state governments reserved the power to redress the failing 
economy by adopting various economic regulations, including the taking of land 
through legislative Acts. Nevertheless, according to a study by Harrington, there are 
no reported cases on the issue of regulatory takings decided by colonial or 
confederation courts.
53
 Harrington found that, in the aftermath of the civil war, 
governments extensively used ‘eminent domain’ power to seize private property and 
build important infrastructure and public facilities.
54
 However, he found that, in spite 
of the extensive nature of land use regulation, there was little resistance against the 
rights of legislatures to govern land ownership.
55
 In addition, Harrington discovered 





 As opposed to the regulation of physical property and land ownership, 
the central concern during this period related to breaches of contract and the burden 
of debt, which could lead to hampered commercial development.
57
 Harrington claims 
that because of the lack of evidence of any court consideration of regulatory takings, 
the concept of a regulatory taking might not have been widely recognized and 
developed by 18
th
 century authorities and legal thinkers.
58
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3. Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause and Compensation for Perceived Regulatory 
Takings 
In 1787, thirteen states joined into a federal union and adopted a Constitution 
whereby they limited their own power by conferring authority, in some key areas, to 
the national US government.
59
 The original US Constitution was enacted for the 
purpose of economic development, and the central government was empowered to 
carry out important fiscal policy tasks, such as tax levies and the control of money 
supply.
60
 However, the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the US 
Constitution in 1787 did not set out a clear position on the nature of the relationship 
between the government and an individual’s private property.
61
  
Due to the lack of an explicit statement regarding the relationship between 
government power and individual rights, protected liberty and freedom, the Congress 
added a ‘Bill of Rights’ to the Constitution in 1791 to restrict the sovereign’s power 
over its citizens.
62
 The Bill of Rights took the form of ‘Ten Amendments’ to the 
Constitution that focused on the protection of individual liberty and freedom.
63
  
Among these newly inserted rights was the Fifth Amendment (or the Takings 
Clause), which was uniquely added to guard against the taking of private property 
for public interest. The Fifth Amendment was initially introduced by James Madison 
in the First Congress convened in 1789, where he proposed an amendment to the 
Constitution by giving more guarantees for individual rights and freedoms.
64
 It was 
created mainly to respond to Anti-Federalists’ fears regarding the extensive powers 
of the new national government to oppress the rights of the people through 
confiscatory taxes and standing armies.
65
 As a strong supporter of the Federal 
system, Madison proposed a way to alleviate these fears,
66
 through introducing legal 
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This newly adopted Fifth Amendment granted the Congress and national 
government the power to take private property for public use.
68
 However, under this 
Takings Clause, the property could not be taken without paying just compensation to 
the property owner.
69
 Despite its broad ambit of property protection, the Takings 
Clause was not used effectively. Skouras claims that during the 18
th
 century the role 
of the Federal government was so limited that each State tended to adopt its own 
takings clause without being supervised or reviewed by the federal judiciary.
70
 
Skouras found that during this time the control of property rights, especially land use 
regulations, was largely dominated by local governments; the state authority 




Since the issue of regulatory takings was not explicitly included at the time of 
constitutional enactment,
72
 there is very little historical material to show that the 
concept of regulatory takings was well received in the Takings Clause.
73
 Treanor has 
explored Madison’s concept of Takings, and has asserted that Madison himself 
supported a narrow interpretation of the Takings Clause to preclude regulatory 
takings. Madison drafted the text on his own initiative, and the Clause was not 
proposed by any of the states that ratified the conventions.
74
 While the Taking 
Clause represented a new development at the time of enactment,
75
 it was rarely 
enforced due to the authorities’ lack of understanding as to how the Clause should be 
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 As a result, the Clause arguably had limited value during this 
founding period. 
However, in the 19
th
 century there was a shift in the US Supreme Court’s practice, 
which started to legitimize greater federal involvement in local affairs. Due to a huge 
transformation in the economic, social and demographic order, state governments 
adopted a wide array of public policies.
77
 As a corollary, state governments tended to 
implement policies that impacted upon constitutionally protected individual rights. 
In response, the US Supreme Court started to hear judicial review cases, challenging 





B. The US Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Regulatory Takings: 
Evolving Property Rights, Takings Jurisprudence and Compensation 





The development of jurisprudence on regulatory takings, reviewed under the Fifth 
Amendment of the US Constitution, has been evolutionary. This Section reviews the 
doctrines concerning regulatory takings that have been developed by the US 
Supreme Court. It begins with the fundamental legal framework of the Takings 
Clause. The evolving concepts of property protection, takings jurisprudence and 
compensation standards are subsequently examined. This review starts from the 
early 19
th
 century and extends to the present. 
1. The Takings Clause and Protection against Regulatory Takings 
The Takings Clause of the US Constitution states that ‘[n]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.’ Under this Clause, the government 
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can take property only for ‘public use’ and must pay ‘just compensation’ for the 
property. The purpose of the Clause is to ensure that if the state seizes private 
property, the owner must receive compensation in return.
79
  
Two main types of lawsuits are considered by the courts pursuant to the Takings 
Clause: ‘direct condemnation’ and ‘inverse condemnation’.
80
 A ‘direct 
condemnation’ involves the exercise of eminent domain powers.
81
 This type of 
government power is usually exerted via formal legislation that transfers ownership 
from a private property owner to the state. In these circumstances, the government 
obtains the property in exchange for compensation. ‘Inverse condemnation’, on the 
other hand, occurs when the government takes property without using formal, 
eminent domain power. When the government adversely affects a citizen’s private 
property to the extent that the property owner loses an essential element of their 
property rights, then a ‘taking’ may have occurred. Compensation for the loss of 
property value, which has been indirectly taken, can only be obtained if the 
aggrieved private party successfully sues the government in court.
82
   
The types of government action that constitute a ‘direct condemnation’ are obvious 
as they generally involve the acquisition of physical private property for state use, in 
exchange for compensation. However, along with a persistent increase in the demand 
for strong state regulations with the ability to respond to social problems, there has 
also been an increase in regulatory interferences by the state that impact property 
rights, but which do not involve a formal condemnation of a private property. Past 
experiences demonstrate that ‘inverse condemnation’ involves a wide range of policy 
regimes, including damage resulting from the denial of development permits, loss of 
access to land, and the revocation of business licenses. The US Takings Clause has 
thus extended to embrace all kinds of ‘regulatory takings’ that interfere with the use 
and enjoyment of one’s private property. Even in the absence of physical seizure, 
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regulatory interference can impose upon an owner of private property excessive 
burdens, which justify regulatory compensation. 
The difficulty involved in drawing a line between regulatory takings and actions that 
fall short of takings, has led the Court to develop legal doctrines to identify when a 
governmental interference constitutes a compensable taking under the US 
Constitution. Prior to 1922, there were few cases concerning regulatory takings 
disputes,
83
 and the disputes that were heard by the Court were generally decided in 
favor of state authority.
84
 The concept of regulatory takings was first acknowledged 
by the Court in the case of Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon in 1922 (‘Penn Coal 
case’).
85
 The Penn Coal case changed the ‘landscape’ of takings analyses by 
conferring more weight to the protection of private landowners.
86
 
In this case, the Pennsylvania Coal Company granted H J Mahon ‘surface rights’ to 
occupy the land. The Company; however, retained the ‘mineral rights’ under the 
property. Mahon accepted the risks inherent within this division of property and 
relinquished all his rights to claim for any damages caused by the mining activities. 
However, after the enactment of the Kohler Act in 1921 (‘Kohler Act’),
87
 by the State 
of Pennsylvania, which prohibited mining activities that could cause damage to 
surface property, Mahon sued the Company to stop mining activities as determined 
by the law.  
Based on the opinion of Justice Oliver W Holmes Jr, the Court held that the 
application of the Kohler Act was unconstitutional. The Court asserted that this law 
destroyed the preexisting property rights of the Company, and interfered with their 
negotiated contractual rights.
88
 The Court emphasized that, although the legislation 
represented an exercise of the state’s ‘police power’ to prevent damage caused by 
mining activities, state power ought to be subject to some limitations.
89
 The Court 
determined that when the diminution in value ‘reaches a certain magnitude…there 
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must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act’.
90
 By 
mandating that all mining be undertaken in a manner that has no impact on the 
subsidence of property, the Court decided that the statute rendered the coal company 
‘commercially impracticable’. 
91
 In order to restrict such expansive use of regulatory 
power, the Court held that ‘the general rule at least is that while property may be 




Although the dictum in Penn Coal has provided more ideas with which to analyze 






 the Court did 
not explicitly define the scope of property, the nature of regulatory interference, or 
the magnitude of impact that is equivalent to a physical taking and, therefore, 
obligates the government to pay compensation to the property owner.
94
 Due to a lack 
of specificity in dealing with regulatory takings, the US Supreme Court in 
consequent cases developed a theory of takings law, grounded in the Fifth 
Amendment, to more accurately identify when a regulatory taking amounts to an 
expropriation, and the appropriate remedy for such regulatory takings.
95
 
2. The Evolving Concepts of Compensable Regulatory Takings After 1922 
Ever since the issue of regulatory takings was first raised in 1922, the Court has been 
elaborating and developing the legal principles that govern regulatory takings 
requiring compensation under the Takings Clause. In the context of constitutional 
debate, the Court has developed new legal doctrines to delineate the scope of 
property rights that ought to be protected under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, the 
Court has conceptualized takings law in a manner that distinguishes non-
compensable regulatory takings from legitimate government police powers, and has 
configured remedies to relieve the harm caused by regulatory takings. 
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(a) Defining Protected Property in the Takings Clause  
The US Constitution does not provide a clear definition of the types of property that 
are to be protected from governmental interference. Generally, the Court interprets 
the Takings Clause to encompass not only physical objects, but also anything else to 
which a bundle of rights might attach.
96
 An expansive range of protected properties 
was asserted by the Court in United States v General Motors Corp (1945).
97
 In this 
case, the Court held that the scope of property protected under the Constitution is 
broad, and includes ‘the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the 
physical things, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it’.
98
 Under modern 
takings law doctrine, the US Supreme Court maintains that a wide range of property 
rights are subject to Constitutional protection. Generally, they include physical 
property, contractual obligations, and investment-backed expectations. 
(i) Physical property 
Originally, the concept of private property protected under the Takings Clause was 
understood as limited to only physical properties. This view of property dates back 
to the work of Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
In the opinion of Blackstone, property is ‘despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any individual in the universe’.
99
 Garrett Power points out that the ‘things’ 
mentioned by Blackstone were confined to land and movable properties, under 
Roman law.
100
 Consistent with the concept developed by Blackstone, the Court in 
the early period interpreted the Takings Clause narrowly, by protecting against a 






century, the Court continued embracing the original understanding of the 
term property, by confining protection to ‘real property’. For example, in Pumpelly v 
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Green Bay Co (1871),
102
 a case which involved a navigation improvement project 
authorized by the Wisconsin legislature, the US Supreme Court held that ‘where real 
estate is actually invaded…so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is 
taking, within the meaning of the Constitution…’.
103
 This concept of property was 
followed in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan in 1982,
104
 where the Court held that 
the occupation of physical property permitted through state regulation could 
constitute a taking under the Constitution. Despite the prominence of the notion of 
physical possession, the Court has recently decided that a taking is not limited to 
‘real property’, and could also include ‘personal property’. In Horne v Dep’t of 
Agriculture (Horne II),
105
 Chief Justice John Roberts (writing for the majority), 
referred to the history of expropriation law and held that personal property should 
gain no less protection than real property. The legislation in this case, which required 
farmers to transfer a portion of their raisin crops to the government in order to 
maintain price stability in the market, was equivalent to the taking of physical 
property, and was therefore subject to compensation under the Takings Clause. 
(ii) Contractual Obligations  
The jurisprudential concept of property has evolved to include intangible properties. 
Originally, contractual obligations were protected under the Contract Clause of the 
US Constitution.
106
 However, the Takings Clause has become an increasingly 




Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld, a professor from Yale Law School, asserts that when 
we take into account market realities, property can be appreciated as a ‘very complex 
aggregate of rights…which…naturally have to do with the [asset] in question’.
108
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Therefore, property encompasses not only the physical thing, but also other 
predominant elements that create valuable interests.
109
  
In keeping with Hohfeld’s conception of property rights, the US Supreme Court 
developed takings jurisprudence in the 20
th
 Century that indicated that the State 
might be liable under the Takings Clause when governmental regulation impairs 
contractual rights. In the Penn Coal case,
110
 for example, where the newly enacted 
Pennsylvania statute prevented the mining company from mining, the Court held that 
the legislation impaired contractual obligations between the coal company and the 
land owner,
111
 which deprived the coal company of its rights.
112
 
Following the Penn Coal case, the Court decided in Omnia Commercial Co v United 
States,
113
 that contractual rights could constitute property within the context of the 
Takings Clause. In this case, the government ordered steel from Allegheny for a 
period of one year following the First World War. The government’s order 
essentially forced the company to fail to fulfill its contractual obligations to Omnia - 
its existing contractual party. The Supreme Court ruled that Omnia’s contractual 
rights represented a ‘property’ within the Takings Clause.
114
 The Court in 
subsequent cases, including Lynch v United States,
115
 Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v Radford,
116
 and Armstrong v United State,
117
 has similarly held that 
contractual obligations fall within the scope of property rights protected under the 
Takings Clause, and that a violation of these rights could trigger a compensatory 
obligation. 
(iii) Investment-Backed Expectations  
The US Supreme Court has further broadened the scope of property protection by 
including the notion of an ‘investment-backed expectation’ within the meaning of 
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constitutionally protected property rights under the Taking Clause.
118
 The Court first 
introduced the concept of ‘investment-backed expectation’ in Penn Central 
Transportation Co v New York (1978) (the ‘Penn Central’ case).
119
 Without much 
elaboration, it held that although a government regulation might result in an 
economic harm, it would not be a taking if it did not interfere with ‘interests that 
were sufficiently bound with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to 
constitute property for the Fifth Amendment purposes’
120
 (emphasis added).  
A compensation claim based upon governmental interference with an investment-
backed expectation, was referred to again in 1992. In Lucas v South Carolina 
Coastal Council case (‘Lucas case’),
121
 which concerned the State’s enactment of a 
law that prohibited the construction of permanent building in the controlled coastal 
zone, the Court relying on the trial court’s ruling, held that this law rendered Lucas’s 
land valueless and was subject to a compensatory obligation. To support this judicial 
decision, Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, maintained that an owner’s 
expectations are a critical factor in the takings analysis, even in circumstances where 
a regulation denies all economically beneficial use.
122
 The Court also asserted that 
the property interests protected must not contradict restrictions imposed by the 
‘background principles of nuisance law’;
123
 otherwise, the plaintiff could not sue for 
compensation as the regulation could not be said to have impacted any lawful right 
of the owner.  
Whilst an investment-back expectation could constitute a property right that is 
entitled to protection, the property owner must have ‘substantial good faith’ based 
upon governmental acts, and the protected expectation must not be a mere 
expectation.
124
 The economic impact of governmental interference is not the only 
important interpretative factor, as the property owner needs to also establish that the 
measure disrupts the returns that the owner could reasonably expect to flow from the 
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established investment. If there is a sudden change in the regulatory framework, then 
the property owner’s expectation is impacted and should be protected.
125
 
(b) The Development of Takings Analysis in the Fifth Amendment 
Following the US Supreme Court’s decision in the Penn Coal case in 1922, the 
Court has developed a body of takings jurisprudence to indicate when and under 
what conditions regulatory interference is subject to a compensatory obligation under 
the US Constitution. From 1922 until the present, the Court has utilized various tests 
and analytical methods. An analysis of relevant jurisprudence indicates that there are 
five basic types of regulatory takings: (i) police powers, (ii) per se takings, (iii) less-
than-total takings, (iv) undue conditions and (v) judicial takings. 
(i) Police Powers  
Generally, the use of government regulations is premised on the implied state 
authority to protect public safety, health and the morality of its citizens.
126
 The state 
authority to restrict use of private property in order to protect public interests can be 
traced back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s reasoning in Brown v State of Maryland 
in 1827,
127
 which stated that ‘the police power…unquestionably remains, and ought 
to remain, with the States…The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound 
articles is, undoubtedly, an exercise of that power…’
128
 The power to regulate 
property rights for public benefits can be inferred from the necessity of government 
action to protect public welfare. The predominance of the government’s police 
powers was reinforced in subsequent cases, such as Munn v People of Illinois 
(1876),
129
 and Hadacheck v Sebastian (1915).
130
 
In modern times, the justification of the use of police powers, even when it results in 
the diminishing of a property’s value, is recognized by the Court. Although there is 
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no specific constitutional clause for the police powers, Article 1, Section 8 of the US 
Constitution grants Congress legislative powers to ‘make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof’.
131
 This clause confers upon Congress wide latitude 
to enact laws that are ‘necessary and proper’ for the state authorities to carry on their 
functions. The US Supreme Court has endorsed the idea of police power contained in 
Article 1, Section 8 by holding that ‘[t]he Constitution…withhold[s] from Congress 




The Court constitutionally reaffirmed the police power as an implied non-
compensable regulation in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty 
Co.
133
 In this case, the company alleged that the zoning ordinance enforced by the 
Village of Euclid, which limited the use of property for residential purposes only, 
caused a reduction in the value of the Ambler company’s property. Although the 
lower court found that the ordinance was unconstitutional and amounted to a taking, 
the US Supreme Court overruled the lower court’s decision. The Court considered 
the zoning ordinance to be constitutional, and held that the ordinance was justified as 
a means to advance public interests. Affirming that the measure was a valid exercise 
of police power, the Court concluded that ‘the reasons are sufficiently cogent to 
preclude us from saying… that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and 




(ii) Per se Takings 
Another type of taking occurs when government action is so extreme as to deprive a 
property owner of all use of, and value in, their private property rights. There are two 
ways in which a ‘per se taking’ can arise: (1) a permanently authorized occupation 
and invasion of private property for government use, and (2) a deprivation of all 
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economic use of the property. To identify these regulatory takings, the Court 
generally takes into account only the impact of the measure imposed on the property 
owner, regardless of the State’s intent behind the measure. 
The first type of regulatory taking occurs when a government grants third party 
rights to occupy a property permanently for public use.
135
 One of the most prominent 
decisions was handed down in 1982 in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.
136
 In this case, the landowner was forced to permit a third party to install 
permanent cable lines on their building. Followed the ruling in Pumpelly v Green 
Bay & Mississippi Canal Co (1871),
137
 where a government-authorized flooding 
program was considered as a taking of property, the US Supreme Court decided in 
favor of the landowner. It held that the permanent occupation of the private property 
destroyed the owner’s right to exclude the third party. Even though the government 
argued that the occupation of physical property was for public benefits, the Court 




In 1987, the US Supreme Court consequently upheld that a ‘temporary’ physical 
occupation can also be a taking under the Taking Clause. In First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v Lost Angeles County,
139
 the Court 
ordered the government to pay compensation for a denial of the use of property even 
for a limited period of time. Despite being only a temporary restriction, the Court 




The second type of per se taking results from a government regulation that causes a 
complete ‘deprivation of all use or value of property’.
141
 In 1992, for example, the 
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Supreme Court decided in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal
142
 that a compensable 
taking can occur when the government measure takes away all economically 
beneficial use of that property.
143
 However, the Supreme Court also held that the 
duty to compensate might be exempted if the said law or regulation simply reflects a 
limitation that already exists within the law of private or public nuisance.
144
 In this 
respect, when the property rights in question constitute a nuisance, the property 
owner whose property rights are subject to regulatory interference has no right to sue 
in relation to this interference and no compensation is owed by the state under the 
Takings Clause.
145
 In 2015, the Court reaffirmed that a ‘physical taking’ could apply 
not just for real property, but also for personal property. In Horne v Dep’t of 
Agriculture (Horne II),
146
 which concerned a dispute regarding the National Raisin 
Reserve policy, the Court held that the reserve requirement by the government 
constituted the taking of property under the Fifth Amendment and the Government 
could not avoid the duty to pay compensation, despite the fact that the farmers were 
simply required to remove a portion of harvested raisins from the market so as to 
resolve the problem of market price instability. The Supreme Court also held that the 
Fifth Amendment does not give less protection to personal property than real 
property. The Government’s requirement to take a portion of harvested raisins off 
the market was regarded as the taking of physical property, and this was considered a 
compensable taking under the Constitution.   
(iii) Less-than-Total Takings 
Another significant form of taking, endorsed by the US Supreme Court, involves 
government takings actions that deprive a property of some value, but not necessary 
all value.
147
 In this less extreme case, the Court has indicated that it is relevant to 
consider a range of ‘ad hoc’ facts. As there is no set formula with which to predict 
the legal outcome under such circumstances, this doctrine is very much fact 
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 To identify whether the governmental interference amounts to a 
compensable taking, the Court needs to utilize more complex analytical mechanisms. 
Normally under this category of taking, the Court considers whether the property 




The concept of less-than-total takings was first introduced by the Court in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v City of New York (1978).
150
 In this case the Plaintiff 
was prevented by the state from carrying out alterations on the Grand Central Station 
landmark building. The Court held that not all use of, and value in, the property was 
taken and there was no specific rule to decide when a compensable taking had taken 
place. However, the Court admitted that to maintain ‘justice and fairness’, its 
analysis required ‘essentially ad hoc, factual enquiries’ to balance three factors, 
which are the (1) character of the governmental action, (2) economic impact 
attributed to the regulation, and (3) extent to which the regulation interfered with 
investment-backed expectations.
151
 In considering all of these factors, the Court 
found that the landmark building law did not totally prevent the owner from use of 
the property and the property owner could still use it as if there was no regulation.   
In the Penn Central case, the Court also rejected the segmentation or separation of 
property interests.
152
 The Court held that the case must be ‘decided on the premise 
that the entire parcel served as a basis for the taking claims’.
153
 As Justice O’Connor 
asserted, this ‘whole parcel’ approach makes it very hard for the Court to find a 
taking, as a diminution in the value of property caused by regulation may represent a 
very small fraction of the entire property.
154
 If the ‘whole parcel’ is defined broadly, 
the Court is less likely to find a taking. Conversely, if the ‘whole parcel’ is defined 
narrowly, it is much easier for the Court to identify the emergence of a taking.
155
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The reasoning within Penn Central was referred to by the US Supreme Court in 
subsequent cases. In Palazzolo v Rhode Island,
156
 for example, the Claimant sued 
and claimed that the wetland regulation, issued by the Rhode Island Coastal 
Resource Management Council, constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment as 
it resulted in the denial of the Claimant’s project, leading to a deprivation of all 
economic use of property. The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Palazzolo’s 
appeal for two main reasons. The first was that the land still had some economic 
value and so the Claimant could not challenge based on the total taking principle 
developed in the Lucas case. The second reason was that the Claimant had no legal 
stance to challenge the regulation as he acquired the land after the regulation had 
been put in place and, therefore, no reasonable expectation to enjoy the property 
could be expected by Claimant.  
In an appeal to the US Supreme Court, this decision was partially reversed. The 
Court held that the Claimant still had the right to challenge the regulation even 
though the land was purchased after the regulation was enforced. The Court also held 
that, as the property was not totally deprived of value, the Claimant could not claim 
the right to sue under the Takings Clause based on the denial of all economic use of 
the property. However, the Court asserted that to decide whether a taking existed, 
several factors had to be considered, and these included (among other things): the 
economic impacts of the regulation, the characteristic of the measure and the extent 
of any interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The Court did 
not decide whether or not the regulation violated the investment-back expectation, 
causing a compensable taking. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to the State 
Court for a reconsideration of whether the measure was a taking, in light of the 
doctrine in Penn Central as opposed to the pure application of Lucas’s per se rule.
157
  
In 2002, the Court adopted the balancing principle in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
158
 In this case, the Court found that 
moratoria were not a per se taking, regardless of the extent to which a moratorium 
affects property rights. The Court reaffirmed the adoption of the case-by-case 
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The ruling from Penn Central was applied recently in Arkansas Game & Fish Comm 
v US,
160
 which involved a government-induced flooding program. The Court held 
that despite being temporary, it could be a taking. The Court refused to rely upon a 
per se analysis when analyzing whether the temporary flooding constituted a taking. 
It, on the other hand, asserted that impact is not the only decisive factor; rather, all 
pertinent elements, such as severity, duration, character of parcel and owner’s 
legitimate expectation regarding property use, need to be considered.  
(iv) Undue Conditions  
Takings claims might concern the ‘required dedications’ or ‘conditions’ that 
governments impose on property for the use of a portion of property or land in 
exchange for issuing development permits. These requirements may appear in 
different forms, such as enforced dedications and charges.
161
 This type of regulation 
may be regarded as a taking if the regulatory conditions make the property owner 
bear an excessive burden and if it lacks the established linkage between the means 
and the goals of the implementing regulation.  
The Court first introduced the doctrine in 1987 in Nollan v California (the ‘Nollan 
case’).
162
 In this case, the Court reviewed the regulation that the California Coastal 
Commission (the CCC) enforced on the beachfront property owned by the Nollan 
family, which involved the imposition of a public easement in exchange for a permit 
to build a new house in place of the family’s old bungalow. The Commission 
asserted that the easement requirement was essential to promote public interests as 
the new house allegedly blocked the view of the ocean. The Court, nevertheless, 
decided in favor of the property owner as the conditions were excessively 
burdensome and did not represent an ‘essential nexus’ between the required 
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dedication and the harm the community must bear.
163
 To decide the issue, the Court 
examined the nature and characteristic of the state’s required dedication by 
investigating whether it would ‘further the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition’.
164
 The Court found that although the construction of the house 
prevented public access to the beach, Justice Scalia, writing the judgment for the 
Court’s majority, held that the state’s required dedication lacked an essential nexus 
between a legitimate state interest and the permit condition.
165
 In the Court’s point of 
view, the condition must bear the same policy goal as that which is required to truly 
resolve the problem.
166
 The Court found that the conditions imposed by the 
Commission were unconstitutional and amounted to a taking that needed 
compensation. 
Subsequently in 1994, in Dolan v City of Tigard (the ‘Dolan case’),
167
 the Court 
developed a more thorough approach to examine unconstitutional regulations as a 
form of regulatory taking. Aside from the requirement of a close nexus between the 
imposed conditions and the impact of the development, the exaction must also 
satisfy a ‘rough proportionality’ test,
168
 whereby the required dedication is 
proportional to the adverse impact caused by the proposed development.
169
 The 
Court held in this case that there was a taking as the City of Tigard could not show 
that its requirement of public access onto greenway was proportional to the impact 
suffered by the landowner.
170
 
In 2013, the Court held in Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District
171
 
that the conditions must comply with the ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ tests 
developed by the Supreme Court in Nollan and Dolan cases. In this case, the Court 
found that the issuance of a permit based on the requirement that the licensee must 
improve property owned by the state was unconstitutional and constituted a taking.  
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(v) Judicial Takings 
Recently, the US Supreme Court expanded its takings jurisprudence to encompass 
judicial takings. This legal concept was mentioned by the US Supreme Court in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection.
172
 This case concerned a Florida law,
173
 which permitted the State 
authority to restore sand on eroded beaches that were hard hit by hurricanes. The 
District Court of Appeal for the First District upheld the Petitioner’s challenge, 
stating that the program impacted the waterfront landowners as the new beach areas 
were open to the public and this resulted in the deterioration of private property 
holder’s common law littoral rights, without any compensation.
174
 However, the 
Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision of the First District holding that, in 
accordance with the property law of Florida, the landowners never possessed the 
alleged rights and were not entitled to compensation.
175
  
After considering the case, the US Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-0, decided in favor 
of the State and held that the program did not cause a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment, since the landowners could not convince the Court that the said 
property belonged to them. Despite a unanimous decision favoring state sovereign 
rights, there were diverse views regarding the appropriate conceptual framework 
applicable to the consideration of the takings issue. Four members of the Supreme 
Court delivered a new concept of judicial taking. The opinion of Justice Scalia, who 
was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence 
Thomas, declared that the Takings Clause is applicable, not only to takings via 
administrative actions, but also to judicial actions.
176
 Justice Scalia stated that ‘[t]he 
Takings Clause is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is 
concerned simply with the act, and not with the government actor’.
177
 The remaining 
four Justices decided the case without referring to the issue of judicial takings, and 
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held that it was adequate to refer to the protection of property rights under the Due 
Process Clause of the US Constitution.
178
  
The split decision in this case leaves the issue of judicial takings unsettled. Some 
commentators remark that the failure to reach a majority in this case contributes to 
uncertainty regarding the manner in which the Court will approach similar issues in 
the future.
179
 If this principle were to be endorsed, it would complicate the issue of 
regulatory takings and add further difficulties, particularly in relation to the judicial 
power of the state courts.
180
 Furthermore, if this principle is accepted, this would 
provide more grounds for litigation by plaintiffs who are dissatisfied with the 
decisions of the courts.
181
  
Based on all testing criteria examined above, it can be seen that the US Supreme 
Court has developed many useful principles to guard private property rights under a 
vague Takings Clause. Despite becoming increasingly focused on the protection of 
private property, the jurisprudence developed by the Court still provides little 
guidance as to how the takings doctrine ought to be adopted and applied. It is 
apparent that rather than focusing on a single formula, the Court tends to decide the 
case on a case-by-case basis, and not to overprotect private interests at the expense 
of public welfare.  
(c) The Remedies for Regulatory Takings under the Takings Clause 
Generally, the Fifth Amendment requires that government pay just compensation 
when private property is taken for public purposes. However, in the context of 




                                                 
178
 Ibid 721-722. 
179
 Timothy M  Mulvaney, 'Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory' (2010) 24 Probate & 
Property 11. 
180
 Jared Policicchio, 'Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection' (2011) 35 Harvard Environmental Law Review 541, 551-3. 
181
 Mulvaney, above n 179, 13. 
195 
(i) Compensation and the Amount of Fair Market Value  
In American practice, the exact quantity of compensation rests upon the 
government’s discretion, and a court has no direct authority to determine the amount 
of monetary damages that ought to be paid to the aggrieved property owner.
182
 
Generally, when the regulation is considered as a permanent taking, the government 
has the option to decide whether to keep the regulation in place or to revoke it.
183
 If 
the government decides to keep it in place permanently, the amount of compensation 
is calculated on the basis of the fair market value of the property in question at the 
time the taking occurred.
184
 On the other hand, if the government decides to revoke 
the measure, such a measure becomes a temporary taking, and damages are usually 




Monetary compensation has been confirmed by the US Supreme Court from time to 
time. In order to confer adequate protection, the US Supreme Court in United States 
v Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.
186
 indicated that just compensation has to 
involve the payment of ‘fair market value’.
187
 Although it is hard to ensure an 
accurate amount, fair market value is considered as the ‘second-best’ method of 
placing the property owner in a subjectively equivalent situation to one in which the 
property was never taken.
188
  
The Court asserts that fair market value should offer the property owner ‘what a 
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking’.
189
 Fair 
market value for both permanent and temporary takings was explained in First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles in 1987 (the ‘First 
English case’).
190
 In this case, the Court endorsed the constitutionality of 
compensation as a remedy for regulatory takings. The Supreme Court held that if a 
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government regulation amounts to a taking, then the court may revoke it or leave it 
in place. If the government carries out a temporary measure, it must pay 
compensation calculated from the date the regulation is imposed to the date it is 
removed.
191
 On the other hand, if the government decides to keep the regulation in 
place, the compensation must be paid for a permanent taking, based on the full fair 
market value of the taken property.
192
 
After introducing a monetary compensation obligation for regulatory takings in the 
First English case, the Supreme Court followed this doctrine closely in subsequent 
cases by requesting fair market value compensation in response to findings of 
regulatory takings.
193
 In 2015, the Court in Horne v Department of Agriculture 
(Horne II) reaffirmed that ‘just compensation normally is to be measured by the 
market value of the property at the time of the taking.’
194
  
(ii) Other Remedies  
Although compensation is common, the US Supreme Court has also recognized 
other forms of reparation for the violations suffered by property owners. With regard 
to ‘non-monetary compensation’,
195
 the US Supreme Court in Agins v City of 
Tiburon
196
 held that compensation obligations are limited to claims concerning 
takings made in accordance with the government’s eminent domain powers; that is, 
when the government appropriates private property through formal legislation. The 
Court asserted that the compensation duty was not available to other forms of 
regulatory interference, since the protection under the Fifth Amendment should be 
interpreted narrowly. To redress injury from regulatory takings, the Court held that 
the only appropriate remedy is ‘declaratory relief’, which simply requires the courts 
to determine rights, duties or obligations without ordering monetary damages, or a 
‘mandamus to invalidate the offending regulation’, which is an order from the court 
to any government agency to suspend an invalid legal order.
197
 Despite the 
                                                 
191




 Ark Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 US 511 (2012), 519; Lucas, 505 US 1003 (1992), 1031 footnote 
17. 
194
 Horne, 135 S Ct 2419 (2015) cited in United States v 50 Acres of Land, 49 US 24 (1984). 
195
 Roberts, above n 95, 225. 
196




introduction of a new approach to redress the injury caused by a taking, the Supreme 
Court in this subsequent case questioned whether the proposed remedy was 
sufficient to relieve the impact.
198
   
In some cases, the Court similarly held that monetary damages might not be the only 
remedy for a taking, but might include other forms of equitable relief. In Eastern 
Enterprises v Apfel,
199
 for example, Eastern Enterprises challenged the 
constitutionality of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (the ‘Coal Act’), 
which required coal companies to pay money into a fund run by a private entity to 
fund the pensions of former employees.
200
 The majority concluded that the Coal Act 
constituted a taking. Although the Court admitted that compensation is the major 
remedy for a taking,
201
 it asserted that in this situation the Plaintiff could not claim 
compensation from the state authority.
202
 Rather than paying compensation directly 
to the Plaintiff, the Court ordered declaratory relief as well as an injunction, asking 




In addition to monetary compensation, the courts may find that a government can use 
‘transferable development rights’ (TDRs) as a tool to mitigate the negative impact 
caused by regulatory takings.
204
 Since property is conceptualized as a ‘bundle of 
rights’, ‘development rights’ are also included as a part of property.
205
 Under the 
TDRs regime, the government may allow an individual landowner, impacted by a 
regulatory taking, to trade his/her development rights in restricted areas to other 
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The concept of TDRs was briefly discussed by the US Supreme Court, in the context 
of regulatory takings, in Penn Central.
207
 In this case, the Court found that despite 
the emergence of a taking, TDRs ‘undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens 
the law imposed…[and] are to be taken into account in considering the impact of the 
regulation’.
208
 Later, the US Supreme Court in Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency (‘Suitum’)
209
 reaffirmed the availability of TDRs as a choice of remedy 
within a takings dispute. In this case, which involved the deprivation of land use by a 
very strict environmental control law imposed by the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency (TRPA), Mrs. Suitum was offered no direct relief in terms of monetary 
compensation, but to preserve the landowner’s asset value, she was encouraged to 
relocate the right to use the land from the prohibited area to an area where 
development was encouraged. Although she had the authority to transfer her 
development rights, she did not do so and, instead, filed a claim before the courts 
pursuant to the agency’s breach of substantive due process requirements. Although 
the lower courts held that the Petitioner’s action for compensation was unripe to be 
admissible, the US Supreme Court reversed and confirmed that the case was ripe to 
be reviewed under the Fifth Amendment, even though the property owner did not 
attempt to sell the development rights she had.
210
 Whilst the main issue was related 
to the ripeness of the case for litigation, Justice Scalia addressed in his judgment the 
role of TDRs in redressing injury. In his words:  
TDRs can serve a commendable purpose in mitigating the economic loss suffered by 
an individual whose property use is restricted, and property value diminished, but not 
so substantially as to produce a compensable taking. They may also form a proper 
                                                 
206
 R S Radford, 'A Last Word on 1998 Recent Development: Takings and Transferable Development 
Rights in the Supreme Court: The Constitutional Status of TDRs in the Aftermath of Suitum' (1999) 
28 Stetson Law Review 685, 687. 
207
 Penn Central, 438 US 104 (1978). 
208
 Ibid 137. 
209
 Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 US 725 (1997) (‘Suitum’). 
210
 Ibid 731. 
199 




In this respect, the Court held that the government could not avoid liability for the 
taking despite the fact that the state was executing a legitimate measure. Instead of 
awarding monetary damages, the Court accepted the use of TDRs as a means to 
relieve the impact resulting from regulatory takings. 
While TDRs appear to be an effective method of alleviating the financial burden 
attributed to regulatory takings, they may not be an effective remedial approach. One 
commentator argues that, since TDRs engage with an exchange of marketable rights, 
a government agency might have some difficulty in finding a ‘well-functioning’ 
market that makes the trading of TDRs feasible.
212
 Moreover, the transferring of 
development rights to others might not gain support from local communities in areas 
impacted by increasing density and decreasing property value, due to the mounting 
congestion and pollution within these areas.
213
 
C. The Evaluation of Future Directions in Takings Jurisprudence 
The review of successive regulatory takings cases reveals that that the US Supreme 
Court has applied various conceptual frameworks to the analysis of compensable 
regulatory takings. The unsettled nature of takings law gives rise to different views 
of what kind of legal principle should prevail over others. The following section 
illustrates the existing tensions and evaluates trends in takings law doctrines. 
1. The Inconsistent Legal Doctrines of Regulatory Takings Analysis 
The historical development of takings jurisprudence in the United States reveals that 
the founders of the Constitution adopted a ‘libertarian attitude’ towards property.
214
 
The protection of property rights was drawn as a principle of ‘natural law’, which 
places the utmost importance on individual liberties and freedoms.
215
  Originally, the 
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Constitution’s framers wanted to protect the people from the abuses of British 
power.
216
 To ensure that the people’s rights are to be properly protected, the 
American Bill of Rights was created to protect citizens, following the declaration of 
independence from Britain. With a strong position favoring property protection, the 
framers of the Constitution ‘thought that the law of property is an institution through 




Apart from protecting individuals’ rights, the property rights regime was also 
instrumental in promoting the ‘national wealth and strength’ of the country.
218
 
During the time in which the Constitution was drafted, the framers perceived a 
linkage between private property and national power.
219
 To make the nation wealthy 
and powerful, a strong system of property rights protection was essential to prevent 
‘a commercial republic from internal threats to private property’. The framers 
believed that ‘if everyone were secure in his property, everyone would invest more 
time and effort in that property, and make the property even more valuable. And in 
turn, this would have positive consequences for the nation’s wealth and strength’.
220
 
Moreover, strong property protection schemes would allow owners to trade their 
properties more freely in markets.
221
 For these reasons, a strong political regime 
towards property rights protection greatly contributed to the unification of the 
Confederation. 
Although the Fifth Amendment guaranteed fundamental property rights, the original 
understanding and scope of the Takings Clause was narrow, and limited to the 
protection of physical seizure by governments. Therefore, whilst used in the context 
of eminent domain issues, which concern the appropriation of physical property by 
the government through formal legislation, the Clause was rarely applied to 
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regulatory takings claims, which involve situations where the use of private property 
is limited by a government regulation, resulting in the deprivation of economical use 
or the value of the property equivalent to expropriation.  
Nevertheless, there was a shift in the judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause in 
the early 20
th
 century when the Supreme Court’s first real regulatory taking case was 
heard in 1922, in the Penn Coal case.
222
 Despite its vague formulation, the Court’s 
decision indicated that regulatory takings could occur if the regulatory interference 
causes too much intrusion on property use. This doctrine extended the protection of 
private property rights and provided a more favorable test for property owners to be 
protected from a wide range of regulatory interferences.  
The prominent role of private property protection was also emphasized in Loretto v 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp in 1982,
223
 where a New York statute was 
challenged by a landlord for giving to a third party a state-authorized power to install 
cable TV facilities on the private property without paying compensation. This case 
was significant as it represented a strict ruling on the protection of property rights. In 
Loretto, the Supreme Court found that a permanent physical occupation of property 
by a third party pursuant to a state-authorized regulation is a taking, regardless of 
how severe the impact of the measure is.
224
 In this case, the Court made clear that it 
did not question the validity of the State authority in regulating property rights.  
In light of the development of takings law jurisprudence, it becomes apparent that 
the Court is increasingly concerned with the promotion of property rights protection, 
adding a greater range of property rights to be protected under the Takings Clause. 
Although the Court limited its protection to tangible property at the beginning of its 
jurisprudence, the Court gradually included other types of intangible assets. Through 
its extensive protection of property rights, the Court’s decisions now favor an 
expansive definition of property and the underpinning concept of compensation.  
Nevertheless, the Court also limited private interests through its non-compensable 
‘police power’ doctrine. The preservation of State’s strict police powers appears in 
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 centuries. For example, in 
Munn v People of Illinois (1876),
225
 in which a private business alleged 
unconstitutional regulation carried out by the State of Illinois to limit maximum 
prices for the storage of grain in warehouses, the Court held that the General 
Assembly of Illinois did not commit a taking violating the Constitution. Since grain 
storage facilities were used to serve public purposes, the prices charged were subject 
to regulatory control. To uphold the state’s police powers, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the state had the authority to control the use of private property that 
was linked to a public interest.
226
 Likewise in Hadacheck v Sebastian,
227
 which 
concerned a prohibition on the operation of brickyards within the city limits, the 
Court held that a Los Angeles ordinance was not a taking requiring compensation, 
since the banning was regarded as ‘the imperative necessity… [that] precludes any 
limitation upon [them] when not exerted arbitrarily’.
228
 The police power of 
government to regulate property was also mentioned by the Court in the Lucas case 
in 1992.
229
 The Court held in that case that the governmental regulation of land 
completely deprived the landowner of economic benefits,
230
 but that the government 
could be exempted from compensatory obligations if it could prove that the 
regulation, despite causing economic loss to private property, was used to prevent 
harm arising from a use of property that constitutes a nuisance.
231
  
The police power, however, is not universal. In Penn Coal, the Court explained that:  
[The police power] must have its limits… One fact for consideration in determining 
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in 
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation 
to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts…
232
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged the longstanding tension between the 
protection of individual rights and the government’s legitimate power to restrict the 
freedom of its citizens in order to serve the public good.233  
2. Towards the Finding of an Overall Balance of Interests  
Today, regulatory controls on private property use are much more complicated. Due 
to changing political and social structures, the Supreme Court will not single out 
certain legal rights deserving of special constitutional protections. However, there is 
a need to articulate takings law principles that are able to ‘create reciprocity of 
advantage to all to whom it applies… to avoid singling out a few individuals, to 




To define the occurrence of compensable takings, the Supreme Court developed the 
three-factor test, as formulated in Penn Central, which attempts to strike a balance 
between regulations and their impact on private property.
235
 Except in circumstances 
where there has been a total deprivation of all value in, or use of, property rights, the 
Court has affirmed that there is no settled formula with which to determine whether a 
taking is compensable. In considering whether a measure that falls short of the total 
destruction of property value is a compensable taking, a number of significant 
factors must be evaluated together; these include the economic impact, investment-
backed expectation, and the character of the government interference.
236
 The takings 
analysis developed by the Court in Penn Central created a balancing test requiring 
the examination of these three factors in every case. 
Additional guidelines emerged in the cases of Nollan and Dolan. These cases 
provide a suitable model for the examination of a fair balance between the measure 
and the impact of the conditions imposed on property owners. Whilst adopting 
different approaches, the Court in both of these cases attempted to consider 
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important factors on all sides of the issue to define a compensable taking. While 
Nollan v California Coastal Commission 
237
 held that, to be non-compensable, the 
regulatory conditions must genuinely advance governmental purposes and satisfy an 
‘essential nexus’ between the negative private impact of the development project and 
the public benefit associated with the easement that crossed the owner’s property,
238
 
the Court also held in Dolan v City of Tigard
239
 that the measure must meet the 
‘rough proportionality’ test, by which the conditions in a development permit must 
be proportional to the negative impacts of the proposed development.
240
 If the 
government fails to satisfy these requirements, the regulatory interference would be 
deemed to have caused a compensable taking under the Takings Clause. 
The significance of the Nollan and Dolan decisions is their contribution to judicial 
analysis in other exaction cases. In the recent case of Knootz v St. John River Water 
Management District,
241
 the Court based its analysis on the Nollan and Dolan 
criteria. In that case, the District Water Management demanded money to pay for 
public land improvements as a condition for the approval of the requested 
development permit.
242
 The Court held that even though the property was not 
actually taken by the government, the exactions imposed by the District 




The Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases reflect ‘accountability for government 
agencies charged with protecting and improving the public interest and empowered 
with broad discretion to achieve those goals’.
244
 By subjecting the conditions of 
approval to the Nollan and Dolan standards, some commentators view these tests as 
providing a strong reaffirmation of the need for a fair balance between government’s 
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broad discretionary power to achieve public interest goals and the accountability that 
government has to achieve in order to protect individual interests.
245
  
In addition to the judiciary, the federal government and a number of state legislatures 
have become aware of the problem of regulatory burden. In 1988, for example, 
President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order requiring that all federal agencies 
undertake a ‘takings impact analysis’ before carrying out any proposed action that 
could potentially impact property owners and be construed as a taking.
246
 This 
presidential Executive Order required agencies to: 
(1) Identify clearly, with as much specificity as possible, the public health or safety 
risk created by the private property use that is the subject of the proposed action;  
(2) Establish that such proposed action substantially advances the purpose of 
protecting public health and safety against the specifically identified risk;  
(3) Establish to the extent possible that the restrictions imposed on the private 
property are not disproportionate to the extent to which the use contributes to the 
overall risk; and  
(4) Estimate, to the extent possible, the potential cost to the government in the event 
that a court later determines that the action constituted a taking.
247
 
To allocate fairly the burden of regulatory restriction, some states have enacted laws 
with provisions aiming to maintain an equal balance between conflicting interests of 
private property rights and public benefits. Florida’s legislature, for example, 
stipulates that the state government can exercise powers that may restrict or limit 
private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or 
the US Constitution.
248
 It requires compensation when a regulation causes an 
‘inordinate burden’ on individual property rights.
249
 Although what constitutes an 
‘inordinate burden’ is not clearly defined, the statue gives general guidance for 
judicial interpretation by describing it as a state act, which: 
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directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that the property owner is 
permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the 
existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property 
as a whole, or …the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a 
burden imposed for the good of public’.
250
  
Among the state legislatures that have enacted regulatory-takings statutes, the State 
of Oregon is of special interest as it adopted the most extreme compensable takings 
law in the United States to protect private interests.
251
 In 2004, Oregon enacted a 
land use law that was known as ‘Measure 37’.
252
 It granted property owners 
compensation rights for a reduction in the fair market value of their real property 
caused by governmental regulations.
253
 Measure 37 attracted a lot of criticism for its 
excessive property rights protection. Not only could the rule apply retroactively, it 
applied to a wide range of land-use-related regulatory decisions, ranging from 
planning and zoning to environmental decisions.
254
 Measure 37 was thus detrimental 
to governmental powers to regulate for public benefits as it led to a wave of 
regulatory takings claims, causing huge frustrations for land use control by state 
government.
255
 Measure 37 was consequently replaced by ‘Measure 49’ which took 
effect in 2007.
256
 Measure 49, with the support of 62 percent of statewide voters,
257
 
was enacted to deal with the drawbacks of Measure 37. Under Measure 49, property 
owners may not override existing zoning laws that prohibit industrial and 
commercial developments. To the contrary, it permits a landowner to claim for 
compensation only when the regulation restricts the use of private residential 
property or of a farm or forest, resulting in the reduction of fair market value on 
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 Measure 49 is a good example of the state’s attempts to strike the 
right balance between the protection of private property rights and the exercise of 
powers to regulate by the government.
259
 
3. The Tendencies of the Court’s Jurisprudence on Regulatory Takings 
With the wave of regulatory takings claims continuing into the early 21
st
 century, the 
US Supreme Court seems to be extensively applying a balancing approach, as well 
as the ad hoc test, more than other approaches when analyzing regulatory takings 
disputes. The Court has consistently applied these standards developed during the 
1980s and the 1990s, despite attempts to renegotiate the balance between private and 
public interests.  
In claims decided by the Supreme Court of the United States from 2001 to 2015,
260
 
the Court drew mainly on the balancing approach to resolve the regulatory takings 
disputes in four out of nine cases discussing the Takings Clause. Of those four 
balancing test cases, three were based on the Penn Central’s three-factor standard, 
and the other one on the Nollan/Dolan’s proportionality test. Within the same period, 
three cases adopted the per se physical takings approach to analyze the issues, one 
adopted the judicial takings doctrine and the remaining one used an unidentifiable 
doctrine. 
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Knootz v St John 
River Water 
Management District, 
133 S Ct 2586 (2013) 
– the Nollan and 
Dolan approach 
The US Supreme Court held that the condition of 
approval of the development permit must comply with 
the ‘nexus’ and the ‘rough proportionality’ 
requirements of the Nollan and Dolan takings cases. 
[para 2599] This standard is applied regardless of 
whether the permit is approved on the condition that the 
applicant continues using the property or it is denied 
due to the failure to meet the requirements. This 
doctrine affirms that the government cannot condition 
the permit approval without meeting the nexus and 
proportionality requirement between the means and 
objective pursued. [para 2603] 
 
Arkansas Game & 
Fish Commission v 
United States, 133 S 
Ct 511 (2012) – the 
Penn Central 
approach 
The temporary government-flooding program could be 
a compensable taking. (para 519) To constitute a 
taking, the length and severity of the interference is not 
the only decisive factor. Other factors such as the intent 
behind the measure and the owner’s expectation 
regarding the foreseeable impact from the authorized 




Inc v Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 
535 US 302 (2002) – 
the Penn Central 
approach 
The Court held that the enactment of the moratoria to 
prohibit the development plan in the Lake Tahoe Basin 
was not a per se taking. To analyze the issue, the Court 
concluded that the use of a per se taking doctrine would 
cause too much financial burden on the government 
when implementing public policies. (para 339) The 
Court held that to determine the emergence of a 
compensable taking, all factors concerning landowner’s 
expectation, impact, public interest and the state’s 
intent must be taken into account. (para 327, 335-337) 
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Testing Standards Cases Highlights 
 
Palazzolo v Rhode 
Island, 533 US 606 
(2001) – the Penn 
Central approach 
Taking claims was ripe. (para 620) The Court held that 
the Rhode Island’s regulation to protect state’s coastal 
properties was not a per se taking as the Claimant still 
retained some economic use over the land. (para 630-
631) The Court; however, did not examine whether the 
investment-backed expectation was affected by the 
regulation. The Court remanded the case to the lower 
courts to re-evaluate the case by using the Penn Central 
approach. (para 632) 
Per se Takings  
(Three cases) 
Horne v Department 
of Agriculture (Horne 
II), 135 S Ct 2419 
(2015) 
The Court held that the US Department of 
Agriculture’s Marketing Order authorizing the 
government to reserve a percentage of raisin crops to 
stabilize the supply and price was a taking. Although 
the required reserve obligated the government to return 
the net proceeds of the sale of transferred raisins, the 
majority held that the Order deprived the growers of 
their property rights to ‘possess, use and dispose of’ the 
products, which was a ‘clear physical taking’. (para 
2428) Despite the personal property, the Court held that 
the Takings Clause was applicable in the same way as 
the per se taking of the real property. (para 2427) 
 Brown v Legal 
Foundation of 
Washington, 538 US 
216 (2003) 
The Court held that the State’s use of interest earned 
from lawyer’s trust funds (IOLTA) to pay for legal 
services for the poor was a per se taking as the interest 
the state government confiscated from the IOLTA to 
finance the public services was the property of the 
owner of the principal. However, the majority 
concluded that the confiscation of interest was a taking 
and a per se approach is more consistent in this case as 
it invaded the private individual rights. (paras 233-235) 
Nevertheless, the Court held that despite the incurring 
taking, the state government was exposed to zero 
compensation value. Since the government was 
mandated by IOLTA to use only interest grown out of 
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the principal for a legitimate public use, the owners of 
those principal lost nothing and were subject to zero 
compensation. (para 237, 240) 
 Verizon 
Communications, Inc 
v FCC, 535 US 467 
(2002) 
Telecommunication Act of 1996 granted FCC the 
power to set the rates charged by incumbent local 
exchange carriers to new operators. The Court simply 
insisted that to be determined as a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment, the new rates based on the forward-
looking cost methodology must impact the incumbent’s 
‘financial integrity’. (paras 523-24) 
Judicial Takings  
(One case) 
Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc v 
Florida Department 
of Environmental 
Protection, 560 US 
702 (2010) 
There was no taking found. The Court unanimously 
concluded that the Florida State Supreme Court 
decision was correctly applied in affirming that the 
beachfront property still belonged to the State. Four 
Justices affirmed that a taking concept could not only 
be applicable to state action, but also a judicial branch 
if a court invalidly declares that the property rights is 
no long existed thereby restricting of property use. 
(para 715)   
Unspecified Doctrine 
(One case) 
Lingle v Chevron 
USA Inc, 544 US 528 
(2005) 
The Court held that it is inappropriate to merely use a 
‘substantially advance state interests’ element in this 
case to determine whether a regulation is a 
compensable taking. (para 545)  The judgment finding 
that the statute accomplished an unconstitutional taking 
was reversed, and as the case was not ripe, the Court 
remanded to case to the lower courts for further 
proceedings to determine the case under one of the 
other theories - either "physical" taking, a Lucas-type 
"total regulatory taking," a Penn Central taking, or a 
land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in 
Nollan and Dolan. (para 548) 
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From the information above, it can be seen that the Court has, since 2001, gradually 
moved its analytical framework towards a balancing and proportionality test in its 
Takings Clause decisions. This allows the Court to engage in a deeper consideration 
of some complex issues. The Court; however, has also utilized the per se takings 
doctrine as a bright line rule when the measure involves the full/extreme deprivation 
of economic benefits. 
 
D. Conclusions 
The taking of private property by government agencies has long been an historic 
concern in US politics. The origin of the Takings Clause can be traced back to the 
Magna Carta, which stated that property could not be taken unless the law had said 
so. However, the obligation to compensate was not spelled out explicitly in the early 
period.  
During the colonial era, the British colonies in America adopted English property 
systems to govern the land. In early American history, the colonial governments 
were entitled to dispose of the private property ownership, but the compensation 
component was still not well developed.  
This matter; however, changed after the civil war in the US. Due to widespread 
discontent over abusive use of power by the British, the US declared its 
independence and formed the US Constitution and attached to it a Bill of Rights to 
restraint governments from arbitrarily intruding on private property rights unfairly. 
This fundamental principle of private property protection was set out in the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, requiring that a ‘taking’ be 
accompanied by just compensation. Nevertheless, due to inherent vagueness in the 
legal text, the notions of property, takings, and remedies under the Fifth Amendment 
were open to debate.  
A review of the US Supreme Court’s decisions shows that the Takings Clause has 
historically been interpreted so broadly as to protect a wide range of property. It is 
not limited to tangible assets, but also covers intangible property that includes 
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legitimate expectation. Moreover, when the government is liable under the Fifth 
Amendment for a taking, the Court has consistently held that fair market value 
compensation is the most effective remedy to redress the injury. 
However, to indicate whether the regulation in question is indeed a compensable 
taking, there is no single formula developed by the Court. The Court has applied 
different legal principles to distinguish a non-compensable regulatory action from a 
compensable regulatory taking. On the one hand, the Court in a number of cases 
expressly advocated stringent property protection regimes. On the other hand, the 
Court’s decisions in some cases reflected a preference for a public power doctrine, 
providing limited remedies despite significant impact caused by the governmental 
acts.  
Apart from two extreme conceptual frameworks, the Court has developed a 
predominant theme with which to balance between public benefits and private 
interests. The Court has ventured to declare that an offending regulation could be a 
compensable taking when the property owners have unfairly borne excessive public 
burdens. Based on the three factors test used in the Court’s review in the Penn 
Central case, the Court will consider the economic impact of the regulation on the 
property owner, the degree of interference with the owner’s investment-backed 
expectation and the character of alleged governmental action. Besides that, the Court 
also applied the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test from Nollan and Dolan to 
determine when regulatory interference is a compensable taking. Corresponding to 
political, policy and social exigencies, the balancing test works to reconcile 
conflicting interests and to recognize changing circumstances in the community at 
large. Any regulatory interference, nevertheless, is deemed to be a compensable 
taking when the regulation is so extreme as to deprive the property owner of all 
beneficial use of property rights. 
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CHAPTER VII 
COMPENSABLE INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
 
The protection of property rights is a principle that has been set out in Article 1 of 
the Protocol No.1 (P1-1) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
since 1954. P1-1 aims to afford protection to property rights within the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms framework of Europe.  
Although P1-1 plays a critical role in protecting human rights, it generated 
ideological debates among European countries, making it hard to reach a consensus 
on the provision when it was introduced in 1954. Due to the ambiguous nature of P1-
1 – and the complex political backdrop existing at the time of its formation, the 
European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (the ECtHR) have developed a body of jurisprudence to analyze 
whether state actions adopted through various regulatory measures contravene the 
terms of the Article so as to amount to expropriation. Since there is no set of clear 
concepts that dictate the appropriate interpretation and application of P1-1, its 
interpreters have encountered difficulty and, as a consequence, the jurisprudence in 
this field is somewhat obtuse.  
This Chapter examines the jurisprudence developed by the Commission and the 
ECtHR, as well as the evolution of legal concepts utilized in determining when a 
state action is considered tantamount to a compensable expropriation, under P1-1.
1
 
                                                 
1
 From 1954 until 1998, the European Commission of Human Rights was the main organ adjudicating 
issues concerning the violation of human rights law in Europe. However, after the enforcement of 
Protocol 11 in 1998, the Commission was abolished and replaced by the ECtHR. Under this new 
organization, individuals can have direct access. Regarding the ECtHR, the judgments sought by the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR were examined. Complaints of violation by member states are first 
reviewed by a committee of three judges. If the complaint is declared admissible, the complaint is 
heard and adjudicated by a Chamber of 7 judges. Decisions of great importance may be appealed to 
the Grand Chamber of 17 judges. Once the Grand Chamber has rendered the decision, the judgment 
cannot be appealed and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe plays a supervisory and 
monitoring role to ensure that the member states comply with the decision. See European Court of 
Human Rights, Your Application to the ECtHR: How to Apply and How your Application is 
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The study carried out in this Chapter analyzes the trends in European regulatory 
takings doctrines, developed by the Court, as well as their compatibility with the 
domestic laws of European countries. 
 
A. Background to the Protection of Property Rights under the European 
Convention of Human Rights 
Before the emergence of the ECHR in the 18
th
 century, there were existing legal 
instruments that concerned the protection of property rights at both domestic and 
international levels. One of the most prominent was the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen, which was established in 1789 (the Declaration).
2
 
Article 17 of the Declaration states that: ‘[p]roperty being a sacred and inviolable 
right, no one can be deprived of it, unless a legally established public necessity 
evidently demands it, under the condition of a just and prior indemnity’.
3
 This 
provision was introduced to grant people specific freedom from oppression via the 
illegitimate exercise of state power. 
The protection of property rights could also be found in some international 
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR). The 
UDHR was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 
December 1948.
4
 Representing commonly accepted but non-binding standards for all 
nations, the UDHR set out for the first time universally protected, ‘fundamental 
human rights’.
5
 Article 17 of the UDHR states that:  
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
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2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
6
 
Despite its universality, a commentator argues that the provision is so vague that it 
inadequately provides meaningful protection to property owners, and could hardly 
prevent owners from being deprived of their property without compensation.
7
 
The impact of the Second World War in Europe was immense. Not only were large 
numbers of people killed, but the violations of human rights on many levels, 
including rights of property, were overwhelming.
8
 Europeans perceived the need to 
develop a legally binding international system that could effectively inhibit human 
right abuses.
9
 The ECHR was created as a mechanism to fight against the 
‘totalitarian’ and ‘dictatorship’ tendencies, which existed in Europe during that 
time.
10
 The Convention, moreover, was drafted to reflect a ‘core minimum of the 
value necessary to create and maintain a democratic society, while also respecting 
and allowing for the different social economic and political conditions which 
prevailed in the signatory states’.
11
  
When the ECHR was first drafted, the inclusion of a human right to property was not 
supported by some member states of the Consultative Assembly (CA) of the Council 
of Europe.
12
 The UK, for example, was initially reluctant to incorporate the 
provision on property rights protection in P1-1. Part of the reason could be attributed 
to British social democratic politics after the war, as state agencies were keen to 
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support national development with public money and nationalization,
13
 especially in 
many key national industries such as coal, steel, railways and shipbuilding.
14
 The 
UK thus strongly opposed the insertion of the right to property in the draft 
Convention.
15
 In addition to the UK, other socialist countries, such as Sweden, also 
questioned the inclusion of the provision due to concerns that it might restrict state 
rights to regulate and also encourage a flood of litigation.
16
  
Conversely, some countries were supportive of the incorporation of the right to 
property in the draft Convention. These countries included France, Turkey, Ireland 
and Italy. They referred to the danger of ‘fascist regimes’, which oppressed 
minorities and deprived Jews of property during war time.
17
 These countries were 
active in promoting the inclusion of a provision on the right to property in the early 
draft Convention. 
After long discussions and debates, the right to property was ultimately included. 
Nevertheless, there was difficulty in achieving unanimity among Member States of 
the Council of Europe and a resolution had to be achieved regarding conflicting 
views as to the scope of property rights protection, the conditions under which the 
taking of property was permissible, the nature of compensation obligations, and the 
extent to which member states were allowed to impose limitations on property use.
18
  
On 17 August 1950, the French representative proposed the following text: 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
Such possessions cannot be subjected to arbitrary confiscation. 
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The present measures shall not, however, be considered as infringing, in any way, the 
right of a state to pass necessary legislation to ensure that the said possessions are 
utilized in accordance with the general interest.
19
 
However, some countries opposed this proposed text. The representatives from the 
UK contended that the term ‘possessions’ did not exist in British local laws and this 
posed an unclear definition of the right to property.
20
 Moreover, some delegates were 
unwilling to leave such a vague provision to be interpreted by a commission or 




Following the French proposal, several texts were suggested by other Member 
States, such as the UK and Belgium.
22
 Over several years of the drafting process, the 
final text of the right to property was adopted under the Protocol of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which ultimately 
entered into force on 18 May 1954. Although the provision on property protection 
was successfully incorporated in the Convention, it was nevertheless criticized due to 
the ambiguity surrounding the notion of possessions, the nature of interference 
falling within the ambit of the Protocol and the circumstances under which an 
individual is entitled to compensation. 
 
B. Current Jurisprudence on Regulatory Interference in the European 
Court of Human Rights 
Currently, the right to property is contained in article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1) to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Based on the P1-1, it states that:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 




Fundamentally, the structure of P1-1 contains three distinct rules governing different 
types of interference, which require the State: 
1. Not to interfere with the ‘peaceful enjoyment of possession’ (the first 
sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1); 
2. Not to ‘deprive the owner of their possession’ except in the public interest, 
and subject to domestic and international law (the second sentence of the first 
paragraph); and 
3. To ‘control the use of property’ in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes, other contributions or penalties. (the second 
paragraph of P1-1). 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the provision, the definition of each type of 
interference is ambiguous and broadly crafted. To ascertain the appropriate scope 
and application of these rules, this section of the Chapter will examine the 
characteristics of each type of interference and the evolution of the legal concepts 
developed by the ECtHR to identify when property interference triggers a 
compensation duty.  
To analyze these issues, this section starts with an investigation of the scope of 
property, or interests falling within the ambit of ‘possessions’. It then examines the 
jurisprudence relating to situations in which each type of interference and could 
become compensable expropriation under P1-1. The final part of this section focuses 
on the standards of compensation developed by the ECtHR to redress the injuries 
that a property owner suffers from state regulatory interference. 
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1. Concept of Possessions 
There is no explicit definition of possessions or property in P1-1. To elaborate the 
meaning of what constitutes possessions or property rights under P1-1, the ECtHR 
has asserted that the concept of possession is ‘autonomous’ and the ECtHR reserves 
the right to interpret the definition of property rights without relying on domestic 
law.
24
 In Gasus Dosier-Und Fordertechnik GmbH v Netherlands,
25
 for instance, the 
ECtHR held that: 
[p]ossession …has an autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to 
ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can 




Generally, the ECtHR accepts tangible property as possessions under P1-1. In 
Handyside v UK,
27
 which concerned the forfeit and destruction of the applicant’s 
books relating to liberal sexual education, the ECtHR insisted that the books were 
recognized as possessions under the P1-1.
28
 The ECtHR also recognized tangible 
property as comprising possessions in a number of subsequent cases, such as AGOSI 
v UK.
29
 In this case, the Claimant argued that the British government’s forfeiture of 
coins without compensation amounted to a deprivation of property. However, the 
ECtHR held that the forfeiture was not unlawful since it was the corollary of the 
enforcement by the British government of a law implemented to serve public 
interests. Although the ECtHR ruled in favor of the host state government, it 
confirmed that a tangible asset constitutes a possession within the meaning of P1-1. 
In addition to tangible property, it is possible that all contractual and vested rights 
that constitute economic interests are also regarded as possessions under P1-1. In its 
early applications of the ECHR, the ECtHR held that a contractual right is a 
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possession. In James and Others v UK,
30
 for example, the ECtHR asserted that 





 the ECtHR examined interference with a landlord’s 
contractual entitlement to rent. In this case, the Government of Austria passed a new 
Act, which affected the pre-existing rental agreement between the Claimant and the 
tenant.
33
 Due to the legislated reduction of rent, the applicants claimed that this was a 
de facto interfere with their property.
34
 The ECtHR held that, despite the absence of 
a total deprivation of property, the Act intervened with the freedom of contract and 




In addition to contractual rights, other vested rights have also been accepted as 
possessions under the P1-1. For example, in Lars Bramelid and Malmström v 
Sweden
36
, which concerned the forced sale of shares to the majority owner, the 
Commission held that P1-1 applied to the ownership of shares in a company. In this 
case, the new Company Law empowered a company which owned more than 90 
percent of the shares and voting rights in another company to compel the minority 
shareholders in that company to sell their shares at the price they originally 
purchased through a public offer.
37
 The minority shareholders complained to the 
ECtHR about the unfairness of being forced to sell their shares at less than the 
market value.
38
 The ECtHR considered that a share was a certificate that promises 
the holder a quantified interest in a company, plus all corresponding rights. The 
ECtHR held that the shares had economic value and were, therefore, possessions.
39
  
The ECtHR also recognized vested rights to seek payment in relation to property or 
contract as a part of possession in many subsequent cases. In Stran Greek Refineries 
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and Stratis Andreadis v Greece,
40
 for example, the ECtHR held that the award 
rendered by arbitral tribunal was to be regarded as a protected right within the ambit 
of P1-1. In this case, Mr. Amdreadis contracted with the State for the construction of 
a crude oil refinery by his company, Stran.
41
 However, after democracy was restored 
in Greece, the new government issued legislation to set aside the contract as it was 
not in the national interests, and invited the company to renegotiate the terms of 
contract.
42
 The dispute was brought to arbitral proceedings and the arbitration court 
ruled in favor of Stran, ordering payment by the State of over US$ 16 million.
43
 
While the State challenged the arbitration award in the Court of Cassation, the Greek 
Parliament passed Law no.1701/1987, declaring that arbitration awards regarding 
contracts concluded during the previous military regime were invalid and 
unenforceable.
44
 The Court of Cassation upheld the new law and declared that 
arbitration award void. The applicant then complained to the ECtHR. The Court held 
that under P1-1, the arbitration award gave rise to a debt that favored Stran. Since the 
award was legally binding at the time it was decided, it qualified as a property 
protected under the scope of P1-1.
45
   
To ensure more effective and practical protection of property rights, the ECtHR 
interpreted the concept of possessions covered under P1-1 as including a ‘legitimate 
expectation’. As Sochacki notes, whilst the ECtHR considered this as being similar 
to the US Supreme Court’s ‘reasonable-investment-backed expectation’, the ECtHR 
classified the presence of a legitimate expectation as a decisive factor when 
determining whether the measure effectively deprives the owner of possession over 
property, thereby justifying an award of compensation.
46
 To be regarded as a 
legitimate expectation within the ambit of protected possessions, the ECtHR usually 
agrees to enforce beneficial interests or the rights attached when a legitimate 
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expectation is non-speculative. In Van Marle v the Netherlands (1986),
47
 for 
example, the ECtHR had to consider whether professional goodwill and licenses 
essential to operate a business were to be considered as possessions and entitled to 
protection under P1-1. In this case, the applicant was a certified accountant who had 
practiced for a number of years. However, after the passing of new legislation that 
required accountants to seek registration to continue to practice, the applicant’s 
request to the Registration Board was denied due to unsatisfactory proof of sufficient 
professional experiences.
48
 The applicant claimed that the Registration Board’s 
decision diminished his income and the goodwill of his business.
49
 The ECtHR 
agreed with the applicant, and held that goodwill is to be considered as a possession 
because ‘[t]he applicant had built up a clientèle; this had in many respects the nature 
of a private right and constituted an asset, and hence, a possession…’
50
 Later in 
1989, the ECtHR applied the same approach in Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v Sweden.51 
The case concerned the revocation of a restaurant’s license to sell liquor by a County 
Administrative Board. The ECtHR considered that the economic interests connected 
with the running of the restaurant were possessions.
52
 The ECtHR held that the 
withdrawal of the business licenses impacted on the goodwill of the business, the 
ability to maintain customers, and the value of the restaurant in the future.
53
 
Similarly, the ECtHR also highlighted the role of P1-1 in protecting legitimate 
expectations in Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (1991).
54
 In this case, Pine 
Valley Developments Ltd, an Irish company had bought a plot of land for business 
development in reliance on the permission for industrial warehouse and office 
development granted by the Minister for Local Government. However, the Supreme 
Court decided in 1982 that the granting of permission was ultra vires and unlawful. 
The Claimant was unsuccessful in their local court claim for damages, and the Irish 
Supreme Court affirmed that the original grant was ultra vires and declared the 
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 Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v Ireland (European Court of Human Rights, Court 




 When the case was referred to the ECtHR, it held that the 
landowner’s reliance on the government’s permission constituted a ‘legitimate 
expectation’, to carry out the plan for proposed development, and this legitimate 
expectation is regarded as a part of protected property rights.
56
  
On some occasions, the ECtHR has protected legitimate expectations even though 
the rights in question have not yet accrued. One of the most striking cases was 
Presso Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v Belgium (1995),
57
 which concerned a 
ship collision resulting from the negligent mistake of Belgian piloting services, for 
which the State was responsible under the Belgian Shipping Act.
58
 However, after the 
ship owner had initiated its case against the State, the State legislature promulgated a 
new Act in 1988 to exclude all claims that were pending.
59
 The ECtHR held that the 
ship owner had a legitimate expectation that any pending claims would be decided 
according to the established law of tort, constituting an asset and amounting to a 
possession within the meaning of the first sentence of P1-1.
60
 This decision indicates 
that, even when the case is unresolved and the liability has not accrued, the ECtHR 
accepts the applicant’s right to obtain compensation for interferences with legitimate 
expectations and such a right cannot be thwarted.  
Despite its broad interpretation, the ECtHR emphasized that a legitimate expectation 
has to be distinguished from a mere hope, as the latter lacks a basis for legal 
protection.
61
 For example, in Kopecky v Slovokia,
62
 the ECtHR held in that:  
‘Possessions’ can be either existing possessions or assets, including claims, in respect 
of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a legitimate expectation of 
obtaining effective enjoyment of property right. By way of contrast, the hope of 
recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively 
cannot be considered as a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 1, 
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In 2010, in Lelas v Croatia,
64
 the Court of First Session held that a legitimate 
expectation should be considered as a possession. The Court considered that:  
[A]n individual acting in good faith is… entitled to rely on statements made by state 
or public officials who appear to have the requisite authority to do so…. A State 
whose authorizes failed to observe their internal rules and procedures should not be 
allowed to profit from their wrongdoing and escape their obligations.
65
  
In sum, the scope of possessions has been interpreted broadly. The ECtHR held that 
what constitutes a protected possession has an autonomous meaning independent 
from classifications under municipal law.
66
 There is a clear trend towards the 
expansion of the scope of protection which covers not only tangible, but also 
intangible assets. Moreover, this is evolving to cover public law rights (licenses and 
the interests connected with social security rights as a beneficiary) and legitimate 
expectations.
67
 From the ECtHR’s point of view, these rights contribute to the 
development of individual livelihood which is the major objective of human rights 
law. 
2. ECtHR Jurisprudence on Regulatory Interference under P1-1 
As mentioned in the previous section, P1-1 comprises three main rules governing 
different types of regulatory interference: deprivation of property, control on the use 
of property, and interference with property rights. However, the rules do not contain 
explicit interpretative guidance to which adjudicators can refer. Since the adoption of 
the Protocol in 1954, the ECtHR has developed a body of jurisprudence to 
distinguish the scope and application of each rule. The following section divides the 
development of this jurisprudence into three phrases: the predominance of the police 
power in the 1970s; the rise of regulatory interference in the 1980s; and the 
development of jurisprudence after the Sporrong case. 
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(a) Predominance of State Power in the 1970s 
In the 1970s, 16 years after the adoption of the Protocol in 1954, challenges against 
the governmental expropriation of property emerged. In 1976, the ECtHR examined 
the application of P1-1 in Handyside v the United Kingdom.
68
 This case is one of the 
most highly cited cases decided by the ECtHR concerning a state defense of the 
governmental rights to regulate. In this case, the British government confiscated 
sexual education schoolbooks published by Mr. Richard Handyside. The 
confiscation was made in accordance with the UK Obscene Publication Act 1959, on 
the ground that the books were said to be against public morality. Mr. Handyside, a 
publisher who had purchased the copyright of the Little Red Schoolbook and 
published it in many European countries, complained to the ECtHR that confiscation 
breached his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession.
69
 The ECtHR considered 
the seizure to be provisional, so it did not result in full deprivation and, as a result, 
the ECtHR found no violation of the second sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1 
(not to deprive the owner of possession), as claimed.
70
 Using a ‘margin of 
appreciation’, the ECtHR held that the interference was legitimate and was 
implemented for public purposes.
71
 The ECtHR did not give weight to the 
‘proportionality test’ as a criterion in deciding the case.
72
 It held that the contested 
measure was in accordance with the law and aimed to protect ‘morals’, as 
understood by British authorities.
73
 Therefore, the ECtHR accepted the arguments 
raised by the Government,
74
 and unanimously decided that the measure in question 
did not breach P1-1.
75
 . 
(b) Rise of Jurisprudence on Regulatory Interference in the 1980s 
Following the jurisprudence of the 1970s, the ECtHR began referring to the role of 
the three distinct rules under P1-1 for the first time in 1982, in the well-known case 
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of Sporrong Lönnroth v Sweden.
76
 In this case, the Swedish government entrusted 
the City Council of Stockholm with the power to expropriate the properties owned 
by Sporrong and Lönnroth for the government’s town planning development plan. In 
addition, some construction and renovation restrictions were imposed on the 
properties in question. However, the local officers never undertook the formal land 
expropriation action, and this barred the landowners from utilizing their properties 
for a lengthy period of time. As no compensation was provided by the government, 
the applicants filed the case with the ECtHR to decide whether the measures were 
tantamount to an expropriation in breach of the P1-1. 
In determining whether the measures violated P1-1, the ECtHR clearly stated, from 
the outset, the standard rules contained in P1-1. The Court held in its analysis that:  
[t]hat Article comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a general nature, 
announces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out in the first 
sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of possessions and 
subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of the same 
paragraph. The third rule recognizes that the States are entitled, amongst other things, 
to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing 




In attempting to identify the specific rule applicable to this case, the ECtHR found 
that there was no formal deprivation of property since the applicant retained the right 
to enjoy the benefits derived from the property despite experiencing some difficulty 
in selling it.
78
 In addition, the Court also held that there was no control of the use of 
property.
79
 However, the ECtHR returned to the general rule under the first sentence 
of the first paragraph of P1-1.
80
 To answer whether two series of measures breached 
P1-1, the ECtHR held that besides serving public interests, the measure must ensure 
that:  
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[A] fair balance was struck between the demand of the general interests of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
rights…The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is 
also reflected in the structure of Article 1.
81
 
Applying the concept to the issues at hand, the ECtHR held that despite the absence 
of an deprivation element, the expropriatory measures were unlawful and infringed 
P1-1 because ‘a fair balance’ between collective and individual interests was not 
achieved, producing an excessive burden on the property owner.
82
 The Sporrong 
case was significant as it was the first violation by Sweden that the ECtHR had 




(c) After Sporrong’s Case: Further Elaboration of the Scope and Nature of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 
The ECtHR has played a more active role since the 1980s in providing legal analysis 
regarding the application of P1-1. One of the main reasons for its increasing P1-1 
caseload is that individuals were granted rights to refer their cases directly to the 
ECtHR.
84
 Originally, an individual had no direct access to the ECtHR, and the 
recognition of the right of individual application was optional and binding only upon 
the States that had approved direct access.
85
 However, after the entry into force of 
Protocol 11 to the Convention in 1998,
86
 the ECtHR’s acceptance of complaints 
directly from individuals became mandatory.
87
 Complaints can be brought against 
Contracting States either by other Contracting States or by individual applicants.
88
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From 1980 onwards, the ECtHR has heard an increasing number of cases, including 
disputes in relation to Protocol 1.
89
  
As a consequence, the ECtHR has intensively developed key principles based on its 
case law concerning the enjoyment of property rights, deprivation of possessions and 
the control of the use of properties.
90
 This section of the Chapter examines the key 
legal concepts developed by the ECtHR in relation to the three distinct rules 
embodied in P1-1. The study investigates which specific rule is applicable to a 
particular state measure. 
(i) Deprivation of Property 
A rule concerning protection from deprivation of property is contained in the second 
sentence of paragraph one of P1-1. Jurisprudence developed by the ECtHR generally 
affirms that the notion of ‘deprivation’ includes not only ‘direct takings of property, 
but also measures that amount to them’.
91
 As explained in Sporrong case, the ECtHR 
stated that:  
In order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of possessions within the 
meaning of the second rule, the Court must not confine itself to examining whether 
there has been dispossessions or formal expropriation, it must look behind the 
appearance and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. Since the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, it has to be 
ascertained whether that situation amounted to a de facto expropriation.
92
  
There have been a number of subsequent cases discussing the nature and 
characteristics of notion of deprivation. Basically, deprivation includes all forms of 
interference, resulting in the ‘dispossession of the subject of property or the 
extinction of the legal rights of the owners’.
93
 For example, in Papamichalopoulos v 
Greece (1993),
94
 which concerned the taking of the applicant’s land in 1967, during 
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the period of dictatorship, and passing it to the Navy, the ECtHR held that the Naval 
occupation of land resulted in the applicant’s lack of effective use of his property and 




(ii) Control the Use of Property 
Besides the rule regarding deprivation, P1-1 also recognizes other forms of 
interference that limit the use of property. Such interference is contained in the 
second paragraph of P1-1, which deals with the state’s right to control the use of 
property. Although this type of interference results in restrictions of property rights, 
such controls are deemed to impose less excessive burdens than the deprivation of 
property. 
Basically, the ECtHR accepts that a broad range of regulations may restrict the use 
of property, but less severely than deprivation. In 1989, for example, the ECtHR held 
in the case of Baner v Sweden
96
 that the termination of exclusive fishing rights 
resulted in a restriction on the applicant’s property rights, and this amounted to a 
control on the use of property under P1-1.
97
 Another example was the case of Pine 
Valley Development v Ireland,
98
 which held that the invalidation of a development 
permit, despite not entirely removing the ownership of the property, gravely limited 
the utilization of property. In its decision, the ECtHR held that the withdrawal of the 
development permission did not prevent the applicant from using the land for other 
purposes, and that the applicant retained the right to ownership over the property, 
resulting in control over the use of property.
99
 In this brief review, the ECtHR has 
developed only some vague legal guidance as to when and whether a state action 
falls within this second paragraph of P1-1. 
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(iii) Peaceful Enjoyment of Property 
P1-1 also protects the property owner from situations which neither involve 
deprivation of property nor control of the use of property. This general rule in the 
first sentence of the first paragraph of P1-1 is considered as a ‘catch-all’ provision 
that applies to situations where neither of the two previous rules is applicable.
100
 A 
commentator describes this rule as a ‘purely judicial construction’ as it is heavily 
dependent on the ECtHR’s discretion in defining the scope of its application to any 
specific type of state measure.
101
 
In the case of Sporrong, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on property development 
and long-term cancellation of permits could also constitute the destruction of the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions under the first sentence of the first paragraph of 
P1-1.
102
 The ECtHR explained that such interference did not affect the right to 
dispose of the property, nor did it aim at controlling the use of the property,
103
 so it 
fell under the ambit of peaceful enjoyment.  
In the case of Stran Greek Refineries and Straints Andreadis v Greece (1994),
104
 
which concerned the legislation that rendered an arbitral award in favor of the 
applicant void, the ECtHR held that such an action was considered as interference 
under P1-1.
105
 The ECtHR also elaborated that such interference was neither a 
deprivation nor a measure amounting to control of property but, rather, was 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
106
 
The ECtHR has also ruled that an unreasonable delay in the payment of 
compensation could be regarded as an interference with property. In Solodyuk v 
Russia (2005),
107
 for example, the applicant complained that late payment of a 
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pension during a period of high inflation in Russia caused a reduction in monetary 
value. The ECtHR held that the considerable reduction in the value of the pension, 
due to government delay, caused economic loss to the applicant and that this resulted 
in the violation of the first rule of P1-1.
108
 
Despite the growing jurisprudence, the ECtHR has admitted that it is difficult to state 
clearly which specific rule should be applied to any particular issue as the 
application of rules has to take into account various factual circumstances and legal 
environments. In Beyeler v Italy (2000),
109
 which concerned a dispute over the 
ownership of a painting by the famous artist Van Gogh, the applicant claimed that 
the painting was his possession. However, the State argued that, due to its historical 
and artistic value, the painting was national property. The Italian courts decided that 
the sales contract for this painting was void and null. The Strasbourg Court held that 
the case was admissible as the applicant had an interest which amounted to 
possession.
110
 Then, after considering the case, the ECtHR admitted that ‘[t]he 
complexity of the factual and legal situation prevents its being classified in a precise 
category’.
111
 Although it could have considered that the case concerned the issue of 
deprivation, the ECtHR held that the forced transfer of ownership to the government 




Despite the absence of a clear distinction between a measure regarded as a control on 
use and a measure amounting to an interference with peaceful enjoyment of 
property, the ECtHR’s rulings generally recognize that certain forms of 
environmental controls and zoning laws are regarded as a control over the use of 
property,
113
 whereas other measures, which fall short of deprivation of property and 
outside the meaning of control on the use of property, are to be regarded as an 
interference with peaceful enjoyment of property rights.
114
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(iv) Complying with P1-1: Striking a Fair Balance through the Proportionality 
Test 
Once the appropriate rule applicable to the circumstances of the case has been 
identified, the Court then assesses whether the interference is justifiable on the 
ground of a general balancing test, which aims to strike a fair balance between the 
means employed and the aim sought.
115
 The ECtHR fundamentally accepts the 
principle of a ‘margin of appreciation’. The ECtHR first mentioned this hallmark 
concept of a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the James case in 1986. Specifically, the 
ECtHR stated that:  
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national 
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate 
what is ‘in the public interest’. …Furthermore, the notion of public interest is 
necessarily extensive. In particular… the decision to enact laws expropriating property 
will commonly involve consideration of political economic and social issues…. The 
Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in 
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the 
legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that judgment be 
manifestly without reasonable foundation. (emphasis added)
116 
Despite upholding state sovereign rights to regulate for internal policies, the ECtHR 
also maintains that measures must not impose an ‘excessive burden’ on an 
individual.
117
 To consider whether the measure is proportional, the ECtHR generally 
takes into account all pertinent factors, which include (among other things) the 
nature of the right, the intensity of the interference, the nature and importance of the 
aim of the interference, and the relationship between the means and the aim sought, 
and the amount of paid compensation. A failure to maintain a fair balance between 
public and private interests would result in disproportionality and, as a consequence, 
impose an excessive burden upon an individual victim. 
The ECtHR has regularly reviewed the justification of regulatory interference based 
on the application of the ‘proportionality test’ in many occasions. For example, in 
                                                 
115
 James Application No 8793/79, [51]. 
116
 Ibid [46]. 
117
 Sochacki, above n 9, 447. 
233 
AGOSI v the UK (1986),
118
 a German applicant, who ran a metal smelting business, 
complained that the UK Customs authority unlawfully refused to exercise its 
discretion to return metal coins that the State seized from a smuggler who obtained 
the objects from the applicant by fraud. Based on the facts of the case, the applicant 
complained that since a wrongdoer refused to pay the commodity in full, the 
ownership of the coins remained with the applicant, and although the wrongdoer 
tried to import the coins into the UK illegally, the State could not confiscate the 
coins, but had to return them to the applicant who was the rightful owner. To justify 
the measure, the Court noted that the prohibition on the import of the smuggled coins 
was in compliance with P1-1 and it served a legitimate purpose.
119
 To determine a 
fair balance, the ECtHR examined whether or not there was a reasonable relationship 
between the means employed and the aim sought by the State, and then 
counterweighed the state’s ‘margin of appreciation’ with the behavior of the 
applicant,
120




Another frequently cited case is Mellacher v Austria (1989).
122
 In this case the 
applicant claimed that the enactment of a new rent control law by the Austrian 
government
123
 was contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
as it unlawfully intervened with the applicant’s contractual rights to obtain rent. The 
applicant claimed that the measure was not supported by the democratically 
majoritarian elected political parties.
124
 Considering the facts of the case, the ECtHR 
held that legislation was reasonable, and was introduced with a legitimate goal to 
help poor people obtain adequate access to rental houses.
125
 After assessing an 
element of the fair balance test, the Court found that although the legislation 
infringed the binding contractual obligation between the tenant and applicant, the 
owner was allowed to pass on various costs to the tenants. Moreover, the Court 
found that under the new regime, the landlords were allowed to charge fees 50% 
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higher than the rates the applicant would have received under the new contract 
during the transitional period.
126
 The ECtHR then held that the measure struck a fair 
balance and did not violate P1-1 of the Convention.
127
 
In 1995, the ECtHR applied the same concept to Pressos Compania Naviera SA v 
Belgium.
128
 The Belgium government passed new legislation to remove the right to 
compensation in relation to damage caused by a ship crash, resulting from the 
negligence of a Belgium navigating pilot. To analyze the State’s responsibility, the 
ECtHR noted that due to the uncertainty of Belgium tort law and its incompatibility 
with the laws of its neighboring countries, the State had freedom to amend the 
internal law to better cope with these problems.
129
 Although the ECtHR accepted the 
State’s authority to deal with the issue, it also held that the alteration of the rights to 
compensation, reasonably expected by prospective victims, could not ‘justify 
legislating with retrospective effect with the aim and consequence of depriving the 
applicants of their claim for compensation’.
130
 The ECtHR held that the interference 




3. Compensation under P1-1 
There is no explicit rule in P1-1 that requires the state to pay compensation to redress 
parties injured as a result of state expropriation. Generally, the ECtHR accepts the 
state’s sovereign power to regulate property for public interest, providing that it 
accords with the domestic law. However, a domestic power to regulate is not without 
restriction. In spite of a wide ‘margin of appreciation’, the power of the State is 
subject to the general principles of international law, which obligate a State to pay 
compensation for a taking of property.
132
 The ECtHR consistently considers that 
regulatory interference without compensation is an unlawful intervention that 
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infringes upon principles of general international law.
133
 Thus, in many cases, the 
ECtHR asserts that compensation becomes a requirement assessed by the 
proportionality and balancing tests. This principle was introduced in the James case 
of 1986,
134
 where the ECtHR held that:  
[C]ompensation terms are material to the assessment whether the contested legislation 
respects a fair balance between the various interests at stake and, notably, whether it 
does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant.
135
 [emphasis added] 
Similar to the judgment in James, instead of distinguishing between private and 
public interests, the ECtHR has consistently applied the principle of proportionality 
in subsequent cases, calling for compensation to achieve a fair balance between 
competing interests.
136
 For example, in Holy Monasteries v Greece in 1994,
137
 the 
ECtHR declared that ‘the taking of property without payment of an amount 
reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate 
interference and a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable under 
Article 1 only under exceptional circumstances’.
138
 Likewise in 2000, in the 
Carbonara and Venture v Italy,
139
 a landowner claimed that the local government of 
Noicattaro town did not take the possession of the land plot for school construction 
within the planned period, and no formal expropriation was taken within the 
authorized period.
140
 The ECtHR held that the inaction of the Town Council of 
Noicattaro was equivalent to a development freeze and amounted to a ‘deprivation of 
possession’ within the second rule of Article 1 of Protocol 1.
141
 In this case, the 
constructive-expropriation did not only violate P1-1, due to the absence of 
compensation,
142
 but it was also unlawful since it was applied arbitrarily.
143
 The 
obligation to pay compensation with respect to the deprivation rule has been 
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subsequently declared in a number of recent cases such as Perdigão v Portugal
144
 
and Curmi v Malta.
145
  
Compensation is also required when the measure falls within the context of the rules 
regarding ‘control of use’. Basically, this type of regulation is less likely to be 
subject to compensation obligations than full deprivation as it imposes less serious 
impacts on the property owner.
146
 The ECtHR, however, still accepts that such 
measures might trigger a compensatory duty if the interference fails to strike a fair 
balance between competing interests and, instead, imposes a disproportionate burden 
on one side.
147
 As seen in the case of Chassagnou and Others v France (1999),
148
 the 
ECtHR held that a law that enabled public rights to hunt animals on the land of other 
people without incurring compensation notoriously upset the fair balance to be 
struck between private property rights and general interests, and violated the second 
paragraph of P1-1.
149
 Following the case of Chassagnou, the ECtHR adopted the 
same legal doctrine in a number of subsequent cases to protect the right of property 




Turning to regulation that caused a loss to ‘peaceful enjoyment of property rights’, it 
is found that the ECtHR generally awards compensation when the property owner 
bears an excessive burden in violation of the first sentence of P1-1. In Sporrong,
151
 
for instance, the ECtHR held that the measure concerned was disproportionate and 
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violated the first paragraph of P1-1, even though the measure in question served 
public interests.
152
 The ECtHR asserted that under certain circumstances a right to 
compensation is necessary, and held that interference with property was an 
‘excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if they had had 
the possibility…of claiming compensation’.
153
 Following the Sporrong case, the 
ECtHR adopted the principle of a ‘fair balance’ and a test of ‘proportionality’ when 
examining whether a right to compensation is required. Compensation is affirmed as 
a critical factor in assessing whether the State’s conduct is legitimate in many recent 
cases, including Beyeler v Italy,
154
 Broniowski v Poland,
155




It should be noted that when the interference is significant, the ECtHR has held that 
‘fair market value’ is the most appropriate standard for compensation valuation.
157
 In 
order to determine the quantum of compensation, the ECtHR tends to use the date of 
taking as the starting point for computation of property value. In addition to material 
damages, the ECtHR includes ‘moral damages’ to heal a victim’s feeling.
158
 Despite 
the requirement for compensation for unlawful expropriation, there is still some 
inconsistency in approaches to calculating compensation, as some tribunals utilize 
the date of award as the appropriate date for property valuation.
159
 
However, the State is not necessarily obligated to pay fair market value 
compensation in every case.
160
 If the essence of social interests outweighs private 
benefits, the property owner may not obtain full compensation for the loss.
161
 This 
doctrine was confirmed in the case of James.
162
 As the ECtHR greatly respects state 
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 James Application No 8793/79 [54]. 
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autonomy in regulating private property through domestic legislation, the Court held 
in Lithgow v UK
163
 that:  
Article 1 (P1-1) does not … guarantee a right to full compensation in all 
circumstances, since legitimate objectives of ‘public interest’, such as pursued in 
measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, 
may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.
164
 
Likewise in Jahn and ors v Germany, which concerned land expropriation for 
German reunification, the ECtHR held that compensation was not required since the 
benefit of reunification of the nation outweighed private interests.165 In such a case, 
the measure was proportionate and did not violate the ECHR, thus no compensation 
was needed. 
 
C. Trends in Jurisprudence under Article One of Protocol One 
This section analyzes the expected future development by the ECtHR of legal 
principles, pertaining to the issue of regulatory takings. The assessment of the future 
directions of the Court’s jurisprudence is made via three key dimensions: the 
tendencies of the nature of disputes, the tendencies of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, 
and the degree of jurisprudential coherence between the Strasbourg Court and 
national courts of Member States. 
1. The Nature of Disputes: Reconciliation of Conflicting Interests between State 
and Private Benefits 
Since the Court’s establishment in 1959 till now, it has heard a large number of 
disputes concerning alleged violations of the ECHR. According to the statistical data 
prepared by the ECtHR, it has examined around 674,000 applications
166
 and 
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delivered about 18,500 judgments from 1959 to 2015.
167
 Among those cases in 
which the ECtHR found a violation of the Convention, breaches of the right to 
property under P1-1 was ranked third, after the right to a fair hearing and the right to 
liberty and security. While 40 percent of violations concern the right to a fair 
hearing, 12.43 percent and 12.14 percent of violations concern the right to liberty 
and security and the right to property, respectively.
168
 The high proportion of 
decisions dedicated to the protection of property has undoubtedly demonstrated a 
strong tendency towards fierce property protection, which has, in turn, resulted in an 
increased caseload before the ECtHR.
169
 
A close examination of its case-law on the right to property reveals that the ECtHR 
has addressed a wide range of intractable investor-state conflicts. The Court has 
typically resolved four main types of property disputes, which cover: (1) claims on 
de facto expropriations; (2) restitution of property confiscated by communist regimes 
without compensation; (3) delayed and insufficient indemnities for expropriation; 
and (4)  excessively high fines or fees.
170
   
2. Reconciling the Conflicting Interests through the Margin of Appreciation and 
the Proportionality Doctrine 
Despite the diversity of these cases, there are common patterns among those 
conflicts which concern the nature of and the justification for a state’s administrative 
actions that interfere with private property interests. First, the ECtHR has tried to 
interpret the notion of the protection of property rights, by fine-tuning and 
reconciling the competing interests between public and private parties. As Lehavi 
asserts, the ECtHR has developed the hallmark concepts of both the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ and the ‘proportionality test’ as norms for European countries. As a 
‘supranational institution’, the ECtHR constructs guidelines for national legal 
systems in accordance with European human rights protection. Rather than 
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developing a single ‘hard-edged rule’,
171
 the ECtHR has established legal doctrines 
and mechanisms that ‘create a certain common denominator that would hold 
countries accountable for standard expropriatory or regulatory actions while 
preserving significant leeway in establishing domestic policy ends and means’.
172
  
Throughout the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, it consistently recognizes the state’s 
legitimate powers to regulate private property for public interests in a wide range of 
policy spheres, such as urban zoning, environmental control, social pensions, and the 
restitution of property at the end of the cold war in 1989. Given the unique 
circumstances that exist within each member country, the ECtHR has applied the 
‘margin of appreciation’ to support and respect decisions of state authorities and 
national legislatures that independently express ‘what was in the general interest’.
173
 
Deferring to state autonomy, the ECtHR relies on state authorities who have more in-
depth knowledge about domestic issues when setting both the means and goals for 
their policies.  
Despite ensuring each state’s rights to determine its own goals, the ECtHR in 
Strasbourg also demonstrates a trend towards more vigilant scrutiny of state 
regulatory measures constituting disproportionate burdens on property owners. In 
this respect, the Court tends to explore approaches to balance conflicting interests. 
By applying principles of proportionality and fair balance, the ECtHR usually 
chooses to impose a strict limit on state measures that result in the ‘permanent 
dispossession or compulsory transfer of title of property’.
174
 Since this causes serious 
injury to property owners, any absence of compensation for permanent dispossession 
on transfer of title would be ‘very difficult to justify’ and would violate the 
requirement under P1-1 of the Convention.
175
 This automatically triggers the duty to 
compensate. 
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Conversely, in cases of regulation with less intrusive impacts, the ECtHR tends to 
apply less rigorous limitations on state measures, and less rigorous fair balance and 
proportionality tests. Due to the ambiguity of P1-1, the application of the general 
rule and the rule on the control over property use has largely been subjected to the 
ECtHR’s judgment based on case-by-case analysis. Even though an interference with 
the right to property triggers a compensation duty, the ECtHR can award 
compensation amounting to less than full market value for the complainant.   
3. European Consensus on Supranational Norms and State Practices in the 
Proportionality Test 
The ‘proportionality test’ has proliferated throughout the realms of domestic 
constitutional and administrative courts and tribunals and is typically used as a 
governing legal standard with which to review the justification for state regulations 
and public policies in many countries throughout Europe. 
In Germany, for example, the principle of proportionality counts as a fundamental 
doctrine that domestic courts use to review the legality of regulatory interferences.
176
 
Under the German Constitution (‘Basic Law’),
177
 the freedom of each citizen’s life, 
liberty and property is regarded as a constitutional right. However, the constitution 
limits these property rights and permits state intrusions on private property whenever 
necessary for public interests.
178
 Due to conflicting interests, the German 
Constitutional Court has deployed the principle of proportionality to ensure that 




France is also a jurisdiction where proportionality has been widely used in a number 
of areas of administrative law.
180
 Starting in the 1970s, the concept of proportionality 
was first introduced by the French Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) which is the 
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highest French administrative tribunal.
181
 The Conseil d’Etat has regularly applied 
this principle in the context of administrative review, requiring that the measure 
reviewed should not be excessive and ensuring that balance is achieved between the 
prohibitions to be imposed and the ends to be pursued.
182
 The use of the 
‘proportionality test’ by the Conseil d’Etat is particularly noteworthy as its 
references to this principle increased roughly five-fold between the period of 2001-




The UK is another country where domestic courts appear to have adopted the 
‘proportionality test’ in their constitutional and administrative review processes. As 
demonstrated by Cora Chan, the UK courts have adopted the ‘proportionality test’ in 
human right adjudications.
184
 However, UK courts have applied this test with 
varying degrees of rigor in different situations. In cases which are ‘not manifestly 
disproportionate’, the courts generally defer to the judgement of the original decision 
maker through applying a ‘reasonableness’ test. However, in the event of an 
apparently severe violation of human rights, the courts tend to apply a more rigorous 
test that does not simply inquire as to the reasonableness of the measure, but rather 
adopts the full scale of structured proportionality analysis. Thus, the UK courts 
generally intervene only when the measure is ‘manifestly disproportionate’.
185
 
This underlying proportionality principle is also adopted by the local courts in post-
communist countries in Eastern Europe.
186
 For example, the Constitutional Court of 
Poland has regularly adopted the principle of proportionality to review the 
constitutionality of statutory provisions that affect human rights and personal 
freedoms. To review whether a legal order is proportionate, three key issues are 
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raised by the Polish Constitutional Court: ‘1) is the regulation capable of achieving 
the intended objectives; 2) is this regulation necessary to protect the public interest it 
refers to; 3) are its results proportional to the burdens imposed on citizens?’
187
 
Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has also reviewed the constitutionality 
of internal legal orders by noting the requirements of the principle of 
proportionality.
188
 By the adoption of the principle of proportionality, these courts 
provide a clear standard to test the legitimacy of the limitation of a private right or 
freedom by the state government. 
The brief survey above demonstrates that, despite the absence of an express 
provision within domestic legislation, the courts in a number of European countries 
usually employ the doctrine of proportionality in the context of judicial scrutiny. The 
widespread use of the proportionality review within public law regimes affirms the 
conceptual flexibility of the ‘proportionality test’ for the legitimacy of challenged 
governmental measures. Not only is the principle widely used by the Strasbourg 
Court, but the proportionality analysis has also found a place in domestic courts 
across legal traditions and systems. Due to its frequent appearance in both 
international and domestic public law, the advent of the proportionality test helps to 
establish a broad consensus across international and domestic legal bodies regarding 
the way in which government acts should be controlled or regulated. 
 
D. Conclusions 
As can be seen from the analysis in this chapter, the Court has developed extensive 
jurisprudence on the notion of property protection under P1-1 against all sorts of 
regulatory interference that amount to expropriation. To give ‘practical and 
effective’ protection, the meaning of possessions has been interpreted expansively to 
include all types of properties. To ensure property rights protections, since the case 
of Sporrong in 1982, the ECtHR has extended the concept of possessions beyond 
tangible property to encompass other types of intangible assets that confer economic 
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benefits to property owners. However, these possessions usually exclude mere 
unreasonable or speculative expectations.  
The ECtHR has also identified governmental measures that fall within each type of 
interference stipulated within P1-1, and the circumstances under which a 
compensation duty is triggered. While the ECtHR respects any European state’s 
‘margin of appreciation’ in carrying out measures for public purposes under 
domestic laws, the ECtHR may perform judicial review and provide redress to 
injured property owners when the measures in question are arbitrary and impose 
excessive burdens. Case-law analysis reveals that the ECtHR usually requires 
compensation to be paid when the measure is so extreme that it deprives the property 
owner of their entitlement to property rights. However, in the case of a measure 
falling short of total deprivation, but nevertheless limiting the use of property, the 
ECtHR usually holds that compensation is required to guard against disproportionate 
burdens and to strike a fair balance between public and private interests. However, 
no full compensation may be required. 
The precedents set by the ECtHR and the national courts of member nations make it 
uncontroversial to predict that the ECtHR will keep reconciling competing interests 
by applying the ‘proportionality test’ to balance the means used against the ultimate 
goals, and will keep using compensation as a tool to strike a fair balance between 
public and private interests. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
COMPENSABLE REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER DOMESTIC LAWS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CASE STUDIES FROM THAILAND AND 
MEXICO 
 
The protection of property rights against regulatory and administrative interference 
has emerged not only in developed countries, but also in developing countries, where 
there is a growing concern regarding the controls imposed by public bodies. Similar 
to the experience of the United States, elite groups have played a significant 
administrative role in developing countries. As these developing countries evolve, 
the protection of private property rights is becoming increasingly important. A 
corollary of the growing dominance of property right protections is the need for 
government intervention, in order to regulate private property in a manner that 
ensures the fair protection of public interests. Due to the intensive regulatory 
intervention of governments within developing countries, property owners together 
with diverse interest groups advocate for the stronger protection of property rights. 
The inevitable consequence of these movements is a growing tension between 
competing public and private interests. Domestic courts, in both developed and 
developing countries, have attempted to overcome the conflict between public and 
private interests by articulating legal principles that can determine the extent to 
which interference is permissible, without incurring liability.  
Indirect expropriation jurisprudence in developing countries is very limited.
1
 
Domestic courts in developing countries, such as Thailand, have little experience in 
dealing with the loss arising from lawful regulatory interference, or other similar 
incidences not based on wrongful acts.
2
 Since courts in developing countries are still 
in the early stages of development, the legal outcome of regulatory taking claims - 
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and in particular, the key factors that courts should consider and apply within these 
cases - is unpredictable. Due to this limitation, some state authorities in those 




This Chapter will examine the legal principles pertaining to compensable regulatory 
takings developed by domestic courts within the selected jurisdictions of Thailand 
and Mexico. In addition to outlining relevant historical events, this Chapter will 
highlight the legal mechanisms that are used to resolve regulatory takings disputes in 
these two countries. It then studies the basic takings clauses contained in the 
respective constitutional and administrative laws of Thailand and Mexico. Armed 
with this knowledge, the Chapter will then move to an examination of the takings 
jurisprudence developed by domestic courts in both countries. This examination 
covers a wide range of issues, such as the notions of protected property rights, 
doctrinal concepts of regulatory takings and the standards of compensation. Finally, 
it will evaluate the potential efficacy of the legal principles on regulatory takings, 
which have emerged from the domestic courts in each country.  
Notwithstanding their different historical backgrounds, and the limited nature of 
their regulatory takings jurisprudence, this chapter argues that both Thailand and 
Mexico have actively developed principles of constitutional and administrative law 
to resolve this kind of dispute. It also argues that despite the early development of 
jurisprudence, the courts in both countries show a certain degree of legal 
convergence of regulatory takings principles. 
 
A. Evolution of State Rights to Regulate and the Emergence of Property 
Rights Protection: Thailand and Mexico 
Both Thailand and Mexico have encountered similar pressures, in relation to 
economic and social struggles, within internal political institutions. Although both 
countries have enacted constitutions to safeguard individual rights, they similarly 
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reserve the state power to regulate private property, subject to certain conditions. The 
following section will examine the evolution of state regulatory power and its 
interaction with property rights protection in Thailand and Mexico. 
1. Thailand 
In Thailand, property rights were originally conceptualized as ‘usufruct rights’, 
which refers to the right of an individual to use or enjoy property belonging to 
others.
4
 Before the revolution in 1932, the King held supreme royal power to rule the 
country; including absolute power to control his own people and to grant individuals 
and groups of elites the right to cultivate, and enjoy the benefits of, his land.
5
  
A period of modernization occurred during the reign of King Rama V (King 
Chulalongkorn, 1853-1910) and his successor King Rama VI (King Vajiravudh, 
1881-1925). During this time, Thailand went through extensive reforms inspired by 
‘western techniques of science, warfare, positivist law and colonial government’
6
 in 
order to create a more modern and progressive society. In particular, the civil law 
tradition from Continental Europe and a new system of Thai public administration, 




From the late 19
th
 until the early 20
th
 century, a new formal system of land law and 
property registry was introduced.
8
 As part of a new regime, human rights protection 
was also recognized in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (‘Thai 
Constitution’) in 1949,
9
 following the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 
1948.
10
 To protect individuals against abuses of power by the government, the new 
Thai Constitution introduced, for the first time, protection from unfair acquisition of 
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 It was stipulated that the state power to appropriate and confiscate the 
land of an individual must only be exercised for public purposes, and is subject to 




Besides the protection against unlawful acquisition of land, a series of Thai 
constitutions have also included provisions to safeguard individuals’ property rights 
from intrusive state laws and regulations. These guaranteed everyone the right to be 
protected from unjust regulations on property rights. However, the protection of 
property rights as such is also generally subject to the terms and conditions 
determined by laws.
13
 Therefore, the degree of property protection is conditional, not 
absolute.  
The Thai Constitutions B.E. 2540 (1997) and 2550 (2007) precluded the State from 
exercising its power or enacting laws in a manner detrimental to the constitutionally 
protected rights. Both constitutions stated that individual rights and liberties could 
only be restricted to the extent that is necessary and without affecting essential 
elements of such rights.
14
 This concept is also contained in the new Thai 
Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017), which specifically states that ‘…law shall not be 
contrary to the rule of law, shall not unreasonably impose burden on or restrict the 
rights or liberties of a person’.
15
 These fundamental principles found within a series 
of Thai constitutions have a strict, legally binding effect on Thai legislatures and 
state agencies. 
In order to redress harm caused by legislation that conflicts with constitutionally 
protected rights, the 1997 Thai Constitution established the Thai Constitutional 
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 and since then, the Constitutional Court has been granted jurisdiction over 
all constitutional matters.
17
 Historically, prior to the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court in Thailand, the Court of Justice was the only competent court 
with jurisdiction to oversee the constitutional validity of the law.
18
 Despite the 
existence of this institution, constitutional review prior to 1997 was not undertaken 
on a regular basis, through any specialized agent.
19
 After a long political struggle 
regarding the demand for constitutionalism in Thailand, amendments were made to 
the Thai Constitution in 1997 to provide greater support for, and protection of, the 
individual rights of Thai people. For this reason, the 1997 Thai Constitution was 
widely regarded as a landmark in Thailand’s democratic constitutional reform.
20
 
Currently, the Constitutional Court is the only court that is able to review the 
constitutionality of enacted legislation.
21
 When legislation is found to be 
unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court can declare the law void and ineffective.
22
 
The decision of the Constitutional Court is final and binds the National Assembly, 
Council of Ministers, Courts and all State organs.
23
 
Aside from constitutional review, citizens may also challenge executive powers that 
interfere adversely with their private interests through the Administrative Court of 
Thailand. This Court is the main public body with the ability to oversee the legality 
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of the administrative actions of public authorities.
24
 The origin of Administrative 
Law and the Administrative Court, in Thailand, can be traced back to 1874 when 
King Chulalongkorn (King Rama V, 1853-1910) established an advisory organ 
called the ‘Council of State’. The Council of State performed both a consultative and 
an adjudicative function similar to the Conseil d’Etat in France. However, at that 
time, the Council of State had limited adjudicative functions, as separate legislation 
was required for it to judge administrative cases.
25
 Consequently, the Petition Act 
was promulgated in 1949
26
 and established the ‘Petition Commission’ to examine 




In 1979, the Council of State Act, B.E. 2522 (1979) was introduced to empower the 
Council of State to operate as both a ‘legal councilor’ for statutory drafters, and a 
‘petition councilor’ with specialist knowledge of the unique characteristics of 
administrative cases.
28
 This Act permitted the Council of State to perform both 
functions, and operate in a manner similar to most Councils of State within Europe.
29
 
Interestingly, the term ‘Administrative Court’ was not used at this point in time as 
the existing judges had strongly opposed the formation of a new court with a new 
jurisdiction.
30
 This situation changed in 1997, however, when a new constitution was 
adopted. The 1997 Thai Constitution laid the foundation for stable government by 
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implementing various ‘watchdog’ organizations to tackle corruption, and including 
provisions designed to protect basic human rights from the abusive use of power by 
government.
31
 As a consequence, the Administrative Court was set up pursuant to 
the new Constitution, as well as the Act on the Establishment of Administrative 
Courts and Administrative Court Procedures B.E 2542 (1999) (the ‘Administrative 
Act’). In 2001, the Administrative Courts began operating and replaced the Petition 
Council of the Council of State.
32
  
The jurisdiction of Administrative Courts is wide. Fundamentally, under Article 9 of 
the Administrative Act, the courts have jurisdiction in relation to public bodies that: 
act beyond their scope of power; behave in a manner inconsistent with law; 
improperly exercise discretionary power; or engage in other wrongful acts.
33
 In 
addition to a wide range of unjust actions, Administrative Courts of Thailand are 
also exclusively vested with judicial power under to adjudicate disputes concerning 
‘other liability’ arising from legitimate administrative acts or orders. Under Article 
9(3), the Administrative Courts is empowered to consider:   
[a] case involving a wrongful act or other liability arising from the exercising 
of administrative act under the law or a by-law, administrative order or other 
order, or from the neglect of official duties required by law to be performed or 
the performance of such duties with unreasonable delay. (emphasis added)  
The drafters incorporated this provision in order to prevent injury resulting from 
‘lawful administrative acts’ that harm property rights in a manner equivalent to 
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 The right to sue state authorities through the Administrative 
Courts, under Article 9(3), is acknowledged by the Thai Constitution.
35
 To redress 
injury caused by an administrative act, Administrative Courts can nullify or revoke 
public administrative orders, or award compensation to aggrieved petitioners who 
suffer from the administrative actions.
36
 
The scope of ‘other liability’ under Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act is 
nevertheless uncertain, as Thai courts most regularly impose remedial actions to 
redress loss based on fault, or the wrongful acts of state agencies or public officers.
37
 
This is different from France, which has long recognized that state liability is not 
limited to a finding of fault alone, but also extends to forms of harm caused by the 
otherwise lawful actions of a state agency in its pursuit of desired social goals.
38
 
Although the Thai Administrative Courts have heard a number of cases concerning 
‘other liability’, Thailand, nevertheless, has less experience in the development of 





The Mexican property rights regime was similar to Thailand. Land and natural 
resources were originally owned by a few favored groups of individuals. Mexico was 
a colony of Spain for nearly three hundred years. During the colonial period, Spain 
brought many changes to the country. Besides new technologies, Spanish conquerors 
also introduced Christianity to the newfound lands. However, conquering Spaniards 
also took so many natural resources (e.g. valuable silver mines) from Mexico and 
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other colonies in Latin America. Spanish conquerors thus played a great role in 
ruling and administrating Mexico in the colonial time.
40
  
After the declaration of independence in 1810, Mexico was born as a Republic and 
moved to a monarchy system in the 1820s. Despite being independent, the country 
faced many internal problems, including the wars between the conservative and the 
liberal groups, the role of Catholic Church, foreign influence over domestic affairs, 
the status of poor and indigenous people,
41
 and the problem of unequal distribution 
of land ownership in which vast amount of properties owned by a few companies 
and wealthy individuals.
42
 From the study by Signet, in the 19
th
 century, one-fifths of 
the natural resources in the country were apparently owned by a minority group of 
people and by 1910, 90 percent of rural land was owned by only 800 owners.
43
  
Responding to the problems incurred, President Benito Juarez started the process of 
expropriation in 1850s and redistributed the properties of the Catholic Church to 
weaken its power and to force these properties to be traded by people in general.
44
 A 
strong socialist movement in the country after the 1910 Revolution then led to the 
promulgation of the Constitution in 1917 so as to enhance a fairer system of resource 
distributions within the country.
45
  
As a result, Article 27 of the Constitution of the United Mexican States 1917 
(‘Mexican Constitution’),
46
 which is considered to be a ‘post-revolutionary model’,
47
 
was enacted and entitled the State to ownership of all natural resources in its 
territory.
48
 In addition, it vests the State with the right to impose limitations on 
                                                 
40
 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Mexico (2017) <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mexico/Expansion-
of-Spanish-rule>. 
41
 Susan Provost Beller, The Aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (Twenty-First Century Books, 
2009) 8. 
42
 J. P. Chamberlain, 'Property Rights Under the New Mexican Constitution' (1917) 32(3) Political 
Science Quarterly 369, 369. 
43
 William D  Signet, Introduction to the Mexican Real Estate System (Carolina Academic Press, 
2010) 25. 
44
 Álvaro Ramírez  Martínez, 'The Mexican Constitution and Its Safeguards against Foreign 
Investments' (Paper presented at the Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student 
Conference Papers, 2009) 8. 
45
 Ibid 9. 
46
 The Constitution of Mexico of 1917. 
47
 Antonio Azuela, 'Property in the Post-Post-Revolution: Notes on the Crisis of the Constitutional 
Idea of Property in Contemporary Mexico ' (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 1915, 1917. 
48
 Mexican Constitution 1917 art 27(1). 
254 
private property for public purposes,
49
 and prohibits foreign nationals from acquiring 
ownership of land, water or concessions for exploitative ends.
50
 As a consequence, 
the Mexican government acquired a great deal of real property and distributed land 
to poor farmers for agricultural purposes.
51
 As Azuela notes, these provisions were 
the ‘foundation program of the Revolution’; granting the State ample power to 
acquire land and to direct economic activity within the country.
52
  
Notwithstanding its extensive power to regulate, the government is still required to 
respect individual property rights. As seen in Article 27, private property can be 
expropriated; however, this power can only be exercised for the benefit of the public 
and is subject to the payment of indemnity.
53
 This provision aims to prevent the 
implementation of confiscatory legislation that breaches individual property rights. 
In addition, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 imposes a limitation on executive 
power in order to prevent abusive interference with private property.
54
 Although the 
government has broad authority to regulate private property rights, a property owner 
can challenge the constitutionality of both legislation and administrative acts, 
through the Court of Justice, by means of ‘amparo’ lawsuits. An amparo (meaning 
to ‘shelter’ or ‘protect’), aims at safeguarding an individual from an arbitrary use of 
power by the government, which is contrary to constitutionally protected rights.
55
 If 
successfully challenged, the law in question can no longer be applied to the 
petitioners, but is still enforceable and applicable to the public in general.
56
 Although 
a successful amparo claim does not grant the petitioner any right to compensation,
57
 
the Supreme Court may declare the legislation or administrative acts null and 
ineffective. 
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B. Jurisprudence on Regulatory Takings 
This Section will focus on the development of related-regulatory takings principles 
under Thai and Mexican law. The study encompasses three key areas: the scope of 
protected property rights; the concepts of regulatory takings developed by domestic 
courts and the standards of compensation. 
1. Protected Property Rights in Public Law 
(a) Thailand 
The Thai Constitution and the Administrative Act do not contain a specific definition 
of the protected property rights. However, a survey of jurisprudence shows that both 
Constitutional and Administrative Courts of Thailand tend to grant injured property 
owners legal redress for harm to either movable or immovable property. 
The Constitution Court has long affirmed that State laws, which unreasonably 
violate property rights, are unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court has invalidated 
those laws that diminish the benefits enjoyed by property owners in relation to either 
tangible or intangible properties. In Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2556 
(2013),
58
 for example, which concerned the constitutionality of Article 30 of the 
Provisional Waterworks Act of B.E. 2522,
59
 the Court held that although the State 
did not acquire private land and the disputed pipeline was laid on the site to serve 
public interests, the provision was unconstitutional because it did not fulfill the duty 
to compensate. The Court held that a statutory provision which vests the State 
Authority with a power to intrude into, and limit the use of, land, is 
unconstitutionally unreasonable, and requires the provision of compensation.
60
  
Likewise, the Court has also heard a claim concerning a challenge over the 
constitutionality of Articles 74-82 of the Emergency Decree on the Establishment of 
Thai Asset Management Corporation, B.E. 2544 (2011), which governs the 
establishment and administration of the Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC). 
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The TAMC was set up with broad powers to resolve the debt restructuring problems 
that occurred during the economic crisis in 1997. The TAMC was required to 
manage assets owned by debtors, sell their purchased properties at the negotiated 
value, and repay the proceeds to the creditors. The Constitutional Court held that the 
powers of the TAMC, as stipulated under Article 74-82, were compliant with the 
Thai Constitution and did not impinge upon the essence of property ownership, and 
all the rights attached to the same.
61
 Although no violation of constitutional rights 
was ultimately found, this case demonstrates that the Constitutional Court cannot 
refuse a case in which there is an alleged violation of property rights, which may 
encompass both tangible and intangible assets. 
Decisions by Administrative Courts also reveal a broad range of properties and 
interests that may be affected by administrative conduct and subject to protection 
under the Administrative Act. For example, in the judgment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court No. 37/2545,
62
 the landowner alleged that the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) had paid unfair compensation for its 
installation of electric power lines on his land. Under the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand Act B.E. 2511 (‘EGAT Act’), EGAT does not need to seek the 
permission of landowners before it installs electrical lines or power generators on 
their private land. Although EGAT does not acquire the land, its installation of poles 
and electrical lines inhibits the use of property by the property owner. The 
landowner, thus, successfully made a claim for compensation. Following this, the 
Administrative Courts have heard a number of cases with respect to disputed 
regulatory takings of immovable property. Some of these cases include the 
installation of electrical lines on private property,
63
 and the construction of a truck-
weight checkpoint, which blocked access to private land.
64
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In addition to claims involving tangible property, Administrative Courts have also 
adjudicated disputes arising from administrative actions violating intangible property 
rights, such as contractual rights and legitimate expectations. The Supreme 
Administrative Court Judgment No. 215/2552,
65
 for example, concerned unfair 
compensation arising from harm caused by the installation of an electricity power 
line that passed across the privately owned land of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff 
demanded higher compensation, since the electrical line caused devaluation of the 
land price and directly affected the Plaintiff’s plan to build a factory.
66
 The 
Defendant insisted that the compensation was adequate and was made in accordance 
with the law governing acts by EGAT. In addition, the Defendant also argued that 
the Plaintiff lacked evidence to support its alleged factory investment plan in that 
area.
67
 The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Plaintiff’s land was located 
in an industrial real estate park and that the Plaintiff was the owner of a number of 
chemical factories. Based on the potential growth of the business in the future, the 
Court held that it was reasonable to believe that the installation of the electrical line 
across the Plaintiff’s property could substantially affect the business investment 
plans of the Plaintiff.
68
 The Court upheld the decision by the Court of First Instance, 




In a subsequent case, the Supreme Administrative Court Judgment No. 180/2554,
70
 
the State’s refusal to grant a permit for the renewal of plantation forestry was 
challenged on the basis that it prevented the Plaintiff from accessing and harvesting 
the plantation forest. The Court held that the State’s conduct substantially impacted 
the Plaintiff, as it amounted to a revocation of license, and removed a future stream 
of benefits reasonably expected by the Plaintiff.
71
 The State action in question, 
therefore, affected contractual rights reasonably expected by the Plaintiff. 
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Under Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, the State is vested with an 
authority to regulate private property. However, a claimant may challenge the 
constitutionality of the government measure through an amparo proceeding. The 
Federal Supreme Court of Mexico has asserted that intangible property falls within 
the scope of the general constitutional protection from unlawful public action. In the 
context of conducting review within an amparo suit, the Supreme Court of Mexico 
considered claims raised by the Mexican Petroleum Company of California against 
acts of the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor and its agents for the 
violation of among other things Article 27 of the Federal Constitution.
72
 In this case, 
the Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor revoked the operating permit of the 
Mexican Petroleum Company on the ground that it had failed to comply with the 
new Petroleum Law, by not applying for a confirmatory concession within one year 
after the date of the promulgation of the Law.
73
 Through amparo lawsuit 
proceedings, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the Plaintiff, holding that the 
discontinuation of the permit was contrary to the constitutional guaranties. In its 
decision, the Supreme Court simply found that the revocation was contrary to the 
pre-existing rights that the Plaintiff had been guaranteed by the old Petroleum Law, 
which covered a concession period of up to fifty years.
74
 In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that intangible property rights are regarded as part of generally protected 
constitutional rights. Based on the Court’s decision, the ‘right of exploration’ was 
regarded as a protected individual interest under the Constitution. Therefore, 
constitutional protection encompasses intangible property and claimant’s legitimate 
expectations to operate an oil drilling business, arising from a permit previously 
granted by the State.
75
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2. Developing a Legal Framework for Regulatory Takings 
(a) Thailand 
(i) Before the Thai Constitution B.E. 2540 (1997) 
Prior to the implementation of the 1997 Thai Constitution, the Court of Justice was 
the sole judicial organ with the power to consider cases concerning the 
constitutionality of legislation and administrative actions. From 1932-1996, the 
Court of Justice heard a significant number of cases that involved the acquisition of 
private property by public authorities.
76
 In addition, the Court of Justice also 
considered government actions that amounted to expropriation contrary to 
constitutional rights.
77
 For example, in Supreme Court Judgment No. 2383/2526 
(1983), the Plaintiff claimed that his application for business registration was 
wrongfully rejected by government officers and this decision violated, among other 
things, Article 33 of the Thai Constitution B.E. 2521 (1978).
78
 The officers argued 
that since the Plaintiff’s business involved trading of commodities for future 
contracts, the business was risky and could produce unexpected harmful effects to 
the economy. The Business Registrar Office deferred approval, causing a lengthy 
delay for business operations. The officials argued that, to be eligible for a business 
registration, the Plaintiff had to first obtain an approval from the Commerce 
Minister, as the business was new and there was no specific law governing this type 
of business. The Supreme Court held that a deferral of business approval was lawful 
only if decided in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the law. Since the 
business was not contrary to public order and security, public officers could not defer 
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the application once it had been made.
79
 In this case, the Supreme Court found that 
the deferral was unlawful and contrary to the rights protected by the constitution. 
Whilst the Court held that a public authority’s inaction could give rise to liability, it 
failed to articulate any legal threshold, or criteria, with which to determine when 
such inaction could amount to an unconstitutional taking. 
(ii) After the Establishment of the Constitutional Court and the Administrative 
Courts in 1999 
Under the existing regime of property rights protection, created by the Thai 
Constitution of 1997, negative impacts on property owners resulting from lawful 
legislation and administrative actions are likely to be remediable. As previously 
discussed, both types of courts have different jurisdictional power. However, both 
have to adhere to fundamental Constitutional principles, which require any 
interference with individual property rights and liberties to be made in accordance 
with the law,
80
 and to not destroy the essential elements of property.
81
 
The following sections investigate the jurisprudence on regulatory takings developed 
by both the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts, pursuant to Thai 
Constitution B.E. 2540 (1997) and Thai Constitution B.E. 2550 (2007).
82
 Despite the 
growing attention that has been devoted to this issue, legal reasoning and theories 
developed by Thai domestic courts are often brief, vague and, in comparison to the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the ECtHR, devoid of rigor. 
Nevertheless, the Thai domestic courts tend to systematically apply the 
‘proportionality test’, in order to assess the overall balance of the measure in 
question.  
The Constitutional Court of Thailand 
The Thai Constitutional Court heard a number of cases during the period of 1999-
2016, concerning the constitutional validity of legislation that impacted upon the 
protection of property rights under Article 48 of the 1997 Thai Constitution, Article 
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41 of the 2007 Thai Constitution, and the general rights and freedoms of Thai 
people, under Article 29.
83
  
Initially, the Constitutional Court of Thailand did not develop a sophisticated legal 
doctrine to identify whether legislation is constitutionally valid or subject to 
revocation. For example, in Constitutional Court Ruling No. 26-34/2545 (2002), the 
Court determined a challenge to the constitutionality of the Emergency Decree on 
the Financial Institution for Asset Management. The Decree entitled the State to 
administer the acquiring, purchasing, rehabilitating and reselling of properties that it 
purchased from bankrupt banks and other troubled financial institutions. The 
Plaintiff argued that the Decree was unconstitutional as the forced transfer of assets 
by the Asset Management Company unconstitutionally ‘limited the rights over 
property’ enjoyed by the Plaintiff.
84
 The Constitutional Court held that since the 
Decree was to help troubled financial institutions, and to resolve the economic crisis 
in the country caused by the economic turmoil in 1997,
85
 the Decree was applied to 
all troubled banks and companies equally and non-discriminatorily.
86
 In addition, the 
Decree did not alter any fundamental rights and duties of the parties involved in the 
rehabilitation processes.
87
 Therefore, without engaging in detailed analysis, the 
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Constitutional Court held that the Decree did comply with the requirements of 
Articles 48 and 29 of the 1997 Thai Constitution.
88
 
After nearly a decade, the Constitutional Court of Thailand developed a clearer legal 
doctrine. In the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 4-21/2554 (2011),
89
 the Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of the Emergency Decree on the Financial Institution 
for Asset Management, which governed the forced transfer of troubled businesses 
and the arrangement of the auction of bankrupt financial companies by the Thai 
Asset Management Corporation. The Court expressly applied the ‘proportionality 
test’ in its ruling. Providing a more sophisticated analysis, the Court began by 
assessing the necessity of the Decree. It held that the purpose of the Decree was to 
help troubled financial institutions and to resolve the instability caused by the 
national economic crisis in 1997.
90
 The Court further asserted that the forced transfer 
of private property did not impose an ‘excessive burden’ on property owners and 
‘did not materially affect the substance of the rights and liberties warranted by the 
Constitution’.
91
 Thus, the Court took into consideration both the Parliament’s margin 
of appreciation and the burden it imposed on individual property owners.
92
 
The Court adopted a similar doctrine in the Constitutional Court Ruling No.13/2556 
(2013).
93
 This case concerned the constitutionality of Article 30 of the Provincial 
Waterworks Authority Act B.E. 2522,
94
 which allows the State to lay down water 
pipelines on private property in the absence of any obligation to pay compensation. 
The Court held that the laying of water pipes served public interests,
95
 as this 
provision aimed to facilitate the construction of a public water network to promote 
the wellbeing of citizens.
96
 Such an intrusion, however, deprives the landowner of 
the right to beneficial enjoyment of the property.
97
 As no compensation was required 
under Article 30, the Court found that the Act breached private property rights, 
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protected under the Constitution,
98
 and imposed ‘an excessive and disproportionate 
burden and severely impaired the essence of property rights’ since, for example, the 
owner of property could no longer build a house or plant trees on the land.
99
 
Ultimately, the Court held that this provision breached Article 29 of the Constitution, 
and was void and unenforceable.
100
 
The selected case studies demonstrate that the Constitutional Court tends to apply 
the ‘proportionality test’ when declaring a law unconstitutional. Although the Thai 
Constitution fundamentally accepts the State’s right to interfere with private property 
for the benefit of public interests, the Court has also attempted to counterbalance 
state sovereignty with individual rights. The Court examines whether the law in 
question properly protects property rights or whether it materially affects the essence 
of those rights. To ensure that the legislation strikes an appropriate balance and does 
not impose an excessive burden on an individual who suffers from loss due to the 
regulatory interference, the Court has established that the enacted legislation must 
satisfy a necessity test, and that the means used is proportional to the goals being 
pursued. Whilst these case studies have illustrated that the Court adopts a balancing 
test in its analysis, this test is arguably still in its early stage of doctrinal 
development to be refined.   
The Administrative Courts 
Thai Administrative Courts have long held that administrative actions interfering 
with property rights, pursuant to state regulations or by-laws, can trigger legal 
liability, even if the government does not actually acquire title or possession of 
property. To ascertain whether a regulatory interference amounts to a regulatory 
taking, the Administrative Courts have adopted Article 9 (3) of the Administrative 
Act to review disputes in relation to any ‘other liability’ in association with the 
administration or public official acts.
101
  
The Administrative Act does not contain a provision defining the nature or scope of 
the term, ‘other liability’. However, the Administrative Courts have been inspired by 








 Leyland, above n 28, 241. 
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the legal principle enshrined in French administrative law, asserting that an act of an 
administrative officer can trigger liability when it places too heavy a burden on the 
property owner and is not equally distributed among citizens.
102
 Since 1999, 
Administrative Courts have heard a number of disputes, and developed doctrinal 
principles, regarding regulatory takings under Article 9(3). These disputes can be 
classified into two main areas: (i) a government’s failure to pay compensation as 
determined by the law, and (ii) liability not based on fault, as developed by the 
Administrative Courts. 
In relation to the first category, Administrative Courts have long held that the 
government is liable for an injury caused by legitimate public works under the law, 
and that the failure to pay compensation is unconstitutional.
103
 For example, in the 
Supreme Administrative Court Judgment No. 37/2545 (2002),
104
 which concerned a 
request for fair compensation for harm resulting from the installation of electrical 
lines over the land of the Plaintiff, the Court held that EGAT has an obligation to pay 
compensation, as required by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand Act, 
B.E. 2511 (1968) (EGAT Act), despite the fact that the landowner still retains 
ownership over the land.
105
 This case demonstrates that, even if the government does 
not actually acquire title or possession over property, the property owner has the 
right to receive compensation, as prescribed by the law in question, for limitations on 
property benefits imposed by the State.
106
  
Alternatively, when there is no written law that explicitly imposes an obligation to 
pay compensation, government agencies could be subject to a duty to pay 
compensation based on the no-fault liability doctrine. This is a legal principle 
adopted from French administrative law,
107
 which holds that the right to 
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compensation can be triggered when an administrative action deprives a property 
owner of the right to use property, and the regulatory interference results in an 
excessive burden. The government has a duty to pay compensation and this liability 
is borne by public.
108
  
This principle has become more frequently applied by Thai Administrative Courts in 
recent years. To establish whether the administrative action creates an excessive 
burden, the Administrative Courts normally focus upon whether the action is 
reasonably practicable in the circumstances, and has a proper relationship with the 
expected outcome. In addition, the Court looks at whether the interference is grossly 
disproportionate to the objective sought. For example, in Supreme Administrative 
Court Judgment No. 525/2547 (2004),
109
 the Plaintiff claimed compensation for 
harm caused by the State’s encroachment onto his private property for the purpose of 
road widening. The Court dismissed the case as the Plaintiff failed to pursue the 
matter before the expiry of the relevant limitation period, which required the claim 
be filed within one year after the time the dispute was known, or ought to have been 
known, to the Plaintiff.
110
 However, the Court admitted at the outset that, despite an 
absence of a duty to compensate, legitimate regulatory action, which causes 
deprivation of the right to use property, triggers the category of ‘other liability’ 
associated with the administrative actions. Thus, the interference was subject to 
Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act, which obligates the State agency to provide 
compensation in circumstances where a regulatory encroachment causes an 
excessive burden to the landowner.
111
  
The Supreme Administrative Court has used a similar approach in subsequent cases. 
In Supreme Administrative Court Judgement No. 180/2554 (2011),
112
 it concerned a 
denial of the renewal of a permit for forest plantation. The Plaintiff was granted a 
permit to plant and harvest timber on State forest land, subject to the condition that 
the Plaintiff had to plant and rehabilitate forest in State Forest Land in Nakorn Sri 
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Thammarat Province. When the planted trees reached harvestable age, the Plaintiff 
was entitled to the harvesting rights associated with these trees; however, a 
Ministerial Resolution was subsequently released declaring that no plantation 
licenses will be issued to anyone and that, in order to prevent undesirable logging of 
forest resources, access to the plantation forest areas will be strictly prohibited.
113
 
Following this Ministerial Resolution, the Royal Forest Department refused to renew 
a license for the Plaintiff and it did not pay compensation for the loss and damage the 
Plaintiff had suffered from the announced Ministerial Resolution. The Defendant 
asserted that the non-renewal of a license was justified on the ground that such an 
action was taken in compliance with the Ministerial Resolution, which was issued in 
the public interests, and that it had no duty to pay compensation. According to 
Article 20 of the National Reserved Forest Act, B.E. 2515, compensation is paid 
only on the grounds of suspension or revocation of licenses. In this case, however, 
the State simply did not renew the license.  
Based on the evidence, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the Ministerial 
Resolution was justifiable and lawful for the purpose of environmental protection.
114
 
However, the Court held that despite an absence of license suspension or revocation, 
the non-renewal of the permit, following the Ministerial Resolution, caused 
substantial loss to the future economic benefits that could be reasonably expected by 
the property owner, and this resulted in an ‘excessive burden’ borne by the 
Plaintiff.
115
 To redress the loss, the Court held that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
compensation under Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act.
116
  
More recently, in the Supreme Administrative Court Judgment No. 29/2557 
(2014),
117
 the Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand developed a more 
sophisticated way of analyzing the object of Article 9(3). Rather than just focusing 
on the effect of the measure, the Court also explicitly took into account the ‘principle 
of proportionality’ and the ‘balance of burden’ borne by the affected individual.  In 
this case, the Plaintiff claimed that state construction of a truck-weighing station in 
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front of their land restricted access, which abruptly diminished the price of the land 
as well as its’ future business opportunities.
118
 In addition to seeking an injunction to 
prevent the construction of the truck-weighing station, the Plaintiff also claimed 
compensation for loss of land value.
119
  
The Supreme Administrative Court held that the truck checkpoint was constructed in 
accordance with acceptable standards,
120
 and that the State did not acquire any part 
of the land nor did it take possession of any part of land ownership.
121
 Applying the 
‘proportionality test’, the Court held that the benefits of the planned construction 
outweighed the impacts caused by its construction, since the new weigh station was 
necessary to control the overloading of vehicles that may cause damage to the 
roads.
122
 However, the Court asserted that by not paying compensation to the 
landowner, who suffered from the construction, the State imposed an ‘excessive 
burden’ on the Plaintiff, and therefore could not avoid the duty to compensate.
123
  
The above case analysis demonstrates that Thai Administrative Courts do not only 
focus on the impact of administrative measures on the property rights in question, 
but also factors such as the ‘principle of proportionality’ and the ‘balance of burden’. 
Although the Administrative Courts accept the State’s margin of appreciation to 
regulate private property for public interests, the State has a duty to compensate 
those who suffer from the loss caused by a special sacrifice for the reason of public 
policy. Compensation is paid on the ground that the responsibility should be fairly 
shared among beneficiaries in society so that the victims who suffer from the 
regulatory interference are not the only persons who bear the excessive burden 
resulting from state measures.
124
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(b) Developing Legal Framework for Regulatory Takings in Mexico 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution serves as the ‘foundation for the 
government’s authority to regulate property’.
125
 It states that:  
…Private property shall be not be expropriated except for reasons of public use and 
subject to payment of indemnity.  
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such 
limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the 
utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to 
conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth. With this 
end in view, necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large landed estates; to 
develop small landed holdings in operation; to create new agricultural centers, with 
necessary lands and waters; to encourage agriculture in general and to prevent the 




According to this provision, the Mexican Government is entitled to ‘expropriate’ and 
‘regulate’ private property for pursuing public interests.
127
 The Mexican Constitution 
grants a broad power to the congress and the Government to regulate private 
property rights for public purposes.
128
  The Supreme Court of Mexico has long 
established that the State is to pay an indemnity only when the property is 
expropriated by a formal legal order for public purposes.
129
  
However, in the event of an injury caused by a general public policy that does not 
transfer complete property ownership to the State, Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution does not require the State to pay compensation.
130
 The interpretation of 
this provision, by the Supreme Court of Mexico, maintains that indemnification is 
not warranted if a regulation is generally applicable and removes only a portion of 
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the owner’s right to the property.
131
 The Court has upheld this legal principle when 
deciding disputes arising from a wide range of government policies, such as 
regulations to prohibit the construction of chimneys, or other potentially hazardous 
structures, that breach town-planning requirements.
132
  
In addition, the Mexican Supreme Court has found that the State transformation of 
tangible private properties into national properties that stimulate a sense of national 
pride does not trigger the constitutional duty to compensate.
133
 During the 1930s, the 
federal government exercised ‘de facto control’ in declaring many land plots as 
archeological sites,
134
 and thereby forced the owners of those private properties to 
allow free public access.
135
 The strong sense of patriotism in Mexico played a 
fundamental part in the State’s justification for imposing these restrictions on private 
property without incurring any duty to compensate. Thus, if the Mexican 
Government can show that regulatory interference is for public interests, and does 
not fully deprive the property rights or economic use, then the state action is unlikely 
to constitute a compensable expropriation.
136
  
3. Compensation Obligations In Relation to Regulatory Takings  
(a) Thailand 
The jurisdiction of the Thai Constitutional Court is limited to reviewing the 
constitutionality of state laws; that is, it can only declare state laws invalid if they are 
found unconstitutional. This is different to the jurisdiction of the Thai Administrative 
Courts, which possess the judicial authority to review the lawfulness and 
reasonableness of decisions or acts of public officials. When a Thai Administrative 
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Court revokes an administrative order, the subject of such an administrative order is 
entitled to claim for compensation for bona fide reliance on the order.
137
  
Besides unlawful acts, a natural legal and juristic person may claim compensation 
for loss arising from the State’s exercise of legitimate public power, by virtue of the 
‘other liability’ clause in Article 9 (3) of the Administrative Act. In such a case, the 
compensation rendered by the Administrative Court can be characterized as falling 
into two main categories. These are: the enforcement of compensation as stipulated 
by the written law,
138




(i) Enforcement of Compensation as Stipulated by the Law  
Within this category, an injured individual is entitled to make a compensation claim 
against a public authority, regarding injury arising from public works. One of the 
most contentious issues facing the Administrative Courts is the magnitude of fair 
compensation that the State needs to pay to a party who has been injured by an 
administrative action. Most legislation does not explicitly define the standard of ‘fair 
compensation’.
140
 Generally, the Administrative Courts grant state authorities the 
power to determine the amount of fair compensation by the government agency. 
However, when the amount of compensation determined appears to be manifestly 
unreasonable, the Administrative Courts may review its appropriateness and 
ascertain an alternative amount.   
In accordance with ordinary judicial norms, the Administrative Courts award fair 
compensation by assessing various relevant factors, beyond calculating the simple 
market value of property, including: the nature and type of property, the location of 
property, and the intent behind the state interference. For example, based on the 
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guideline in the EGAT case, the determination of compensation to redress loss 
arising from the installation of electrical lines needs to take into account relevant 
factors, such as the land price assessed for tax purposes (rather than the prevailing 
market price), the location of the land, the value of plants upon the land, and the 
construction and removal costs.
141
 This method helps to ensure that state authorities 
can continue to deliver public services, in the best interests of society, without 
bearing the burden of unreasonably high compensation. 
(ii) Compensation based on the Judgment of the Courts 
When there is no specific legal provision, which explicitly imposes liability upon the 
government for damage caused by an administrative action, the Administrative Court 
is vested with discretionary power to determine whether the challenged 
administrative action is subject to a finding of ‘other liability’ under Article 9 (3) of 
the Administrative Act. In such a case, the Administrative Courts possess the 
discretion to determine the appropriate amount of compensation to be paid to the 
person affected by the act of a public authority.
142
 Due to an absence of specific law, 
within this category of disputes, Administrative Courts may apply the principle of 
mutatis mutandis, under Article 438 of the Civil and Commercial Code on Tort 
Law.
143
 This principle requires the Court to take into account the ‘situation and the 
gravity of the act’. Since there is no clear guidance on the meaning of ‘situation and 
the gravity of the act’, the Court has wide discretion to determine the quantum of 
compensation. Often, the Administrative Court calculates compensation after a 
consideration of all pertinent factors, so as to ensure that the compensation awarded 
is sufficient to redress the loss of the victim, without imposing a disproportionate 
burden on the state authority carrying out public works.
144
 For example, in a ruling 
by the Central Administrative Court of Thailand in Judgement No. 1631/2553 
(2010),
145
 a case that concerned the government’s flood management response to the 
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2003 monsoon - the Applicant, an owner of rice mills, claimed that the government’s 
poor management of water resulted in flood damage to farms and factories in the 
adjacent provinces. The Central Administrative Court held that due to the heavy 
monsoon, it was impossible to keep all land dry or safe from floods. Moreover, since 
the government had warned the residents about the approaching monsoon, it was the 
responsibility of the people living in risk areas to stay alert and get prepared. Whilst 
the government did its best to accommodate the floods, the Court held that the State 
still had a duty to compensate those who suffered property damage, in order to 
redress injuries pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act. Since there was no 
express rule governing compensation in this situation, the Court applied Article 438 
(1) of the Civil and Commercial Code of Tort Law to determine the amount of 
compensation. Ultimately, the Court awarded Baht 929,241.50 as compensation, 
plus the interest that had accrued from the date the damage first occurred. Seeing as 
the Court found that the government was not at fault, it exercised its discretion to 
award compensation, by including only the cost of damaged rice mills as well the 
cost to repair damaged equipment.
146
 This case illustrates that Thai Administrative 
Courts are granted wide discretion in balancing opposing interests through the 
assessment of compensation. The Administrative Courts, therefore, are not obligated 
to order the agency to pay full compensation for damages incurred. 
In sum, within the Thai public law system, the Constitutional Court and the 
Administrative Courts tend to balance the conflicting interests between private 
individuals on the one hand, and public entities, on the other. While the Courts have 
long accepted the supremacy of individual rights, they are sensitive to state 
sovereign-rights to regulate for the purposes of public welfare. To maintain a balance 
between opposing interests, the rate of compensation is dependent upon a 
consideration of relevant factors, such as situation and gravity, the nature, type and 
location of the property, the purpose of state interference and the public interests in 
question. 
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(b) Mexico 
In Mexico, the owner of expropriated property is entitled to compensation as 
determined by Article 27 of 1917 Constitution. According to the Constitution, which 
contains a vague compensation standard for expropriated property, the amount of 
payment is generally not based on the fair market value price determined by 
consumers, but rather the appraised value for tax purposes determined by state 
agencies.
147
 Therefore, the appraised value might not equal to the property’s market 
value, and represent only a fraction of real property value.
148
 However, when a 
regulatory interference merely limits the scope of property rights, the owner of 
property is not entitled to obtain compensation.
149
 Nevertheless, a property owner 
suffering from regulatory interference can challenge the constitutionality of the 
legislation or administrative act through an amparo lawsuit. While a successful 
amparo claim does not grant the right to compensation, it can require the courts to 




C. Analysis of the Trends of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence:  
Thailand and Mexico 
1. Thailand 
Only a small number of cases in relation to regulatory takings have been heard and 
adjudicated by Thai courts. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court and the 
Administrative Courts have developed jurisprudence to evaluate the relationship 
between public and private interests, when determining whether a regulatory taking 
is compensable. The persuasive use of the ‘proportionality test’ is supported by 
recent changes within the legal landscape.  
Firstly, due to rapid changes in the social, political and economic development of 
Thailand, a wide range of laws and regulations have recently been enacted to 
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promote public interests, civil liberties and private property rights.  For example, the 
Fuel Control Act, B.E. 2542 (1999) was promulgated to regulate fuel oil businesses 
in Thailand. It determines the criteria, procedure and conditions for the operation of 
fuel oil businesses. According to this legislation, the State can control and regulate 
entry into business, and can use or possess immovable property, so as to prevent 
hazards arising from oil depots or oil pipeline transportation systems. However, 
when State actions harm private property, the property owner can request 
compensation.
151
 Likewise, to regulate the production, conservation, purchasing and 
facilitation of the mining industry in Thailand, a mandate has been given to the State 
administration under the Thai Minerals Act, B.E. 2510 (1967).
152
 However, in 
accordance with the new Thai Minerals Act, B.E. 2560 (2017),
153
 the State Authority 
is obligated to pay compensation in relation to amendments or reductions to the 
concession time to extract minerals, and the cancellation of a mining permit granted 
to a right holder for the purposes of national security, public infrastructure or other 
public interests.
154
 Within Thailand’s emerging public law infrastructure, neither a 
private entity nor a public body can claim any superiority of rights over the other.  
Aside from the issue of changing legislation, a paradigm shift has occurred in the 
judicial reasoning of Thai courts in recent years. Instead of placing more weight on 
the practical, regulatory role of the State, jurists are more frequently utilizing 
balancing tests within their analyses, in order to better reconcile conflicting interests 
in society. In Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2556 (2013),
155
 for example, which 
concerned the constitutionality of Article 30 of the Provisional Waterworks Act, B.E. 
2522 (1979),
156
 the Court held that, although the State did not acquire private land, 
and the pipeline was laid in keeping with public interests, the absence of a duty to 
compensate those affected by the public works was unconstitutional as it resulted in 
an excessive burden on the property owner. Thus, a provision which vested the State 
with power to intrude upon, or limit, the private use of land was unconstitutional. In 
this respect, the Court did not use the degree of ‘impact’ as the sole or predominate 
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factor in identifying the existence of regulatory takings, but rather, it evaluated the 
relationship between the means and outcomes of a State measure, when scrutinizing 
the constitutionality of laws and administrative acts. 
The ‘principle of proportionality’ is well accepted in contemporary Thai 
Constitutions. As previously discussed, the hallmark of the proportionality and 
reasonableness tests appears in the Thai Constitution B.E. 2550 (2007) article 29
157
 
and the Thai Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017) article 26.
158
 These legal provisions 
imply that the legislature and state authorities should engage in a weighing and 
balancing of conflicting constitutional values when enacting law, and the State is not 
allowed to intrude upon constitutionally protected rights more than is necessary.
159
 
Since the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the Thai parliament is 
compelled to enact laws that meet the requirements within the Constitution. 
Administrative agencies are similarly required to commit to the standards of 
protection outlined within constitutional provisions, by not imposing a 
disproportionate burden on property owners. 
2. Mexico 
The Supreme Court of Mexico has long held that a regulation that is generally 
applicable and does not entirely deprive a property owner of his or her right to use 
property does not amount to a regulatory taking requiring compensation.
160
 
However, to challenge the constitutionality of legislation or administrative actions, 
an aggrieved party may sue a public authority through an amparo claim, and request 
the federal courts to declare the law in question null and ineffective.  
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Applications for amparo proceedings have come before the Mexican federal courts 
in the context of administrative acts revoking oil-drilling permits. This was first 
raised in 1928, when the Mexican Petroleum Company contested the decision of the 
Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor to not renew a permit for oil drilling. 
The Secretary argued that the revocation was valid and lawful on the ground that the 
Mexican Petroleum Company had failed to comply with the new Petroleum Law, by 
not applying for a confirmatory concession within one year after the date on which 
the Law was promulgated.
161
 The Supreme Court decided in favor of the Plaintiff, 
who argued that the discontinuation of the permit was contrary to the Mexican 
Constitution. It found that the revocation was contrary to the pre-existing rights that 
the Plaintiff had been guaranteed by the old Petroleum Law, which gave the 
concession for a period of up to 50 years.
162
  
Nevertheless, the Court did not set out any general criteria with which to determine 
when a government measure, falling short of the full deprivation of property rights, 
could be regarded as an unconstitutional regulatory interference subject to 
compensation. Mexican courts have never answered this question clearly; instead, 
they have developed an abstract but comprehensive set of reviewing standards with 
which to scrutinize a regulatory interference. In answering whether the government 
can legally apply laws retroactively to the extent that affect the private property 
rights, the Mexican Supreme Court has long held that the Court can apply the law in 
a retroactive manner given that it is the intent of the legislature.
163
 In addition, the 
Court developed a broad principle to affirm state sovereign right to regulate private 
property for public benefits. It stated that:  
When the legislator finds himself faced with simple interests invoked by individuals, 
he may suppress such individual rights and sacrifice them for the benefit of the Public 
Community ... In the sense, we set as a general rule that law controls actions in the 
past when its purpose involves a Public Concern and has before it only private 
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interest….The individuals by the very fact of membership in society should sacrifice 
their private interest in favor of the general welfare.…
164 
According to the underlying concept proposed, the Supreme Court of Mexico 
undoubtedly placed a high priority over public utility that permits the control actions 
by the government. However, to assess whether the contested regulation contravenes 
constitutional requirements, the Mexican Supreme Court has recently adopted the 
‘proportionality test’ to determine the validity of law, in the context of rights to 
equality in 2004.
165
 The Court has also applied the ‘three-tier reasonableness test’ in 
its criminal and tax cases.
166
 Its approach to proportionality traverses three 
subordinate inquiries; i.e. objectivity of the goals pursued, rationality of the measure, 
and the reasonableness of the relationship between the means and the outcomes of 
the measure.
167
 Nevertheless, in addition the proportionality test, the Court has held 
that a statute or government action must also pass a ‘strict scrutiny’ test relating to 
‘suspect classifications’, which are those touching on race, ethnicity, national origin 
and other fundamental rights that strictly cannot be violated.
168
 In contrast, in the 
field of economic law, courts may adopt a ‘weaker scrutiny’ test, which permits the 
decision maker to implement a law or measure that affects personal interests that are 
not regarded as fundamentally essential.
169
 
In a pertinent case, Judicio de Amparo en Revision 1659/2006,
170
 the Supreme Court 
of Mexico deployed the ‘proportionality test’ to resolve a conflict between individual 
and public interests. This case involved a young soldier who was dismissed from the 
military after a diagnosis of HIV. The case was presented to the Supreme Court as a 
constitutional collision between societal interests, represented by the collective 
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capacity of the military forces to carry out their duties, and individual rights based on 
the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination in relation to health.
171
 In February 
2007, the Supreme Court of Mexico used the ‘proportionality test’ to adjudicate the 
case.  It held that the dismissal of the soldier diagnosed as HIV positive imposed an 
onerous burden on him. Despite his diagnosis, the soldier would have been able to 
remain in the military if he was transferred to an administrative position. Although it 
is legitimate for the military to dismiss unhealthy soldiers, so as to maintain the 
efficiency of the Mexican armed forces and the security of the country, the Supreme 
Court held that the military action collided with the individual right to equality and 
non-discrimination.
172
 As a consequence, the Supreme Court invalidated the military 
order, reinstated the soldier to his previous position and granted him all the legal 
benefits he had been denied during the dismissal period. Following an examination 
of this complex case, Martin concluded that there were four steps taken by the 
Supreme Court: (i) an examination of whether the law governing the social security 
system of the Mexican armed forces had a constitutionally legitimate aim in enabling 
the dismissal of the soldier as a consequence of being HIV positive; (ii) an 
examination of whether there was a rational connection between the means and the 
ends of the statute; (iii) an examination of whether the measure employed satisfied a 
‘least drastic means element’; and (iv) an examination of whether the solution was 
proportional to the goal of the statute.
173
 
Although there is no fixed legal formula for the classification of regulatory takings, 
the above Mexican case studies illustrate how the courts permit public organs to 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when adopting regulations that infringe 
private property rights. Nevertheless, public interests pursued by the State may be 
insufficient to justify a non-compensable regulatory interference when they entirely 
deprive the owner of property rights. In such an extreme case, some compensation 
has to be paid in order to attain an appropriate balance between conflicting interests. 
However, in other circumstances, wherein a less-than-full deprivation is found, the 
Mexican courts might apply a lower threshold to determine whether a compromise 
must be awarded to remedy the impact of a regulatory taking. In such a case, the 
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interference might be characterized as a compensable regulatory taking, when it fails 
the ‘proportionality test’ by imposing an excessive burden on the property owner. 
 
D. Conclusions 
The political history of both Thailand and Mexico is characterized by the 
concentration of power in the hands of a few elite groups within each country. These 
influential groups held great social influence and gained control over large amounts 
of property.  Due to the momentum of national revolutions, new constitutions were 
implemented to protect individual rights and freedoms in each country, reflecting the 
growing significance of private property rights. Both Thailand and Mexico have 
since then developed legal mechanisms to ensure that property is fairly distributed 
and safeguarded against arbitrary interference by public bodies. However, due to 
rapid change in the political, economic and social spheres, the need to develop a 
judicial test that allows judges to evaluate the relative importance of multiple 
conflicting factors has become essential. Given that only a limited number of cases 
regarding compensable regulatory interference have been adjudicated, the courts in 
both countries are in the early stages of developing the relevant legal principles. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which both Thai and Mexican courts have addressed the 
issue of regulatory interference illustrates some similar approaches to assessing the 
scope of property protection and balancing conflicting interests. 
In relation to the scope of property protection, this Chapter has found that the courts 
in each country have protected both tangible and intangible property rights. In 
Thailand, the courts tend to provide a strong safeguard against regulatory 
interference by providing property owners with protection against interference by 
public authorities across a broad range of property rights. Thai jurisprudence not 
only acknowledges and protects tangible assets, but also all associated rights 
attached to the property. The Mexican federal courts have similarly interpreted 
constitutional protections of property rights as encompassing a broad range of 
private interests, including legitimate expectations.  
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To identify the occurrence of a regulatory taking that requires legal redress, each 
country has applied a different approach. In Mexico, the courts have set a high 
threshold, which the plaintiff must overcome in order to successfully claim 
compensation. Thus far, compensation has only been warranted when either the 
property’s value or ownership is entirely taken by the State regulatory action and the 
action has been adopted in breach of the constitution. Mexican courts can only 
declare the measure unconstitutional and void through amparo proceedings. Whilst 
jurisprudence regarding the parameters of regulatory takings is limited, the federal 
courts in Mexico have adopted a sophisticated ‘proportionality test’ with which to 
identify when a government policy that limits individual rights is contrary to the 
constitution.  
In Thailand, on the other hand, the courts are more generous in providing protection 
to private property owners. In addition to providing compensation for the revocation 
of an unlawful measure, compensation may be awarded for harm suffered as a result 
of legitimate regulatory interference, provided that the interference fails to satisfy the 
‘proportionality test’ and imposes an excessive burden on a private party. Thai 
administrative courts usually assess situational factors to ensure that public interests 
are fairly protected too. Public interests can be regarded by ordering less-than-full 
market compensation even when an administrative act violates constitutionally 
protected rights. 
 This Chapter’s analysis of compensable regulatory takings laws in Thailand and 
Mexico indicates that jurisprudence in both countries recognizes a margin of 
appreciation that public institutions enjoy when formulating or implementing public 
policies. Nevertheless, to ensure that individual constitutional rights are also fairly 
protected, the courts in both countries deploy a ‘proportionality test’ in order to 
strike a balance between competing interests. 
281 
CHAPTER IX 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The foregoing chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that domestic courts as well 
as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have applied different 
interpretative approaches in addressing legal ambiguities in regulatory expropriation 
clauses. Although no fixed formula has been established, each court has utilized a 
type of balancing approach to identify the occurrence of compensable regulatory 
takings. 
This Chapter will commence by comparing various conceptualizations of 
compensable regulatory takings developed by each of the domestic courts, within the 
selected jurisdictions, and by the ECtHR. To provide a comprehensive overview, this 
comparative examination will address the historical background of takings-related 
provisions, the scope of property, and emerging compensation standards. In the 
second section, this Chapter will distill the common approach, and principles, 
generally applied by domestic courts in the US, Thailand, Mexico and the ECtHR, 
when deciding upon the existence of a compensable regulatory taking. This section 
will summarize key legal elements and elaborate upon the role of the ‘proportionality 
test’ as a legal tool with which an adjudicator can differentiate between an 
expropriation and a non-compensable regulation. It highlights strengths and 
weaknesses of the ‘proportionality test’, and how this test can solve the issue of legal 
indeterminacy in international investment law. 
 
A. Thematic Concepts of Indirect Expropriation Compared 
1. Legal background 
Originally, the United Stated Constitution (the ‘US Constitution’)
1
 provided no 
explicit protection of property rights. However, to prevent property rights from 
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abuses of government power, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was later 
included as part of the Constitutional Bill of Rights.
2
 This clause contains a negative 
right that aims to protect individuals from abusive government power, by declaring 
that ‘[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation’.
3
 The codification of the Fifth Amendment was modeled on general 
state constitutions, as well as the common law, to provide economic stability to 
property owners and to avoid conflicts with domestic laws.
4
 In order to ensure the 
adequate protection of legal and property interests, domestic US courts play a vital 
role in interpreting and applying the Takings Clause when assessing the legality of 
government interferences.  
Similarly, the original Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (commonly known as the ‘European Convention on Human 
Rights’ or ‘ECHR’)
5
 did not contain a provision for the protection of property rights, 
even though it was drafted in the aftermath of the abuses of the Second World War.
6
 
However, on 20 March 1952, the Council of Europe agreed to include Article 1 
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
7
, and member States adopted it as part of the binding ECHR. 
The aim of the ECHR is to foster human rights protection and humanitarian 
objectives without prescribing the standards adopted in each country.
8
 Currently, P1-
1 contains three main rules. These include: ‘1 every natural or legal person is entitled 
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions; 2. no one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law; and 3. the preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way, impair the right of a state to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
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general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ 
The protection of property under P1-1 does not confine the adopted standards to the 
national laws of member states, it focuses on legal conceptions that are compliant 
with human rights laws.
9
 In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) reviews not only the legality of the measure in question, but also enforces 
P1-1 to ensure that the standards of protection determined by the ECHR are fully 
complied with, and implemented by, the member states.
10
 
Reflecting upon the context of Thailand, the protection of individual freedom and 
property rights was not realized until the promulgation of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand (the ‘Thai Constitution’) in 1932. Prior to 1932, private 
property rights were obscure and the King retained the supreme royal power to 
assign land to elite groups.
11
 Due to the influence of Western colonization in the 
region, Thailand ‘overhaul[ed] its system of public administration’, including tax 





 Since 1932, a series of Thai constitutions have included a 
provision concerning expropriation, according to which the forced transfer of land 
ownership must be for public purposes and accompanied by compensation.
13
 In 
addition, a series of Thai constitutions have also contained a provision that prohibits 
general government regulations that violate individual rights and freedoms. This 
implies that, in the absence of a written requirement for compensation, any 
restriction of property rights must be made according to the law and must not impose 
an excessive burden on property holders.
14
  
Currently, property owners in Thailand can challenge the validity of legislative and 
administrative actions that affect constitutionally protected rights through either the 
Constitutional Court or Administrative Courts.
15
 While the Constitutional Court is 




 Ibid 439. 
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vested with power to review the validity of legislation, the Administrative Courts 
may review the lawfulness and reasonableness of administrative actions. 
Similarly, in Mexico, the protection of property rights was not emphasized prior to 
the promulgation of the Constitution of the United Mexican States (the ‘Mexican 
Constitution’) in 1917.
16
 Prior to this, land and natural resources were originally 
governed by influential groups and the Catholic Church.
17
 A specific protection for 
property rights is now provided in Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, 
which guarantees the development of communal land-use for the benefit of poor 
people and society,
18
 and also protects private property by outlining that 
expropriation can only occur in circumstances serving a public purpose and when 
accompanied by compensation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Mexico has long 
held that compensation is only necessary when the State acquires the ownership of 
private property.
19
 The imposition of restrictions on the use of property, for public 
interest purposes, does not trigger to the right to compensation.
20
 Importantly, 
though, a regulation may be opposed through an ‘amparo’ lawsuit, whereby 




The evolution of the domestic legal framework within each of the selected countries, 
as well as the framework created by the ECtHR, reflects the changing perception of 
the role of property rights in the respective jurisdictions. In addition, the changing 
structural framework in the selected jurisdictions is demonstrative of the growing 
demand for the judicial review of legislation and administrative actions by the host 
state government. Although the protection of private property, and associated rights, 
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17
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is the primary objective of each of the examined legal instruments, some restrictions 
on property protection may be imposed if these restrictions comply with the 
conditions determined by the country’s Constitution or the ECtHR.    
2. Scope of Property Protected 
The US Constitutional Bill of Rights contains no clearly defined limit to the scope of 
property protection granted within the Takings Clause. Therefore, the US Supreme 
Court has explicitly formulated a wide list of property rights that are protected under 
the ambit of the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the 
Takings Clause generally protects tangible property.
22
 In addition, the Supreme 
Court has also held that rights in rem and rights attaching to land are considered as 
protected property rights.
23
 Moreover, the US Supreme Court has also regarded 
‘economically beneficial or productive use of property’ as the rights protected under 
the Constitution. In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court affirmed this 
concept in its ruling, stating that compensation is needed when the confiscation of 
property has occurred and ‘where regulation denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of property’.
24
 However, the Supreme Court did not recognize a 
‘future right’ or a ‘right not yet accrued’ as a property right to be protected as a 
‘reasonable-investment backed expectation’.
25
 To be regarded as a ‘reasonable 
investment expectation’, the Court relies on the government’s own representation at 
the time the investment was made. If the Plaintiff can show that he or she made an 
investment on the basis of a government representation, then the Court will regard 
this expectation as a right protected under the Constitution.
26
  
Similarly, the ECtHR adopts an expansive interpretation of the definition of a 
‘possession’ protected under P1-1, and may regard the object in question as a 
protected property, even in circumstances where it not recognized as such under the 
domestic law of a member country.
27
 In addition to tangible property, a broad range 
of intangible property rights are also regarded as a ‘possession’ under P1-1. They 
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include, for example, contract rights,
28
 business restitutionary claims and debts,
29
 and 
a shareholder’s rights to claim compensation resulting from the nationalization of an 
industry by the State.
30
  
The ECtHR has also honored the ‘legitimate expectation of realization’ and counted 
it as a ‘possession’.
31
 The Court held that to be protected under P1-1, the owner must 
have a legitimate expectation of being able to carry out the proposed development of 
property. To uphold a legitimate expectation, the Court in one case went further to 
affirm that although the right to claim compensation was terminated by a new 




A broad conceptualization of property protection is also adopted by Thai courts. 
Neither the Thai Constitution nor the Act of the Establishment of the Thai Supreme 
Administrative Court
33
 (the ‘Administrative Act’) contains a provision outlining the 
meaning and scope of protected property rights. However, a survey of relevant Thai 
jurisprudence suggests that both of these legal instruments tend to provide legal 
redress to property owners who have lost interests associated with either movable or 
immovable property due to state legislative or administrative actions. 
The Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of legislation that affects a 
broad range of property interests. For example, in the Constitutional Court Ruling 
No. 13/2556 (2013), the Court held that Section 30 of the Provisional Waterworks 
Act B.E. 2522 (1979), which deprived the land owner of use of their property 
without compensation, was unconstitutional. In this Ruling No. 13/2556, the Court 
asserted that all purchased properties and inherent contractual obligations were 
counted as property for the purposes of constitutional protection.
34
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Likewise, the Thai Administrative Courts have affirmed that administrative actions 
that affect a broad range of property interests may trigger legal liability. For 
example, the Supreme Administrative Court has held that although forced 
installation of electrical lines on land without compensation was lawful under the 
EGAT Act, to ensure equity and fairness, the State had a duty to pay compensation 
to the affected property’s owner who suffered as a result of state operations.
35
 In 
addition, the Court has also asserted that administrative actions can trigger liability 




The Supreme Court of Mexico has similarly expanded the scope of property rights 
protection, provided under the Mexican Constitution, beyond tangible property in 
order to encompass reasonable expectation rights. In the course of amparo 
proceedings, the Supreme Court of Mexico has asserted that the discontinuation of a 
drilling permit, requested by a foreign oil company, affected its reasonable 
expectation, and enabled the Court to hear the case.
37
 
Based on case reviews, both the selected domestic courts and the ECtHR tend to 
acknowledge that a wide range of property rights and possessions fall within the 
ambit of protections provided within takings law. As a result of adopting an 
expansive interpretation of property, the domestic courts and the ECtHR have 
included both tangible and intangible property rights within the protections afforded 
under takings laws. However, despite the fact that all of the examined jurisdictions 
protect a wide range of property rights, the basis of consideration is different across 
these jurisdictions. On one hand, the US Supreme Court bases its analysis on the 
definition of ‘taking’ rather than on the definition of ‘property’.
38
 Therefore, the US 
Supreme Court decides in favor of property owners when government measures 
interfere with either a ‘reasonable investment-backed expectation’
39
 or ‘all 
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economically viable use’ of property.
40
 This is similar in Thailand and Mexico, 
where courts in both countries do not analyze the definition of property as a separate 
issue, but they consider this question as part of the courts’ judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation and administrative actions. In contrast to those 
countries, the ECtHR considers this issue separately, and employs a broad 
interpretative approach when analyzing the term ‘possessions’.
41
 In this way, a 
variety of properties are also counted as possessions.  
3. The Development of Takings Jurisprudence  
A review of the jurisprudence within the selected jurisdictions reveals that the 
relevant domestic courts as well as the ECtHR have developed the legal doctrines 
regarding indirect expropriation, with a significant focus on delineating a ‘bright 
line’ with which to distinguish normal state regulations from compensable regulatory 
interference. However, due to the lack of an explicit constitutional and legislative 
provision protecting an individual against a state’s regulatory interference, courts 
play a critical role in developing the interpretation of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence and such interpretations have evolved over time. 
In the United States, the US Supreme Court has developed a takings doctrine under 
the Fifth Amendment. In the early 20
th
 century, the takings analysis was applied only 
to the occupation of physical property, and a state regulation that simply restricted 
the use of property was regarded as a public policy not subject to compensation. 
However, an increase in State regulation of migrants, immigration and industries, 
resulted in a huge burden to individuals.
42
 The US Supreme Court started examining 
the power of government to affect property rights in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v Mahon, in which the Court proposed a vague threshold by stating that a 
measure becomes a taking if it ‘goes too far’.
43
  
As discussed in Chapter Six, from 1978-1992, the US Supreme Court reviewed a 
number of cases and significantly developed regulatory takings doctrines. Examining 
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those cases, the Supreme Court variably employed the per se test and the ad hoc test 
to identify the existence of compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment. 
According to the per se test, compensation is required, regardless of the public 
interests served by the regulation, so long as the regulation causes a substantial 
deprivation of property rights.
44
 Therefore, the Supreme Court focuses on the impact 
of the regulation as the sole determining factor, regardless of the objectives served 
by the measure. 
In the alternative, the Supreme Court adopts the ad hoc test when the regulation falls 
short of full expropriation of physical property or the denial of all economically 
viable uses.
45
 To apply the ad hoc test, the Supreme Court examines all relevant 
factors on a case-by-case basis, including the government actions involved, the 
diminution of property value caused by the regulation, the extent to which the 
regulation interferes with a reasonable investment expectation of the property owner, 
and the nature of the government measure.
46
  
However, the US Supreme Court has more recently developed a more sophisticated 
method to identify regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment by introducing the 
principle of proportionality.
47
 This doctrine implies, that rather than focusing on the 
impact of a measure as the sole determining factor, the Court may find that a 
regulatory taking, justifying compensation, has occurred when the regulation 
‘crosses a line’ by imposing an excessive burden on the property owner.
48
  
This principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the US in many subsequent 
cases such as Nollan v California Coastal Commission
49
 and Dolan v City of 
Tigard.
50
 Both cases are exceptional in not considering impact as the sole 
determining factor but, rather, emphasizing the need for proportionality between the 
character of the regulatory measure, on the one hand, and its impact on the property 
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owner, on the other. Thus, if the measure in question imposes an excessive burden, it 
may constitute a compensable taking.  
At present, the US Supreme Court frequently adopts the ‘proportionality test’ when 
assessing regulatory takings inquiries.
51
 Due to the perceived benefits of the 
‘proportionality test’, Oregon has adopted this principle in its land use law known as 
‘Measure 49’, which permits the landowner to seek compensation from the State 
government in circumstances where the land use regulation restricts the use of a 
private residential property or a farm.
52
 
In contrast to the US, the ECtHR does not commence its assessment with an analysis 
of the elements that form a taking. Instead, the ECtHR starts by identifying which 
specific rule under P1-1 is best suited to the case. However, in order to determine 
whether the regulation in question is a regulatory interference violating the ECHR, 
the ECtHR has employed the ‘proportionality test’ to examine the nature of the 
relationship between the purpose and impact of the measure in question.
53
  Under 
P1-1, there are three main specific rules, spelling out different types of governmental 
interference. The first rule is for the ‘deprivation’ of property, which is limited to a 
complete destruction of legal title.
54
 The second rule concerns the ‘control of 
property use’, which involves a specific restriction of an owner’s right to use 
property either at present or in the future.
55
 The third rule is a ‘catch-all’ provision 




After identifying the specific rule applicable to the case, the Court then assesses 
whether the regulatory interference is justifiable. To assess this, the ECtHR usually 
adopts the ‘overall balancing test’,
57
 which involves a consideration of the 
appropriateness of any compensation paid by the government,
58
 the suitability of the 
measure and its relationship to the goal pursued, and the burden borne by an 
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individual who is adversely affected by the regulation.
59
 In conducting the test, the 
ECtHR accords deference to the state’s margin of appreciation.
60
 The Court will 
interfere only if the regulation is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’.
61
 
The adoption of the ‘proportionality test’ by the ECtHR is indicative of its 
recognition of state sovereign rights to control and regulate private property in order 
to promote social interests. In light of the diversity within the legal traditions, 
cultures and economic development of member States, this principle ensures that the 
ECtHR respects state autonomy when implementing public policies that serve the 
general interests of participating countries. However, as the analysis within Chapter 
Seven reveals, whenever a measure results in total deprivation of property or 
property rights, it is generally found to be a regulatory taking that triggers a 
compensatory obligation. 
Unlike the US and European Union, the Thai legal system does not incorporate a 
specific legal provision concerning protection against regulatory takings. Prior to the 
enactment of the Thai Constitution B.E. 2540 (1997), Thailand did not have a 
specific mechanism for the settlement of disputes arising from public law matters; 
only the Court of Justice of Thailand was vested with the jurisdiction to conduct 
judicial review and oversee any improper functioning of state authorities.
62
 Due to 
limitations in legal competency to overlook public law matters, attempts were made 
to fill existing gaps by introducing a system of public law courts with the capacity to 
award remedies against grievances caused by public authorities. The Thai 
Constitution of 1997 was widely regarded as ‘the People’s Charter’,
63
 containing 
many important and innovative provisions, covering an improved system of checks 
and balances via the establishment of the Constitutional Court and the 
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Administrative Courts, and the enhanced protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of Thai people.
64
 Pursuant to the broad power conferred to the 
Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts, as well as the wide scope of 
protection granted by the amended provisions, property owners in Thailand can now 
challenge the constitutionality of both legislation (through the Constitutional Court) 
and administrative actions (through the Administrative Courts).  
To review the constitutionality of legislation, the Thai Constitutional Court has from 
time to time adopted a ‘proportionality test’ in assessing the magnitude of the impact 
imposed by legislation.
65
 Likewise, the Administrative Courts of Thailand are vested 
with power to review the validity and lawfulness of administrative actions. Under 
Article 9 of the Administrative Act, not only can legal liability be imposed on a state 
authority for unlawful actions, it can also be imposed for economic injury resulting 
from lawful actions. As stipulated by Article 9(3) of the Administrative Act, the 
Administrative Courts are empowered to decide a case in relation to ‘other liability’ 
associated with administrative actions. Although there is no explicit interpretation of 
what constitutes ‘other liability’, the Court assesses each case on the ground of a 
‘fair balance test’ that determines whether the measure substantially deprives an 
individual of property rights or the economic value of the property in question. If 
compensation for lawful state action is not paid, or is incommensurate to the lost 
value of the property interests, the regulation in question might fail to strike a fair 




In the context of Mexico, a consideration of the impact of a measure is utilized most 
frequently as the primary determining factor for an award of compensation. 
According to Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, the Supreme Court of 
                                                 
64
 Under Section 29, where the restriction of rights and freedoms must be verified by laws and must 
not affect the essential substances of such rights and freedoms. 
65
 See Constitutional Court Ruling No 4-21/2554 where the Court examined whether the Emergency 
Decree of the Financial Institution for Asset Management was so egregious as to cause excessive 
burden; Constitutional Court Ruling No 13/2556 to find whether Article 30 of the Provincial 
Waterworks Authority Act 2522 caused an excessive burden upon the victim. 
66
 See, eg, Supreme Administrative Court Judgment Order No. 37/2545; Supreme Administrative 
Court Judgment, Red Case No. Aor 180/2554; ศาลปกครองสูงสุด [Supreme Administrative Court of 
Thailand], Judgment No. 525/2547; Supreme Administrative Court Judgment Red case No. Aor 
29/2557. 
293 
Mexico formally awards compensation for regulatory interference that destroys all 
property rights or ownership rights through formal expropriation laws.
67
 However, 
for a general regulation that does not entirely deprive the owner of all property 
rights, state interference is not generally subject to compensatory liability.
68
 
Nevertheless, such regulatory interference may be subject to judicial review. Even 
though its legal doctrine on regulatory takings is underdeveloped, the Supreme Court 
of Mexico has recently applied the principle of proportionality to settle disputes 
arising between private and public interests, in areas outside of the law of 
expropriation.   
Following the comparative analysis outlined above, it can be concluded that the 
selected domestic courts and the ECtHR have different mechanisms and approaches 
with which to analyze the issue of regulatory takings. Despite adopting a variety of 
approaches, all jurisdictions are alike in applying the ‘proportionality test’ in order to 
determine the existence of compensable takings. Consonant with changing social, 
political and economic structures within each country, this principle permits the 
domestic courts as well as the ECtHR to balance the competing interests in society. 
Essentially, whenever the regulatory interference results in a deprivation of property 
or viable economic use of property, it is considered egregious and is subject to 
compensation. However, if a regulation falls short of full deprivation of property, the 
adjudicators defer to the state’s margin of appreciation. In circumstances where 
relevant social benefits outweigh the incursion upon private property rights, no 
compensation, or an amount less than full compensation, might be required. 
4. Determining the Standards of Compensation 
Under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, a state authority is to 
compensate an owner for any action that amounts to a regulatory taking. According 
to the approach of the US Supreme Court, the determination of compensation is a 
separate step that is undertaken after the existence of a taking has been ascertained.
69
 
When compensation is awarded under the Fifth Amendment, the US Supreme Court 
usually holds that ‘Fair Market Value’ (FMV) is required, regardless of the scale of 
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the loss suffered by the property owner.
70
 FMV generally refers to the amount a 
willing purchaser would need to pay to a willing vendor.
71
 Therefore, in order to 
strike a fair balance, the FMV is the most appropriate standard to redress the loss 
sustained by the affected party. Nevertheless, a payment of FMV can render the 
implementation of regulations that qualify as takings very costly for governments 
and, thus, exacerbate the financial stress faced by local governments. For this reason, 
the US Supreme Court recognizes other means, such as Transfer Development 
Rights (TDRs), as an alternative means to compensate an individual whose property 
is affected by a regulation.
72
 As discussed in Chapter Eight, the US Supreme Court is 
moving towards the formulation of a remedial approach that assists the government 
to reach a solution that strikes a more appropriate balance between public and private 
interests. 
In contrast to the US Supreme Court, the ECtHR has held that reasonable 
compensation does not always mean full FMV compensation.
73
 The ECtHR has held 
that less-than-full compensation can be justifiable, depending upon the prevailing 
economic and social justice circumstances prevailing in the relevant country.
74
 
Generally, the ECtHR will honor the state’s margin of appreciation when 
ascertaining the amount of compensation that the state government needs to pay. The 
ECtHR will only intervene if the compensation is not reasonable, and does not fairly 
cover the lost value of property.
75
 The ECtHR usually views the payment of 
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Similarly, the Thai Administrative Courts generally let the competent state agency 
determine the amount of compensation that is to be paid to the property owner in 
relation to harm caused by regulatory interference. When compensation is required, 
it is paid by the state agency in accordance with its compensation guidelines as 
determined by the law concerned. In this situation, the state agency takes into 
account a range of relevant factors, which include the land price as appraised by a 
state authority for tax purposes, the location of the property, and the purpose of the 
public work in question.
77
 The Court interferes only when the compensation is 
manifestly unreasonable.  
However, when there is no specific requirement for compensation, the Supreme 
Administrative Court may apply the principle of mutatis mutandis under Article 438 
paragraph one of the Civil and Commercial Code of Tort law
78
, whereby the 
appropriate amount of compensation is critically dependent upon a consideration of 
the ‘situation and the gravity of the act’.
79
 An illustrative example of this is the 
Central Administrative Court of Thailand Case No. 1631/2553.
80
 This case 
concerned the impact on private property caused by the government’s flood 
management in response to a severe monsoon in 2003. The applicant, who owned 
rice mills, claimed that the poor management of water by the government caused 
flood damage to farms and factories in adjacent provinces. The Central 
Administrative Court held that due to the heavy monsoon, it was impossible to keep 
all of the properties dry. Also, since the government had warned the residents about 
the approaching monsoon, it was the responsibility of the people living in those areas 
to stay alert and get prepared. The Court held that although there was no specific 
requirement for compensation, the State had a duty to compensate those who 
suffered from the floods in order to redress their injuries according to Article 9(3) of 
the Administrative Act. Since there was no express rule governing compensation in 
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this situation, the Court applied Article 438 (1) of the Civil and Commercial Code of 
Tort Law to determine the amount of compensation. After a consideration of all 
relevant circumstances, the Court awarded a total of Baht 929,241.50, plus the 
interest that had accrued from the date of the initial flood damage. Since the Court 
asserted that the government was not at fault, the Court exercised its discretion to 
award compensation for damaged rice mills only as well as the repair costs for all 
associated equipment. 
In the context of Mexico, the courts only award compensation for direct acquisitions 
of lands by formal expropriation decrees.
81
 For types of regulatory interference that 
do not deprive full ownership, the affected owner can only seek a court injunction 
through amparo proceedings, whereby the court can rule against the government 
action or declare the statute unconstitutional. Mexico’s jurisprudence interprets the 
Constitution narrowly, limiting the duty to compensate to cases of direct 
expropriation. In this respect, like the ECtHR and the Thai Administrative Courts, 
the Mexican Supreme Court confers great flexibility to the State to exercise its 
sovereignty in regulating private property free from the imposition of a 
compensatory duty towards individuals who may be affected by regulatory 
interference.  
In sum, with the exception of Mexico, all of the examined domestic courts as well as 
the ECtHR have awarded compensation to redress property owners suffering from 
regulatory interference. Although compensation is an important means of redress, the 
adjudicators within each system have applied different standards and methods to 
determine the magnitude of the compensation award. While the ECtHR and Thai 
courts can exercise wide discretion in determining the amount of compensation - 
thereby ensuring that all relevant circumstances and conditions are taken into 
account in order to reach a fair award - the US Supreme Court cannot exercise the 
same degree of discretion under the fair market value standard (or FMV). Despite 
significant differences, the US Supreme Court has recently implemented the 
Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) programs, which aim to mitigate and 
reduce the financial hardship experienced by state governments in response to laws 
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that impose restrictions on property owners. In this regard, the courts in selected 
countries (excluding Mexico) and the ECtHR, have attempted to balance individual 
property rights with public interests by taking into account all prevailing conditions 
in order to ensure that property rights are respected and the exercises of state 
authority are preserved. 
 
B. The Concept of Proportionality Compared 
The survey above reveals a tendency across each of the examined jurisdictions 
towards the deployment of a ‘proportionality test’ when determining the existence of 
a compensable regulatory taking. As discussed in previous Chapters, this principle is 
predominant at both domestic and international levels. The case analyses exposed 
that the adjudicators in our selected jurisdictions follow a very similar approach 
when adopting the ‘proportionality test’ to assess expropriation disputes. A close 
examination reveals that the adjudicators in various jurisdictions base their reasoning 
and decisions on three sub-elements of the proportionality principle: the principle of 
necessity, the principle of suitability and the weighing of the public and private 
interests at stake. 
1. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
The ECtHR asserts that regulatory interferences must strike a fair balance between 
the means employed and the aim sought.
82
 To test the validity of the regulatory 
interference, the ECtHR generally does not only rely on a mere ‘rational basis’ or 
‘reasonableness’ of the measure, but rather focuses on three key issues: whether the 
measure is necessary to achieve a social need, whether it is the most suitable option 
(or whether alternative options are available) and whether the measure is 
proportional to the goal the state government sought to accomplish.
83
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For example, in Mellacher v Austria (1989),
84
 which concerned the enactment of a 
new rent control law by the Austrian government,
85
 the applicant claimed that the 
law was contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as it 
unlawfully interfered with the applicant’s contractual rights to obtain rent. 
Considering the facts of the case, the ECtHR relied on the state’s margin of 
appreciation to take the measure, and held that even though the new rent control law 
affected the previously concluded contracts, the legislation was reasonable, and was 
introduced with a legitimate goal to help poor people to obtain access to rental 
housing.
86
 In addition, the ECtHR asserted the existence of other alternative 
solutions does not render the measure in question unjustified.
87
 The Court explained 
that as long as the measure is within the boundary of state power, the State is vested 
with the full authority to make a final decision that best fits the situation.
88
  
To assess the justification of the interference, the Court engaged in further analysis 
via the proportionality test, and took into account all relevant factors including the 
amount of compensation. After assessing the factors pursuant to a fair balance test, 
the Court found that, although the legislation infringed on the contractual obligations 
between tenant and landlord, the owner was allowed to pass on various costs to the 
tenants. In addition, the Court found that under the new regime, landlords were 
allowed to obtain the rental fees from the tenants at a rate that was 50% higher than 
would be allowed under an old lease.
89
 The ECtHR ultimately held that the measure 
struck a fair balance and did not violate P1-1 of the ECHR.
90
 By taking into account 
all prevailing facts, and the legitimate aims pursued by the legislation, the Court did 
not merely focus upon the impact of the measure; rather, it substantiated the analysis 
by scrutinizing the state’s margin of appreciation and asking whether the measure 
imposed an impact commensurate to its articulated goal.  
In addition to resolving tensions that arise between public and private interests in the 
context of social problems, the ECtHR has also applied the proportionality principle 
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to other areas of conflict, such the disputes resulting from the State’s omission to 
comply with a law that the Applicant has relied upon. In 1995, the ECtHR applied 
the same line of analysis in Pressos Compania Naviera SA v Belgium.
91
 The Belgian 
government passed legislation to remove the right to compensation for damage 
caused by a ship crash resulting from the negligence of a Belgian navigation pilot. 
Based on its analysis, the ECtHR accepted the State’s freedom to amend its internal 
law to resolve the problem of legal unpredictability, attributed to the uncertainty of 
Belgian tort law and its incompatibility with the laws of its neighboring countries.
92
 
The Court deduced that the national authority could enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in determining what is in the public interest.
93
 However, it also held that 
the alteration of the right to compensation, reasonably expected by prospective 
victims, could not ‘justify legislating with retrospective effect with the aim and 
consequence of depriving the applicants of their claim for compensation’.
94
 The 
ECtHR held that the interference was ‘inconsistent with the preserving of the fair 
balance between the interests at stake’.
95
 
In the recent case of Sargsyan v Azerbaijan,
96
 the ECtHR recently applied the three-
step approach in analyzing a dispute that related to refugee protection. In 2015, the 
Court heard the complaint from an applicant who was forced to leave his home by 
the Government of Azerbaijan, following the conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenian forces. After the Azerbaijan army disarmed the local Armenian army in 
the Shahumyan region of Azerbaijan, ethnic Armenian people were forced to leave 
their village and residence. To justify its actions, the Government of Azerbaijan 
claimed that the area was too dangerous to live in. Based on the submitted factual 
evidence, the Court held that Azerbaijan had violated the applicant’s rights under P1-
1 of the ECHR. Although the Court was fully aware of the Azerbaijan government’s 
justification to displace its population from the disputed area,
97
 it pointed out that the 
Government did not provide adequate assistance to the people suffering as 
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consequence of this displacement.
98
 In addition, it did not provide any alternative 
measure to adequately restore and secure the applicant’s property rights or to provide 
compensation to redress his loss.
99
 Thus, the Court decided that the conduct of the 
Azerbaijan government created an excessive burden in violation of P1-1.
100
  
These illustrative cases demonstrate that the ECtHR has granted state governments 
and legislatures broad leeway in determining their country’s best interests. To be 
admissible, the measure must meet the tests of necessity and suitability. Although 
the ECHR guarantees the protection of private property rights under P1-1, these 
rights are not absolute. To this end, member states can interfere with the property 
rights of their citizen as long as the regulatory interference satisfies the requirements 
of the ‘proportionality test’; according to which, a fair balance amongst public and 
private interests must be maintained. 
2. United States 
The US Supreme Court introduced the concept of proportionality, to review the issue 
of regulatory takings, in the cases of Nollan (1987)
101
 and Dolan (1994).
102
 Prior to 
these cases, the Supreme Court had adopted the Penn Central (1978) three-prong 
test, to ascertain whether a compensable taking had occurred. The factors examined 
within the three-prong test include: the impact of the measure, any interferences with 
investment-backed expectations and the character of the measure. Despite the 
adoption of a balancing method, the conceptualization of compensable takings 
developed by the US Supreme Court in Penn Central was arguably too generalized 
and did not provide a clear guideline with which to determine when an alleged 
regulatory taking would trigger a duty to compensate.
103
  
In order to refine the three-prong test into a structured doctrine with the ability to 
more accurately pinpoint the circumstances that will trigger a compensatory duty, the 
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US Supreme Court introduced the ‘essential nexus requirement’ in the case of 
Nollan. According to this new conceptual framework, the existence of an ‘essential 
nexus’ between the condition imposed by the government and the goal being pursued 
must be demonstrated. Moreover, the Court considered whether the imposition of a 
public easement by the California Coastal Commission, in the absence of 
compensation, constituted a taking under the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. 
The Court examined the nature and character of the state’s imposition by 
investigating whether it would ‘further the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition’.
104
 After examining the case, the Court found that the easement imposed 
on the construction permit lacked an essential nexus with a legitimate state 
interest.
105
 From the Court’s point of view, the condition must bear the same policy 
goal as the public interest issue that the state is attempting to protect.
106
  
The Court’s judgment in Nollan on the nexus requirement has had legal implications 
for subsequent cases. In 1994, the Court developed a more concrete principle to 
identify the emergence of a regulatory taking in the case of Dolan v City of Tigard. 
In addition to requiring a connection between the proposed development and the 
imposed conditions for the development, the Court also required ‘rough 
proportionality’ between the permit condition imposed and the adverse impact of the 
proposed development.
107
 The Court did not, however, establish a precise formula 
with which to calculate proportionality.
108
 The Court merely required the city to 
explain the manner in which the imposed condition would offset the adverse impact 




The test adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of Nollan and Dolan (the 
‘Nollan-Dolan test’) is arguably more structured and transparent than the Penn 
Central three-prong test.
110
 Although both the Penn Central and Nollan-Dolan tests 
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require courts to be more contextual in their legal reasoning, the Penn Central 
balancing approach does not strictly engage the courts in a discussion of all the 
facets of public interest, and the respective weight attributable to each of these 
factors.
111
 Under the Nollan-Dolan test, the Supreme Court appears to adopt a set of 
rules, analogous to the proportionality principle, which provides a clear analytical 
tool with which to assess and reconcile conflicting interests. In order to evaluate the 
Nollan-Dolan factors holistically, the Supreme Court must defer to the reasoning of 
the defendant, and examine the rationale and real legislative purpose behind the 
regulation,
112





In Thailand, the principle of proportionality is one of the most important legal 
doctrines utilized by judicial organs with the ability to control state power and 
prevent abusive or unreasonable state conduct. As discussed in Chapter Eight, both 
the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Courts of Thailand have frequently 
applied the ‘proportionality test’ as a means to control legislative and administrative 
discretion, and uphold individual rights and freedoms.
114
 
To decide whether legislation or administrative acts satisfy the central tenets of the 
‘proportionality test’, Thai courts focus on the state’s margin of appreciation as the 
first step in determining the appropriate scope of state authority. For example, in the 
Constitutional Court Ruling No. 27/2546 (2003), which examined the 
constitutionality of legislation that confiscated assets obtained by criminals via drug-
related activities, the Constitutional Court held that the legislation was constitutional 
as it was enacted for the primary purpose of tackling problematic, criminal behavior. 
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When determining whether the measure was justifiable, the Constitutional Court 
emphasized that confiscation was restricted to assets acquired from criminal activity 
only. As a consequence, it then held that the legislation in question did not impose an 




Similarly, in the Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2556 (2013), which concerned 
the constitutionality of Section 30 of the Local Water Act B.E. 2522, the Court held 
that the installation of water pipes across private property was legitimate and 
essential in facilitating the provision of domestic water services. The provision was 
legitimate. However, the Court held that since Section 30 of the Act did not 
incorporate any requirement for compensation, it imposed an excessive burden on 
the property owners and was, therefore, unconstitutional as it enabled the state 
authority to interfere with private property without incurring any liability.
116
 
The Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand has also adopted the same line of 
analysis when examining whether individual rights are protected from a wide range 
of arbitrary state administrative actions. It has performed judicial review to 
invalidate regulations that have imposed excessive burdens on property owners. In 
the Red Case Judgment No. 180/2554 dated 8 June 2554 (2011), for example, the 
Court reviewed the validity of state discontinuation of a forest plantation license, and 
commenced its assessment with an examination of the legitimacy of the state order.  
It held that the discontinuation of the license was a lawful act as it was supported by 
a Ministerial Declaration that aimed to restrict logging, and other timber harvesting 
operations, so as to protect the environment.
117
 Although the state’s discontinuation 
of the license was justified and legally valid, on the ground of environmental 
protection, the Supreme Administrative Court asserted that the diminution of the 
legitimate investment expectation of the license holder, as well as the economic 
impact caused by the cancellation of the permit without compensation, resulted in a 
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Recently, the Supreme Administrative Court determined a case which concerned the 
appropriateness of the construction of a truck weighing station, in which judgment 
was made against the claimant on 11 February 2557 (2014).
119
 As discussed in 
Chapter Eight, the Court clearly adopted the proportionality principle to examine the 
issue, ultimately deciding that the measure did not result in an excessive burden to 
the landowner. This was because the land owner was not completely prevented from 
accessing the land, and no essential elements of his property rights were deprived.
120
 
Nevertheless, the Court asserted that the land owner was entitled to compensation to 




The above analysis demonstrates that Thai courts have extensively applied the 
proportionality principle to examine the justification of legislation and administrative 
acts, despite the fact that Thai domestic law does not explicitly mandate the use of 
this principle.
122
 To assess the justification of legislation and State measures, the 
courts generally examine three distinct components: necessity, suitability and the 
balance between competing interests. Nevertheless, the examination of case law also 
revealed that Thai courts do not always apply a strict three-part test in a coherent and 
consistent manner; some courts have interchangeably and inconsistently analyzed the 
components of necessity and suitability. Moreover, Thai courts are yet to develop a 
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clear threshold with the ability to indicate when interference is severe enough to be 




 The concept of a regulatory taking under Mexican law is somewhat obscure. In the 
Mexican legal system, compensation is normally limited to those property owners 
who have been adversely affected by an expropriation of land through a formal law. 
However, property owners who have been affected by a state regulatory interference, 
in breach of constitutionally protected rights, must file for an amparo legal 
proceeding in order to request an injunction against state legislation or administrative 
actions. 
The Supreme Court of Mexico has long been struggling to develop legal principles 
that can resolve conflicts between public and private interests.  As discussed in 
Chapter Eight, the principle of proportionality for judicial review of the 
constitutionality of state measures was illustrated in a case involving a young soldier 
who was dismissed from the military after being diagnosed as HIV positive.
124
 The 
Supreme Court adopted the proportionality test to determine the validity of the 
military order to dismiss the unhealthy soldier. As discussed in Chapter Eight, the 
Supreme Court carried out a four-step test to scrutinize whether the order was 
rational and proportionate to the goal pursued.
125
   Although this case is not directly 
related to the issue of regulatory takings, it provides a good example of the way in 
which Mexican courts have utilized the principle of proportionality when resolving 
disputes arising from conflicting public and private interests. 
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5. Summary of the Comparative Analysis of the Proportionality Test across 
Jurisdictions 
Based on the jurisprudence developed by the courts in the United States, the ECtHR, 
Thailand and Mexico, in response to disputes involving competing interests, it is 
apparent that the ‘proportionality test’ frequently consists of three key components: 
(i) the necessity of the measure; (ii) the suitability of the measure; and (iii) the 
proportional relationship between the means and the goals pursued. However, each 
jurisdiction adopts a different approach to comprehend the proportionality analysis. 
While the ECtHR analyzes each of the three factors separately, Thai courts 
sometimes use the ‘necessity test’ and the ‘suitability test’ interchangeably. In the 
same vein, the US Supreme Court - instead of directly exploring the necessity and 
the suitability of the measure under the Nollan-Dolan framework - requires the state 
government to prove how the imposed conditions upon development approval could 
promote legitimate state interests.  Moreover, when the courts engage in a process of 
weighing and balancing opposing rights and interests, they adopt different threshold 
standards to justify an order of compensation. For instance, while Mexican courts 
award compensation for regulations that entirely deprive the owner of his/her 
property rights, US and Thai courts, as well as the ECtHR, similarly resort to a 
compensation remedy when the challenged measure imposes an excessive burden on 
an individual. This diversity of approach is indicative of the fact that adjudicators in 
different jurisdictions are likely to have divergent opinions of, and attribute varying 
importance to, particular protected rights. Despite such differences, the comparative 
study ultimately reveals that each of the selected jurisdictions adopt a version of the 




C. The Proportionality Test: Rationale, Problems and Solutions to 
Improve Legal Coherence and Determinacy in the Context of 
International Investment Arbitration 
The principle of proportionality is widely recognized in many jurisdictions. For this 
reason it is regarded as one the general principles of law that adjudicators in both 
domestic and international courts frequently use to investigate the validity of laws 
and administrative actions under public law. 
As described by Alexander, the ‘proportionality test’ is widely recognized as a tool 
to promote ‘contextuality, transparency of the relevant factors and reasons, breath in 
the competing considerations and overt normality’.
126
 The function of this test is 
hence not merely to review government policy but, rather, to provide a structured 
process of inquiry,
127
 which encourages adjudicators to define the competing 
objectives that must be balanced with each other.
128
 Although the ‘proportionality 
test’ may render a less solid answer to every hard case, the doctrine of 
proportionality, widely embedded in domestic constitutional law as well as 
international law, allows adjudicators to adopt effective interpretative strategies that 
assist in resolving the problem of legal indeterminacy, by taking into account the 
context, facts and norms of the situations faced by the adjudicators. When applied 
consistently across a series of rulings, the ‘proportionality test’ provides an 
adjudicator the framework within which to articulate a ‘class of criteria’ that can 
then be utilized by subsequent adjudicators encountering similar conflicts pertaining 
to the validity of state laws and administrative actions.
129
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Despite its advantages, however, the framework afforded by the concept of 
proportionality grants significant leeway to adjudicators when determining the 
relevant factors taken into their analysis. It is thus within the adjudicators’ discretion 
to construe the relative value of each of the interests at stake. Since the 
proportionality principle is a ‘form of contextualized practical judgment’,
130
 the 
adjudicators employing this method might overstep or second-guess the authority of 
the relevant decision-making bodies, raising concerns regarding adjudicative 
legitimacy or the creditability of rulings.
131
  
Issues surrounding the arbitrary exercise of discretion by adjudicators, when framing 
legal reasoning and conducting proportionality analysis, have long been discussed in 
the context of international investment arbitration, and this problem has implications 
for the choice that must be made among possible outcomes.
132 Historically, arbitral 
tribunals have struggled to find solutions to international investment disputes that are 
considered fair to all parties. Although the ‘proportionality test’ is regarded as a 
preferable approach to manage conflicts between states and individuals,
133
 without a 
clear mandate restricting the power of arbitral tribunals, they might exercise their 
discretion erratically, and this poses the risk of conducting an overly stringent review 
or intruding into the traditional areas of state sovereignty. As Calamita claims, 
‘proportionality is not a simple technical exercise, but rather involves, at a minimum, 
the making of judgments and choices informed by socio-political values’.
134
 If the 
‘proportionality test’ is not conducted properly, appointed arbitral tribunals might 
interfere with the province of the political branches by independently judging and 
weighing competing societal interests and values, potentially undercutting the 
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democratically appointed decision-making bodies in that country.
135
 As claimed by 
Bücheler, this problem could affect arbitral tribunal’s ‘legal legitimacy’, which could 
ultimately undermine the trust and reliability of the arbitration system in general.
136
  
To mitigate the problem mentioned above, the arbitral tribunals should defer to ‘state 
authorities’ factual and legal assessment by attaching weight to authorities’ 
assessments as to appropriate balance between public and private interests.
137
 As 
claimed by some commentators, the arbitral tribunals should ascribe weight to the 
view of those decision-makers since most courts and tribunals adjudicating public 
law matters of this nature are more familiar with the relevant social circumstances, 
and the context in which the conflict has emerged, compared to ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals.
138
 Rather than engaging in speculation, the ad hoc arbitral tribunals should 
adopt a ‘margin of appreciation’ when examining the boundaries of state regulatory 
interferences and the justifications associated with such measures.
139
 In addition, it is 
more appropriate for legitimate decision-makers or domestic courts to carry out the 
assessment of competing interests, required under the ‘proportionality test’; 
therefore, arbitrators should defer to national authorities’ assessment of the weighing 
and balancing of a measure’s effect vis-à-vis the goals it endeavors to pursue.
140
 If a 
state’s regulatory interference exceeds the appropriate margin of appreciation, or 
creates an excessive burden for property owners, only these can the tribunal 
intervene so as to afford protection to foreign investors. 
 
D. Conclusion 
The comparative study above shows that the American, Thai, and Mexican domestic 
courts and the ECtHR provide protection for a wide range of property rights, 
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associated with both tangible and intangible properties. This protection also extends 
to the legitimate expectation of an investor, although the expectation must not be 
speculative, and must be actually realized by the property owner.  
In relation to the types of regulatory interference that require compensation, the 
comparative study has found that there is no comprehensive rule with which to 
distinguish an unfettered regulatory interference from an indirect expropriation that 
will attract an award of compensation. All courts have considered the issue on a 
case-by-case basis. Instead of formulating a clear definition of the types of policy 
measures that are likely to constitute an act of indirect expropriation, the judiciary 
tends to focus on the substantial deprivation standard, while also recognizing the 
state’s wide margin of appreciation in expropriation claims. Based on the 
jurisprudence developed by adjudicators in all selected jurisdictions, it is found that 
when a measure has entirely deprived a property owner of their property rights or 
substantive economic use of property, the intervention is deemed to impose an 
excessive burden on the property owner, therefore justifying compensation. On the 
other hand, where an intervention has fallen short of full deprivation or expropriation 
of ownership, the adjudicators take into account various factors in their analysis 
before declaring the measure a ‘taking’ and determining the appropriate amount of 
compensation. 
With the exception of Mexico, the courts in the selected jurisdictions tend to award 
compensation as a means to mitigate the injury caused by regulatory interference. 
While the US Supreme Court emphasizes fair market value (FMV) in an award of 
compensation, the Thai administrative courts and the ECtHR place a greater 
emphasis on other factors that may reduce the value of compensation. Nevertheless, 
the US Supreme Court is currently considering other options of compensation 
payment, such as the assigned Transfer Development Rights (TDRs), so as to 
mitigate the problem of financial distress in the country. 
The comparative analysis undertaken within this thesis demonstrates that, due to a 
global convergence in the economic and political values of legally diverse countries, 
the ‘proportionality doctrine’ is increasingly recognized as a standard applicable in 
both domestic and international law for the resolution of conflicting interests. To use 
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the ‘proportionality test’, an examination of competing interests must be made on a 
case-by-case basis. Generally, the courts assess various factors, including the 
necessity of the measure, the suitability of the measure, and the proportionality of the 
burden borne by the property owner in relation to the anticipated impact of the 
regulation.  
Although the proportionality doctrine is widely recognized as a ‘center-piece of the 
jurisprudence’ in domestic courts and international organizations to resolve the 
disputes related to regulatory interference,
141
 it is revealed that doctrine has been 
used in different jurisdictions in different pace and degree. The study reveals that the 
doctrine forms a strong foundation in the jurisprudence developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights. The doctrine has also consistently been used by the Court as 
a central mechanism to resolve the conflicts arising out of state’s regulatory 
interference. Likewise, borrowing from the ECtHR, Thai courts have adopted the 
same doctrine to review the justification of legislation and administrative actions 
taken in the country. The courts in the United States and Mexico, however, have not 
explicitly referred to the proportionality doctrine when examining the regulatory 
takings enquiries. Although the doctrine is just existed in both countries, there is a 
tendency towards the using of this doctrine more in the future, especially in the 
United States, where some key aspects of the doctrine resemble to the balancing test 
which weights and balances a series of domestic interests and values pursued.  
In spite of the differences, the proportionality doctrine is not alien to the courts in 
those jurisdictions and those courts generally do not deny the existence of the 
‘proportionality test’ as an instrument to reconcile the differences between 
competing values and interests. However, due to the lack of clear guidance in 
relation to the relative value of each of the interests at stake, the adjudicating tribunal 
should make an assessment, subject to supervision by local decision-makers, of the 
relevant factors and acknowledge the state’s margin of appreciation. 
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CHAPTER X  
SUMMARY AND SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADVANCE THE 
DETERMINACY OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION PROVISIONS 
 
A. Summary of Main Findings 
Essentially, the concept of indirect expropriation is not a new phenomenon within 
international law and jurisprudence. It largely concerns situations in which State 
regulations impact upon the use of private property in a manner tantamount to direct 
expropriation. Nevertheless, the exact conduct that constitutes an indirect 
expropriation, subject to international responsibility, is still unclear.  
This investigation of the evolving concept of indirect expropriation in international 
law reveals that there have been many attempts at demarcating the distinction 
between a normal regulation, on the one hand, and a compensable regulatory taking, 
on the other. A close examination of international disputes, as well as the 
jurisprudence developed by a series of international adjudicative bodies, shows that 
there has been no consensus to create a uniform standard across countries and across 
international legal orders. Indeed, the ill-defined concept of indirect expropriation 
contained in old-versioned of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Chapter 11 of 
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have contributed immensely to 
inconsistent and unpredictable interpretation by international adjudicative bodies. 
The failure to develop a clear conceptual framework or uniform standards of 
interpretation regarding the issue of compensable indirect expropriation, has led to 
the problem of legal indeterminacy within the existing system of international law. 
To date, a variety of international legal instruments, such as the a series of new 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the emerging Trans Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP), have been developed in accordance with customary 
international law standards with the aim of improving the clarity of treaty texts and 
the consistency of legal interpretation in many key areas, including indirect 
expropriation provisions. Nevertheless, this thesis has argued that the newly 
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formulated international agreements retain problematic ambiguities, which might 
result in arbitral interpretations that appear to conflict with the intent of the parties. 
In order to develop a more coherent approach with the potential to combat the 
indeterminacy - and inconsistent interpretation - of indirect expropriation provisions, 
this thesis has argued that, considering the public law nature of international 
investment treaties, vague terms contained within those treaties should be interpreted 
in light of legal doctrines drawn from public law principles under both domestic and 
international law. To achieve a certain level of coherence and consistency, the 
interpretation of treaty texts could utilize ‘general principles of law’, as is required in 
the context of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).  
The comparative study of state practices, and jurisprudence developed by the US 
Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Constitutional 
and Administrative Court of Thailand, and the Mexican Supreme Court, has shown 
that the powers of governments to limit rights over property have long been 
recognized within these selected jurisdictions. In essence, the governmental power to 
control property has, historically, been conceptualized as an exercise of ‘police 
power’ to promote legitimate public purposes in society. However, as societies 
evolve politically and economically, the protection of property rights becomes an 
increasingly predominant mode of curbing abusive uses of state power. Nevertheless, 
since property rights are not absolute, and must serve a determinate social function, 
they are subject to limitations. In this respect, state authorities can legitimately 
exercise their powers to control private property within the bounds of permissible 
legislative or bureaucratic discretion; however, conduct exceeding such bounds 




To ensure that public and private interests are appropriately balanced, domestic 
courts in all selected jurisdictions, as well as the ECtHR, have commonly adopted 
the ‘principle of proportionality’ as the main tool with which to resolve disputes in 
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 Steven J Eagle, 'The Birth of the Property Rights Movement' (Policy Analysis No 558, CATO 
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relation to regulatory takings. Within this conceptual framework, courts in the 
selected jurisdictions generally recognise that regulatory interference is subject to 
compensation under two main circumstances: The first circumstance is when a 
regulation deprives the property owner of all property rights or all economically-
viable use. This situation is considered to be an extreme case, justifying the payment 
of full market value as compensation for the loss incurred. The second circumstance 
is when the regulatory interference falls short of total deprivation of property rights, 
or of economically-viable use of property. In both cases, if the private interest 
nevertheless outweighs the benefits arising from the regulatory interference in 
question, compensation is generally required to redress the harm arising from an 
excessive burden borne by the property owner. However, the quantum of 
compensation may be dependent upon the conditions, and the nature of the measure, 
in question. The respective courts may grant less-than-full compensation when this 
amount is capable of striking a fair balance.  
The appeal of this principle is that it permits the adjudicator to avoid an ‘all or 
nothing’ interpretation, whereby it must favour either the private or public interest as 
the main determining factor in deciding an indirect expropriation claim.
2
 While the 
former focuses upon the impact of a state measure on the affected property, the latter 
largely refers to the state’s margin of appreciation as a key component of legal 
analysis. As claimed by Kriebaum, this ‘all or nothing’ approach would result in a 
situation where a tribunal fails to achieve a compromise between public and private 
interests, and simply places the interest of one over the other.
3
 Thus, the 
characteristics of the ‘principle of proportionality’ provide a coherent framework for 
legal analysis of expropriation, and enable the adjudicator to scrutinize all kinds of 
regulatory interference that expropriate private property, without impeding the 
processes of democratic politics within a country.  
However, it should be noted that the proportionality principle is not a panacea for 
addressing inconsistencies and indeterminacies inherent in indirect expropriation 
analysis. The principle is a context-specific form of analysis and the application 
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varies on a case-by-case basis. Despite the unpredictability of its outcome, the 
application of the principle must take into account not only all relevant facts, but also 
a stable set of criteria for evaluating the issues at hand. Such application of the 
proportionality principle can reduce the existing anomalies in the investor-state 
dispute settlement system, and contribute to the progressive development of 
international investment law in the future.   
 
B. Conceptual Framework for the Coherent and Consistent 
Interpretation of Indirect Expropriation Provisions 
1. Scope of Protected Property Rights Protection in Investment Treaties 
The scope of protected investment and property rights is not defined in the 
expropriation clause of a typical investment treaty. However, a drafter of an 
investment treaty could limit the application the expropriation clause by restricting 
the scope of protected property rights and investments. As discussed in previous 
Chapters, the scope of property rights protection under indirect expropriation laws in 
our surveyed jurisdictions is broad in each case and generally encompasses any form 
of both tangible and intangible property. However, it does not generally encompass 
property rights that are either speculative in nature or a mere expectation of vested 
rights.  
2. Adopted Proportionality Doctrine as Substantive Law 
Largely as a result of its appeal, the ‘principle of proportionality’ is implicitly 
embedded in modern international investment treaties. Under the 2004 US Model 
BITs, and the revised 2012, the drafters have listed a class of criteria in the Annexes 
that reflect the opportunity to apply the ‘principle of proportionality’.
4
 Following the 
legal standard developed in US jurisprudence in Penn Central,
5
 the drafters have 
included, in consecutive US BIT Models, three key legal factors to determine 
whether an action by a party constitutes an indirect expropriation. These factors are: 
                                                 
4
 Gebhard  Bücheler, Proportionality in Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
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5
 Penn Central, 438 US 104.  
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(i) the economic impact of the government action; (ii) the extent to which the 
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.
6
  
Despite the introduction of the new framework, which permits the adjudicators to 
better balance public and private interests, the applicability of the provisions is 
arguably unpredictable as it is subject to the unguided discretion of arbitral tribunals. 
As discussed in Chapter Nine, the three-prong test arguably involves an ‘amorphous 
process’, whereby the courts take all of the relevant factors into consideration at 
once, rather than engaging in a systematic evaluation of these factors.
7
 This is 
different from the ‘proportionality doctrine’, which is more structured and explicitly 
requires that all pertinent rights and interests at stake be thoroughly weighed and 
compared in a systematic and logical manner.
8
 The explicit introduction of the 
‘proportionality test’ to the field of international investment law will allow 
adjudicators to ground their analysis within a more formal and consistent framework, 
thereby encouraging a holistic assessment of the impact of regulatory interference.  
Although the proportionality doctrine is recognized in the surveyed jurisdiction, the 
degree in which the doctrine is actually applied varies. While the doctrine has long 
been established by the ECtHR, it has been borrowed and applied to case law by 
Thai courts from time to time. The doctrine is, however, an emerging concept in the 
United States and Mexico. In both countries, the doctrine has become a standard 
feature of constitutional analysis in the recent years. In the United States, where 
courts adhere to the balancing of interests and values when determining the existence 
of regulatory takings, the proportionality doctrine has recently been adopted in 
courts’ legal reasoning when analyzing the regulatory interference issues. 
Despite the variants of the application, the doctrine is not alien in the surveyed 
jurisdictions. Since the concept of proportionality is fairly recognized in the surveyed 
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jurisdictions, even in the United States,
9
 it emerges as a ‘general principle of law’ 
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT when the arbitral tribunals 
articulate the vague standards of protections under international investment treaties.  
To establish a common platform of legal analysis in international investment treaties, 
at least three basic questions commonly featured in courts’ jurisprudence should be 
referred by international arbitral tribunals when analyzing the compensable 
regulatory takings: first, the means must be necessary to serve the stated goal; 
second, the means must be suitable; and third, the regulatory interference must be 
proportionate to the goals that the state government wants to pursue.  
3. Procedural Law for Adjudicating on Proportionality 
If the proportionality doctrine is adopted as substantive law, then it will need 
procedures to hear and consider opinions of the contracting parties during the 
balancing process.
10
 As discussed in Chapter Nine, arbitral tribunals that have less 
political expertise, and are not embodied within local politics, should listen to 
domestic government and take into their account the means and goals pursued by the 
host state government in their balancing process of proportionality analysis. 
Although the legal outcome may still be unpredictable, the proportionality test is 
considered to be an ideal instrument with which to encourage the defendant to 
articulate the justification for the interference.  
Deference to decision-making bodies during the arbitration processes is not a new 
idea. Article 31 of the US Model BIT, for example, states that: 
1. Where a respondent asserts as a defense that the measure alleged to be a breach is 
within the scope of an entry set out in Annex I, II, or III, the tribunal shall, on request 
of the respondent, request the interpretation of the Parties on the issue. The Parties 
shall submit in writing any joint decision declaring their interpretation to the tribunal 
within 60 days of delivery of the request;  
2. A joint decision issued under paragraph I by the Parties, each acting through its 
representatives designated for purposes of this Article, shall be binding on the 
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This sample provision provides a good illustration of how the local political 
decision-making bodies of host state governments could participate in the process of 
proportionality analysis to ensure that the context and relative importance of public 
interests – a product of the socio-political settings within each specific country - will 
be properly taken into account. The involvement of decision-makers in the process 
would help to mitigate the risk of valid policies being undermined by ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals, which are often unfamiliar with the circumstances present within a specific 




C. A Proposed Legal Framework for Future International Investment 
Law on Indirect Expropriation 
Given the problems associated with the indeterminacy of indirect expropriation 
clauses, a new approach to review and identify compensable regulatory interference 
is greatly needed. A viable approach to developing a new model law is to adopt 
‘general principles of law’ employed by the domestic courts of the US, Thailand and 
Mexico, as well as the ECtHR.  
In relation to the notion of protected property rights and investments, the drafters 
might include a broad range of properties and interests in the possible model. 
However, the scope of protection should exclude certain property interests that are 
either a mere expectation or a speculation.    
To clarify the distinction between direct and indirect expropriation, the model law 
could use the standard proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). However, to promote predictability, the UNCTAD 
definitions of both direct and indirect expropriations could be improved upon. Based 
                                                 
11
 U.S. Department of State, above n 6, art 31. 
12
 Caroline Henckels, 'Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality 
Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration' (2012) 15(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 223, 250. 
319 
on the model proposed by UNCTAD, which is in line with the concept developed by 
courts within the jurisdictions surveyed here, there are two different types of state 
regulatory interference that are subject to state liability. First, a direct expropriation 
is the consequence of a measure that results in nationalization, or other modes of 
expropriation, through the formal transfer of title, or forfeiture. Second, an indirect 
expropriation is the consequence of a regulatory interference that has an effect 
tantamount to direct expropriation, but without a formal transfer of title, or the 
equivalent effect. A model text adopted by UNCTAD is suited well and should read 
as followed: 
Direct expropriation occurs when an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly 
expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure; 
Indirect expropriation occurs when a measure or series of measures by a Party has an 




In addition, the model law should set up some criteria to distinguish between a 
normal regulation and a compensable regulatory taking. The current regime of US 
Model BITs provides a wide exemption clause to exclude certain types of policy 
measures from expropriation liability. The 2012 US Model BIT, it sets out that:  
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.
14 
However, the proposed model exemption clause is not free from ambiguities and 
there is no clear threshold that identifies the circumstances in which regulatory 
interference is exempted from an indirect expropriation liability. Nevertheless, by 
applying the common principles found in our surveyed jurisdictions, key elements 
by which could be combined to form a proportionality test, to provide a coherent 
basis for legal interpretation by arbitral tribunals, can be formulated. Starting with 
the proposal prepared by UNCTAD and the US Model BIT, but adding criteria 
                                                 
13
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pertinent to the ‘proportionality doctrine, a model exemption clause to distinguish 
compensable from non-compensable regulatory takings might be formulated as 
follows: 
Except in rare circumstances, a measure which is adopted and applied for public 
purposes, adopted in good faith, on a non-discriminatory basis, and meets the 
proportionality requirements, is not an indirect expropriation subject to the duty to 
compensate. To determine the proportionality of a measure, the arbitral tribunal must 
examine: (i) the necessity of the measure, (ii) the suitability of the interference in 
relation to the policy goal; and (iii) any excessive burden resulting from the measure. 
To decide whether the measure imposes a disproportionate burden on the property 
owner, the arbitral tribunal has an obligation to consult with governmental decision-
making bodies in the contracting parties prior to making a final decision. Subject to 
the state’s margin of appreciation, the arbitral tribunal may award fair market value, or 
less than the fair market value, as compensation.
15
 
Articulated in this way, arbitral tribunals would be discouraged from acting 
unreasonably when either limiting a state’s sovereignty to regulate or protecting the 
property rights of foreign investors. To justifiably interfere with private property 
rights, a regulatory measure must be necessary, suitable to the goals pursued and not 
impose excessive burden on the property owner in a given case. Thus, arbitral 
tribunals should recognize the state’s margin of appreciation; but be able to intercept 
those measures that have an impact disproportionate to the alleged goals being 
pursued. 
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